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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the cross-sectional variation in the corporate governance 
practices and disclosures of corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia as documented in their 
annual reports and on the World Wide Web (WWW). Furthermore, it examines the impact 
of three institutional isomorphisms (coercive, mimetic, and normative) at the micro, meso, 
and macro level on corporate governance practices and disclosures by corporations in these 
two countries. 
Indonesia and Malaysia have different colonisation histories. Most notably, the nations 
had dissimilar paths to independence and distinctly different political climates since then. 
These contrasts may contribute to the disparate levels of corporate governance practices 
and disclosures in the two countries. A 2014 ADB report (ADB, 2014) has put Indonesia 
among the worst performers of corporate governance practices and disclosures in the 
Southeast Asia, and Malaysia among the best. 
This thesis uses an institutional theory lens to analyse these corporate governance 
practices and disclosures. According to institutional theory, the institutionalised corporate 
form may be explained through institutional isomorphism at three institutional determinant 
levels (Beattie, 2014; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Oliver, 1997). Therefore, this thesis 
analyses whether coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism at the micro, meso, and 
macro levels are associated with corporate governance practices and disclosures by 
corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The quality of the corporate governance practices of Indonesian corporations is found to 
be poorer than those of Malaysian corporations. However, the extent of corporate 
governance disclosures of Indonesian corporations both in their annual reports and on the 
WWW is very similar to that of Malaysian corporations. Furthermore, this thesis documents 
that the WWW is used as a complementary disclosure channel to the annual reports. 
Findings reveal that institutional isomorphisms at three levels are associated with the 
corporate governance practices of corporations in both countries. Significantly, institutional 
isomorphism at the micro level is only associated with corporate governance disclosures by 
Indonesian corporations in their annual reports. Furthermore, institutional isomorphisms at 
the meso and macro levels influence corporate governance disclosures in both the annual 
reports and on the WWW by corporations in both Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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It is concluded that institutional isomorphism at all three levels, micro, meso, and macro, 
is influential on corporate governance practice and disclosure improvements. This thesis 
provides empirical evidence on how coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and 
normative isomorphism at the micro, meso, and macro levels influence corporate 
governance practices and disclosures. For example, improvement in corporate governance 
practices and disclosures by corporations in Indonesia as a consequence of the new 
Indonesian administration’s reform agenda is traced and illustrated. This thesis shows that 
foreign-educated directors in Indonesian corporations are asserting best international 
practice to improve the corporate governance disclosures of Indonesian corporations. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis suggest that regulators in the two countries should 
continue to encourage corporations to use the WWW for corporate governance disclosure. 
In addition, this thesis also proposes that both corporations and regulators need to recognise 
the importance of micro, meso, and macro level influences on corporate governance 
practices and disclosures. 
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate governance practices, corporate governance 
disclosures, institutional isomorphism, coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, 
normative isomorphism, micro level, meso level, macro level                     
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis investigates the cross-sectional variation of the corporate governance 
practices and disclosures of Indonesian and Malaysian corporations in their annual reports 
and on the World Wide Web (WWW). The 1990s Asian financial crisis was the trigger for 
significant governance reform in Asia. The primary causes of the crisis have been attributed 
to poor corporate governance practices together with many institutional and policy 
weaknesses in Asia, including Southeast Asia (Das, 2001; Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro, 
2011; Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000). At that time, Asian corporations were 
strongly criticised for their low-quality disclosure practices, lack of transparency and inferior 
board practices (ADB, 2014; OECD, 2014). Following the financial crisis, there have been 
improvements in Asian corporate governance practices (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; 
Sawicki, 2009). Most Asian countries adopted codes of corporate governance practice 
which have been adapted from OECD-prescribed corporate governance principles and/or 
best practices in other countries (mostly following an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
model).  
This thesis focuses on the largest listed corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia. They 
are close neighboring countries, both having historically attracted European interest. 
Europeans first arrived in the regions which are now Indonesia and Malaysia only for trading 
purposes but later colonised them. Both nations have experienced quite different influences 
during their colonisation periods, including different colonising countries and approaches, 
different education and legal systems, different modes of cultural assimilation, different 
paths to independence, and different political ideologies post-independence. Armed conflict 
between them existed for a brief period following Malaysia’s independence, with the 
relationship improving and stabilising after a new administration gained power in Indonesia 
in 1965. Both countries achieved constant economic growth from the time of independency 
until the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  
The crisis led to both countries developing formal Codes of Corporate Governance which 
were introduced for the first time in 2000 (Alnasser, 2012; Daniel, 2003). Prior research 
documents similar business practices in the two states, for example, extensive family 
ownership and significant government ownership, (Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 2011; Globerman 
et al., 2011). However, different colonisation histories have led to diverse patterns of 
economic growth, legal systems, and political climates in both countries after independence. 
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This may have contributed to disparate levels of corporate governance practices and 
disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia. A 2014 report shows that Indonesia is among the 
poorest performers in corporate governance practices and disclosures in Southeast Asia 
and Malaysia is one of the best (ADB, 2014). The comparison of corporate governance 
practices and disclosures of these two countries provided in this thesis documents how 
institutional changes influence such practices and disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
This thesis applies institutional theory to analyse the institutional pressures in both 
nations. It provides an analysis of the impact of coercive isomorphism, mimetic 
isomorphism, and normative isomorphism at the micro, meso, and macro levels on 
corporate governance practices and disclosures. At the micro level, the impact of the 
international board on corporate governance practices and disclosures is analysed. Prior 
studies using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980) and Gray’s secrecy 
hypotheses (Gray, 1988) have found that the macro level culture has a significant impact on 
corporate practices. In contrast, Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Merchant, Chow, and Wu 
(1995) argue that the culture of influential individuals in a corporation has a greater impact 
than macro level culture. Using the foreign education of the board as a measure for culture 
at the micro level, this thesis investigates whether institutional isomorphism at the micro 
level determines corporate governance practices and disclosures. At the meso level, the 
impact of specific corporate characteristics on corporate governance practices and 
disclosures is explored and analysed. Finally, at the macro level, this research examines 
whether institutional changes at the country level have any significant impact on corporate 
governance practices and disclosures.  
This study finds that the quality of corporate governance practices of Indonesian 
corporations is poorer than those of Malaysian corporations with most Indonesian 
corporations not following recommended corporate governance practice. This finding 
indicates that regulators in Indonesia must actively educate Indonesian corporations on the 
importance of corporate governance. This study also finds that not all corporations in 
Indonesia and Malaysia follow all of the mandatory disclosures required by the regulations. 
Therefore, regulators in both countries need to strengthen their enforcement to ensure all 
corporations follow all the requirements. Another finding of this thesis also suggests 
regulators in both countries to encourage all corporations to use the WWW for corporate 
governance disclosures, as the usage of the WWW for corporate governance disclosures is 
still minimal.  
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Finally, this thesis finds that institutional pressures, at all levels, influence corporate 
governance practices and disclosures. Thus, corporations and regulators need to recognise 
the importance of micro, meso, and macro level influences on corporate governance 
practices and disclosures. The findings suggest that other developing countries facing 
similar issues in corporate governance should also pay attention to these institutional 
pressures to improve their corporate governance practices and disclosures. Previous 
research studies on corporate governance more generally and on corporate governance 
disclosures specifically are discussed in the following section. 
1.1. Corporate governance and corporate governance disclosures 
A commonly accepted broad definition of corporate governance is “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992, p. 15). Researchers have 
documented that the implementation of good corporate governance practices provides 
many benefits to corporations, such as the reduction of accounting fraud (Balachandran & 
Faff, 2015), higher stock liquidity (Chung, Elder, & Kim, 2010), higher corporate valuation 
(Durnev & Kim, 2005), reduction in corporate risk taking (Jiraporn, Chatjuthamard, Tong, & 
Kim, 2015; Zagorchev & Gao, 2015), reduction in likelihood of financial distress (Miglani, 
Ahmed, & Henry, 2015), and higher return on assets (Munisi & Randøy, 2013). 
According to the general guidelines on corporate governance issued by the OECD 
(OECD, 1999, 2004, 2015), corporate governance information should be disclosed through 
various media channels that provide equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant 
information by users. Increases in information disclosure about corporate governance 
improve the monitoring abilities of shareholders and corporate boards. Furthermore, 
improved corporate disclosure has been found to also be associated with increased share 
value and liquidity, decreased share volatility, increased credibility, decreased cost of 
capital, better governance, decreased information asymmetry, decreased agency costs, 
financial scandal avoidance and financial stability improvement (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & 
Walther, 2010; Eccles & Mavrinac, 1995; Farvaque, Refait-Alexandre, & Saïdane, 2011; 
Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Kothari, 2000).  
There have been several specific studies of corporate governance disclosures in Asia. In 
describing those made in the annual reports of companies from Indonesia and Nepal, 
Darmadi (2013) and Sharma (2014) find that such corporations provide a low level of 
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corporate governance information within the reports. However, their findings cannot be 
generalised for all Indonesian and Nepalese corporations because they only use a small 
sample of banking and financial corporations.  
Studies on corporate governance WWW disclosures have been conducted by Gandía 
(2008), Yabing Jiang, Raghupathi, and Raghupathi (2009), Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, 
and Stapleton (2012) and Stewart, Asha, Shulman, Ng, and Subramaniam (2012). These 
studies provide evidence that corporations find the WWW to be a useful channel for 
communication with stakeholders. While some of these studies only describe the corporate 
governance disclosure practices, others examine the determinants of those practices. The 
examination of determinants in these prior studies has been limited to a focus on the impact 
of specific corporation characteristics (for example corporate size, profitability, and 
leverage) and corporate governance characteristics (for example size of the board and 
CEO-chairman duality) on corporate governance disclosures. 
This thesis applies institutional theory to explain the corporate governance practices and 
disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia. The comparison between the Indonesian and 
Malaysian contexts is useful as the countries share both commonalities and differences in 
their history, culture and corporate structures. This theory posits that corporate practices, in 
this case including corporate governance and its disclosures, are influenced by the 
institutions in which corporations operate (Brammer, Jackson, & Matten, 2012). Typical of 
institutional theory is the position of Oliver (1997) who contends that corporations operate 
within norms and values that are appropriate or acceptable in a particular institution. 
Therefore, the institutional theory can be used to explain any disparity in corporate 
governance disclosure practices between these two countries. According to DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983), institutional isomorphism is the process of institutional homogenisation within 
the same environmental conditions. This can be categorised into three different kinds. This 
thesis explores the impact of these different institutional isomorphisms at the various 
institutional levels. A comparison is made between the two countries using the conceptual 
frame of the three forms of isomorphism at the three conceptual orders of its extent: the 
micro, macro and meso levels. 
First, this thesis considers whether coercive isomorphism at the macro level, derived from 
coercive authority and cultural expectations, determines corporate governance practices 
and disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia. The new administration and policy in Indonesia 
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since 2014 may explain the differences in corporate governance practice and disclosure by 
corporations in both countries. 
Second, this thesis examines the impact that mimetic isomorphism, derived from imitating 
other corporate practices, operating at the meso level, has on corporate governance 
practices and disclosures. Specifically, this is due to family and government ownership and 
corporate size. This approach is consistent with prior studies (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; 
Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Eng & Mak, 2003; S. S. M. Ho & Wong, 2001; Samaha 
et al., 2012), which have documented how these ownership characteristics and corporate 
size are significant determinants of corporate practices. 
Third, this thesis explores the effect of normative isomorphism, which involves normative 
pressures from professionals and exists at all three institutional levels. At the micro level, 
this research analyses the impact of an international board of directors on corporate 
governance practices and disclosures, using a foreign-educated board as a measure of 
culture at this level. While several researchers have found an association between the 
macro level culture of countries and corporate disclosures (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; 
Minichilli, Zattoni, Nielsen, & Huse, 2012; Van Veen & Elbertsen, 2008), it has also been 
suggested that culture plays a role at the micro level where the culture of influential 
individuals is important to a corporation (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Geletkanycz, 1997; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Merchant et al., 1995; Minichilli et al., 2012; Van Veen & 
Elbertsen, 2008). At the meso level, the good quality of corporate governance mechanisms 
provides normative pressure on corporate practices. This aspect is also examined in this 
thesis.  Finally, at the macro level, the differing board structures in the two countries (dual 
boards in Indonesia and a single board in Malaysia) also provide normative pressure on the 
corporations, which, in turn, influences corporate governance practices and disclosures. 
The impact of these disparate board structures is investigated in this thesis. 
1.2. Research objectives and contributions 
The first objective of this research is to document the corporate governance practices 
and disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia. The second objective is to examine whether 
coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism at the micro, 
meso, and macro levels are influential on corporate governance practices and disclosures 
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in Indonesia and Malaysia. In doing so, the research relies on institutional theory to explain 
these isomorphisms within a conceptual framework. 
Through the lens of institutional theory, this thesis contributes to the understanding of the 
corporate governance practices and disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia, where there is 
a lack of research in this area compared to developed countries. This thesis also highlights 
any differences between corporate governance disclosures in annual company reports and 
on the WWW in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
While prior research on the impact of culture has concentrated on the macro level, this 
thesis also investigates the importance of culture at the micro level through the proxy of 
foreign-educated directors, investigating whether this factor influences the corporate 
governance practices and disclosures of Indonesian and Malaysian corporations. Thus 
culture is conceived of as a construct influenced by the cultural context of the directors’ 
education. As foreign directors become more common, this research offers a contemporary 
perspective. 
1.3. Thesis structure 
This thesis is organised as follows. The following chapter sketches the institutional and 
historical background to Indonesia and Malaysia. The purpose Chapter 2 is to illustrate the 
different colonisation histories and corporate governance development histories in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. The chapter commences with illustration of political history and 
economic history of Indonesia and Malaysia. This is followed by corporate governance 
development in both countries. Chapter 2 concludes with a summary of the differences 
between the two countries and how the updated corporate governance-related regulations 
in Indonesia, as a result of the new administration, may assist Indonesia’s economy to 
perform better.  
Despite the limited research in corporate governance practices and disclosures in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, there is a large body of related literature investigating international 
corporate governance development and disclosures. This thesis considers studies of 
corporate governance development, corporate disclosures and corporate governance 
disclosures – both in the annual reports and on the WWW. These literatures are reviewed 
in Chapter 3. This chapter also discusses the UNCTAD corporate governance disclosure 
benchmark which is used to measure the extent of corporate governance disclosures in this 
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thesis. Furthermore, this chapter provides discussion of the corporate governance 
disclosure regulation in Indonesia and Malaysia. Chapter 3 concludes with a summary of 
the differences between the corporate governance model in Indonesia and Malaysia and 
the differences between their corporate governance disclosure requirements. 
Chapter 4 surveys prior research relevant to corporate governance practices and 
disclosures. Chapter 4 also develops hypotheses regarding the determinants of corporate 
governance practices and disclosures. Micro, meso, and macro level explanations are 
proposed within an institutional framework. The hypothesis at the micro level is based on 
the institutional isomorphism exercised by influential individuals in a corporation. 
Hypotheses at the meso level are based on the institutional pressures from other 
corporations. Furthermore, the hypothesis at the macro level is based on the institutional 
pressures from the government and different structures in Indonesia and Malaysia. Chapter 
4 also discusses the control variables used in this thesis.  
The research design, sample selection criteria, mode of data collection, specifications for 
the variables and the testing procedures are outlined in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 6 provides the results and analysis of all research models to find the 
determinants of corporate governance practice and disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
These results provide support for the hypotheses that institutional isomorphisms at micro, 
meso, and macro level are important determinants of the corporate governance practices 
and disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
This thesis concludes in Chapter 7 with a discussion of the contribution and limitations of 
this thesis as well as possible directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 Institutional Background 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Indonesia and Malaysia are countries located in Southeast Asia and share some 
commonalities and differences in their history, culture and corporate structures. Both regions 
attracted Europeans to populate the countries which were invaded solely for trading 
purposes. Before colonisation, the sultanates within what is now Indonesia actively traded 
with those in Malaysia. However, after the Dutch came, these trading activities were stopped 
as the main objective of the Dutch was to monopolise Indonesian trade. Both countries were 
subject to Dutch and British interests respectively, until these European nations, 
representing their corporate interests, agreed to a compromise in the Treaty of London in 
1824. It was then that they decided that the Dutch would colonise Indonesia and that the 
British would colonise Malaysia. This treaty also decided that the Dutch and the British would 
not invade each other’s colonies. A clear dividing line between the borders of Indonesia and 
Malaysia was drawn and this formed the basis for the current boundary between them.  
Apart from Indonesia and Malaysia being closely related geographically, both countries 
also share similarities culturally. During the mid to late nineteenth century, many migrants 
from Indonesia were regarded as Malays due to their similar socio-religious roots. 
Furthermore, the official language of both countries is similar, with the Indonesian language 
being a modernised form of Malay.  
However, some key differences exist regarding culture and education. During 
colonisation, a limited proportion of the Indonesian population was able to attend the Dutch 
schools, and a few of the Malaysians were able to attend the British ones. The differences 
between Dutch schooling (including its tertiary education in the Netherlands) and British 
schooling (including its tertiary education in Britain) may have had an impact on current 
business practices in both countries. Furthermore, previous literature (Hooker, 2003) has 
documented that while most of the Malaysian immigrants to Indonesia were unified culturally 
with the Indonesian locals, cultural assimilation and intermarriage was comparatively rare in 
Malaysia. Additionally, other languages (i.e. English, Chinese, and Tamil) are commonly 
used in Malaysia while in Indonesia Bahasa Indonesia is the main official language, with 
numerous local dialects also spoken. 
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Both countries have had different paths to independence. Indonesia achieved its 
independence in 1945 after the Japanese surrendered in the Pacific War. However, it took 
four more years of war and negotiation before the Dutch finally transferred sovereignty to 
Indonesia. In Malaysia, the process to achieve independence was rather peaceful, with the 
British agreeing to hand over Malaysian independence in 1957. The Indonesian government 
at the time regarded Malaysian independence as a neo-colonialist plot and therefore 
decided to attack Malaysia. Indonesia halted all trading with Malaysia as well as other 
Western countries due to its anti-colonialist ideology (C. Brown, 2003; Liow, 2005). In 
contrast, at that point, Malaysian foreign policy was strongly inclined to the West due to its 
relationships with the British and the Commonwealth. The peace agreement between 
Indonesia and Malaysia in 1966 was signed after Indonesia’s new administration took office. 
The new government also resumed trading with Malaysia and other countries, including the 
West. Following this period, both countries experienced healthy economic growth until the 
1997 Asian financial crisis (Basri & Hill, 2008). 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis significantly affected both countries, with Indonesia 
requiring financial aid from the IMF. Indonesia was among the worst countries impacted by 
the crisis and the last to recover. The commitment to the International Monetary Fund urged 
Indonesia to increased awareness of corporate governance. In 2000, they issued the first, 
which has been amended several times since. Meanwhile, Malaysia did not receive any 
financial aid but understood the importance of corporate governance and also issued its first 
code in 2000, also since amended several times (Alnasser, 2012; Singam, 2003).  
This chapter aims to discuss the development of both countries in several periods as 
depicted in the following timelines. The first two figures depict the political history in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, and the next two illustrate the economic history in these two 
countries. Both periods of colonisation are discussed in the following section.  
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Figure 2.1. The political history of Indonesia. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. The political history of Malaysia. 
 
 
 
 
1602 1811 1816 1824 1942 1945 1949 1965 1966 1998 1999 2001 2004 2014
Colonisation period 
Post-independence parochial period
Foreign policy with international and local balance period
Political history events:
1 Dutch came to Indonesia 4 Treaty of London 7 The Dutch agreed to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia
2 British captured Indonesia 5 The Dutch surrendered to the Japanese 8 New administration (president)
3 British handed back Indonesia to Dutch 6 Indonesia declared its independence 9 Peace agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia
8 8 8 86 7 98 83 41 2 5
1786 1824 1942 1945 1957 1966 1970 1976 1981 2003 2009
Colonisation period 
Post-independence Western-focus period
Foreign policy with international and local balance period
Political history events:
1 British came to Malaysia 4 British forces landed in Malaysia and organised a military administration 7 New administration (PM)
2 Treaty of London 5 Official handover date (independence of Malaysia)
3 Japanese forces landed in Malaysia 6 Peace agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia
7 7 7 7 71 2 3 4 5 6
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Figure 2.3. The economic history of Indonesia.  
Note: * Gross Domestic Product based on The World Bank Data in current USD (for more details, please see Figure 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7). 
  ** Inward Foreign Direct Investment stock based on UNCTAD Data in current USD (for more details, please see Figure 2.19). 
 
 
 
 
1602 1811 1816 1824 1942 1945 1949 1962 1963 1965 1966 1968 1972 1990 1991 1997 1998 1999 2001 2004 2006 2009 2014 2016
Colonisation period 
Post-independence parochial period
Foreign policy with international and local balance period
Political history events:
1 Dutch came to Indonesia 4 Treaty of London 7 The Dutch agreed to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia
2 British captured Indonesia 5 The Dutch surrendered to the Japanese 8 New administration (president)
3 British handed back Indonesia to Dutch 6 Indonesia declared its independence 9 Peace agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia
Economic history events:
10 Trading suspension with Western countries 18 Asian financial crisis
11 Period of GDP growth less than 3% (1962 to 1967) 19 Negative GDP growth*
12 Trading suspension with Malaysia 20 GDP growth less than 1%*
13 New administration opened trading with foreign countries 21 GDP hits USD 300 bn*
14 Period of good GDP growth (1968 to 1984), mostly with more than 7% growth each year 22 IFDI stock Indonesia surpassed Malaysia**
15 GDP hits USD 10 bn* 23 IFDI stock hits USD 100 bn**
16 GDP hits USD 100 bn* 24 Market capitalisation of Indonesian listed domestic companies surpassed Malaysia
17 IFDI stock hits USD 10 bn**
8 8
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Figure 2.4. The economic history of Malaysia.   
Note: * Gross Domestic Product based on The World Bank Data in current USD (for more details, please see Figure 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7). 
  ** Inward Foreign Direct Investment stock based on UNCTAD Data in current USD (for more details, please see Figure 2.19). 
1786 1824 1942 1945 1957 1961 1966 1970 1976 1981 1990 1997 1998 2003 2009 2010 2012
Colonisation period 
Post-independence Western-focus period
Foreign policy with international and local balance period
Political history events:
1 British came to Malaysia 4 British forces landed in Malaysia and organised a military administration 7 New administration (PM)
2 Treaty of London 5 Official handover date (independence of Malaysia)
3 Japanese forces landed in Malaysia 6 Peace agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia
Economic history events:
8 Period of good GDP growth (1961 to 1984), mostly with more than 7% growth each year 13 Asian financial crisis
9 The New Economic Policy 14 Negative GDP growth*
10 GDP hits USD 10 bn* 15 GDP hits USD 300 bn*
11 'Malaysia is able' slogan 16 IFDI stock hits USD 100 bn**
12 The National Development Policy; IFDI stock hits USD 10 bn**
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2.2. Colonisation period 
Pre-colonisation trade networks connected Indonesia to the world, including Malaysia, 
even though the sultanates in Malaysia did not collectively comprise Indonesia’s major 
trading partner. The arrival of the Dutch cut off the Indonesians’ trade networks and regular 
contacts with the outside Indonesia due to the Dutch intention to monopolise trade (Liow, 
2005; Maddison, 1989; Sukoharsono & Gaffikin, 1993). Colonisation history and the 
education and culture of migrants during colonisation are discussed in the following sections. 
2.2.1. Colonisation history in Indonesia 
The Dutch initially came to Indonesia in 1602 solely concerned with trade under a trading 
company named the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) later becoming a 
regional administrator by force (C. Brown, 2003). Following the collapse of the VOC in 1799, 
resulting from the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, the Dutch government took over administration 
in Indonesia. In 1806, the Netherlands fell to Napoleon Bonaparte. This event changed 
colonisation practices in Indonesia as the appointed Governor-General of Indonesia wanted 
to modernise the colonial administration and eliminate forced labour and forced deliveries 
(C. Brown, 2003). During the short period of 1811 to 1816, the British took over part of 
Indonesia and followed the same general principles as the Dutch Governor-General: the 
abolition of forced labour and forced deliveries. However, as a result of the ending of the 
Napoleonic wars and the reassertion of Dutch independence, in 1816, the British handed 
back to the Netherlands the territory they had briefly controlled in Indonesia. Furthermore, 
in 1824 Britain and the Netherlands negotiated the Treaty of London. This treaty drew a 
clear dividing line between the interests of the British and the Dutch in Southeast Asia. As a 
result of this treaty, the Dutch controlled what came to form Indonesia and the British 
controlled what is now called Malaysia. 
As the Dutch regained their power over Indonesia in 1816, the colonialist practices in 
Indonesia reverted to those of the pre-1806 period. They did not believe they could achieve 
the greatest net return by eliminating forced labour and forced deliveries. The Dutch 
surrendered to the Japanese in March 1942. Benda (1966) has documented that the Dutch 
exercised constant repression which caused damaging psychological wounds to the 
Indonesian people. However, the Japanese colonisation was much harsher and more 
restrictive than that of the Dutch. On 15 August 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allies (with 
the British Commonwealth and Netherlands forming part of this group). The surrender 
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agreement with Japan required them to maintain the political status quo in Indonesia until 
Allied forces could land and reestablish an administration. Indonesia declared its 
independence on 17 August 1945 after Indonesia unofficially informed the Japanese and 
agreed not to intervene. It required four more years of brutal fighting, negotiations, and UN 
mediation before the Netherlands agreed to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949 (C. 
Brown, 2003). 
2.2.2. Colonisation history in Malaysia 
The British first came to Malaysia in 1786 under the auspices of the British East India 
Company who took formal possession of Penang in the name of King George III to develop 
it as a port and as a British base for the company (Hooker, 2003; Yamada, 1971). This was 
conducted through direct negotiation with local leaders, which was completely different to 
the process of the Dutch who had taken Indonesia by force. In 1824, Britain and the 
Netherlands negotiated the Treaty of London, in which a clear dividing line was drawn 
between the interests of both countries, establishing the basis for the current Indonesia-
Malaysia border. This treaty used the Straits of Malacca as a boundary line. During 1786 to 
1873, the British used Malaysia as their trade base and the British government refused to 
accept responsibility for colonial rule in Malaysia (Yamada, 1971). Eventually, in 1874 British 
colonial rule started, mainly to protect their trading interest in Malaysia from outside 
intervention. British colonialism in Malaysia is completely different from the Dutch 
colonialism in Indonesia, the latter being characterised by forced labour and delivery 
practices for its entire period.  
The Japanese landed in Malaysia on 8 December 1941 and took possession of Malaysia 
from the British. Their administration was even tougher than the Dutch, particularly in terms 
of their forced labour practices for Japanese projects. The Japanese surrendered on August 
1945. 
Unlike Indonesia which declared its independence as soon as the Japanese surrendered, 
the Japanese were able to maintain the political status quo in Malaysia until September 
when the British forces landed. The British then organised a military administration until April 
1946. The civilian government was restored afterward, and in July 1946 Malaysian leaders 
agreed to work with the British to discuss a constitution for Malaysia.  
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In 1952, high commissioner General Sir Gerald Templer announced that Malaysia was 
being prepared for self-government under the condition that they can maintain racial 
harmony and control communist terrorism (Hooker, 2003). In early 1956, Malaysian leaders 
held talks with the British to determine a date for their independence and discussed the 
establishment of a constitutional commission. The British finally agreed to 31 August 1957 
as the official handover date in a peaceful independence process without any conflict or 
violence, unlike the case in Indonesia. The British delivered good infrastructure and an 
efficient government mechanism for Malaysia, far more than what the Dutch had provided 
in Indonesia (Menon, 2009; Zeeman, 2012). Yazid (2014) also contends that the better 
political stability and conditions in Malaysia are influenced by the peaceful separation from 
the British and the existence of a dominant pro-West political group. 
2.2.3. Education and culture of migrants during colonisation in Indonesia 
The majority of schools in Indonesia during colonisation used either Bahasa Indonesia or 
the local language, not Dutch. Bahasa Indonesia, the official language of Indonesia, is a 
modernised form of Malay. Only a slight number of Indonesian children, mostly Christians 
or those from wealthy families, were permitted to attend Dutch language primary schools, 
which opened up the possibility of their entering Dutch language secondary schools and 
universities either in the Netherlands or Indonesia (C. Brown, 2003). 
There was some cultural osmosis between Indonesian culture and Dutch culture as it was 
common for Dutch men to take Indonesians as their mistresses or wives in the 1700s. 
However, in the 1800s the Dutch who came to Indonesia usually brought their families. They 
saw Indonesia as a place to make money and then return home. Thus, there was little 
cultural mingling during this period as the Dutch had no intention of residing in Indonesia in 
the long-term and not interested in learning about the Indonesian culture (C. Brown, 2003). 
Similar to the Dutch migrants, the first Chinese migrants were also strongly acculturated 
with Indonesia as the majority of early Chinese migrants were male. By the beginning of the 
20th century, there was a gender balance in the Chinese, so Chinese tended to form their 
own community and tended to marry exclusively within it. The result was that the majority of 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia developed a distinctive local culture. The census conducted by 
the Dutch in 1930 showed that around 66 percent of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia spoke no 
Chinese language at all. 
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2.2.4. Education and culture of migrants during colonisation in Malaysia 
In contrast to Indonesia, minimal scholarships were offered to exceptional commoners in 
Malaysia to attend the elite British schools (Hooker, 2003). However, most of the students 
in these schools came from affluent families. Graduates from these were able to continue 
their tertiary education in Britain, where many of them became Anglicised and lost contact 
with their Malaysian culture. They returned to Malaysia to work as civil servants, business 
people, and politicians. 
Chinese and Indians migrated to Malaysia during the mid-to-late 19th century. During the 
same period, there were also many migrants from Indonesia. However, because the socio-
religious organisations of Indonesian migrants were recognisably similar with those of 
Malays, they were regarded as Malays. Unlike Indonesia where cultural assimilation of 
migrants is quite common, this is not the case in Malaysia. Intermarriage and cultural 
assimilation was comparatively rare, which may be explained by the geographical spread of 
migrant residences (Hooker, 2003). Furthermore, as Hooker (2003) stated, religious and 
cultural barriers to intermarriage are an accepted practice in Malaysia and became the basis 
for its modern pluralised society. Even though the official language of Malaysia is Malay, 
other languages (for example English, Chinese, and Tamil) are commonly used. 
2.3. Post-independence parochial period  
Prior to the Dutch transfer it sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, the businesses in Indonesia 
were heavily dominated by Dutch-owned companies. The first administration was anti-
colonialist and anti-Western. With its main aim of restoring national identity, Indonesia 
decided to nationalise these companies despite the absence of a clear strategic vision about 
how to move forward (C. Brown, 2003; Verhezen & Abeng, 2016). Indonesia suspended all 
trading to Western countries and with Malaysia after late 1963, as the administration 
deemed Malaysia to be neo-colonialist (Dick, 2016). These events led to severe economic 
decline and inflation during the first administration. The relationship between Indonesia and 
Malaysia deteriorated following Malaysian independence. The Indonesian political and 
military elite at that time believed that true Malaysian independence would never be granted. 
Furthermore, Malaysia’s foreign policy at that point involved strong relations with Britain and 
the Commonwealth. This made the Indonesian leadership believe that Malaysia 
independence was merely a new form of colonialism (Liow, 2005). At that time, the 
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Indonesian first president used the slogan ‘crush Malaysia’ and sent armed forces to attack 
it. 
2.4. Post-independence Western-focussed period 
Foreign companies were heavily dominated by Britain interests in Malaysia at the time of 
its independence in 1957 (Puthucheary, 1960). Gomez (2004) explains that the Malaysian 
government was reluctant to control such companies’ dominance as they expected these 
could resist the emergence of ethnic Chinese businesses in Malaysia. Furthermore, 
Malaysia’s strong Western focus in its foreign policy at that time contributed to close relations 
with Britain and the Commonwealth (Liow, 2005). In 1971, Malaysia implemented the New 
Economic Policy, a positive discriminative policy to help develop Bumiputera (ethnic Malay) 
businesses and to eradicate poverty. While Indonesia suffered during its post-independence 
parochial period, Malaysia enjoyed good economic growth during the Malaysian post-
independence Western-focussed period, with their GDP growth from 1961 to 1981 
exceeding seven percent each year. 
2.5. Period of foreign policy with an international and local balance 
From 1981 onwards, foreign policy emerged to balance international and local interests. 
In Malaysia, there has not been much political shift during this later period, indeed since 
1981, all Malaysian Prime Ministers have come from the same political party. The 2017 
Prime Minister, Najib Razak, assumed office in 2009 and has governed Malaysia for nine 
consecutive years.   
In comparison, Indonesia has experienced a major political shift since 1998. The 1998 
Asian Financial Crisis ended 32 years of Soeharto’s authoritarian rule. Following his 
resignation, the then vice president, B. J. Habibie briefly assumed the presidential role until 
1999. During his short tenure, he was able to reform Indonesia towards democracy and 
oversaw some of its most significant changes post-independence (Pohlman, 2010). 
Abdurrahman Wahid succeeded B. J. Habibie, but was impeached in 2001 and then 
replaced by the then vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri. Megawati’s administration led 
Indonesia to its first direct presidential election in 2004. The Indonesian political landscape 
is arguably more stable during S. B. Yudhoyono’s era than previous times. He was president 
for two five-year terms, despite his three predecessors’ relatively short tenures in office.  
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Even though Indonesia opened up international trading relations following the post-
independence parochial period, this has had its ups and downs. As Basri and Hill (2008) 
state: “there has been a strong anti-globalisation sentiment in the public policy debates since 
the economic crisis of 1997–98” (p. 1404). Basri and Hill (2010) explain that this sentiment, 
which dates back to the colonisation period, had worsened during the 1998 Asian financial 
crisis because of the excessive conditionality in the IMF rescue packages. Despite this 
sentiment, Basri and Hill (2010) contend that the Indonesian level of regional and global 
engagement has been rising. 
President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, succeeded S. B. Yudhoyono in 2014. 
Previously the mayor of a local district in Central Java from 2005 to 2012, and governor of 
Jakarta from 2012 to 2014, his background differed from those of his predecessors. 
Transparency and good governance were recognised as strengths during his tenure in these 
earlier positions (Fukuoka & Djani, 2016; Muhtadi, 2015; Warburton, 2016). He showed his 
commitment to transparency and good governance by launching a series of deregulation 
and de-bureaucratisation policies, particularly designed to attract foreign investment. The 
improvements in this area, among others, have led to Indonesia’s credit rating being 
upgraded for the first time to investment grade by the top three credit rating agencies. While 
Fitch Ratings upgraded it in December 2016, Moody’s and S&P raised it in February 2017 
and May 2017 respectively (Y. Ho & Salna, 2016; Salna, 2017; Suroyo, 2017). 
The announcement of Jokowi’s nomination as a presidential candidate was made in 
March 2014, after which polls indicated that he would win (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). These 
proved to be correct. He was officially announced as president-elect in July 2014 and 
assumed office in October 2014.  
2.5.1. Legal system 
Indonesia and Malaysia have adopted different legal systems. The basis of private law in 
Indonesia has been the Dutch Civil Code of 1848. The French heavily influenced the codified 
laws as a result of French occupancy of the Netherlands during the Napoleonic wars 
(Juwana et al., 2005; Laiman, Reni, Lengkong, & Ardiyanto, 2015). In Malaysia, most of the 
British laws were adopted before independence. The application of common law is specified 
in the Civil Act Law 1956. Malaysian law is also modeled on other jurisdictions’ laws, 
particularly as a member of the Commonwealth (Ahmad, 2014; Noordin & Supramaniam, 
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2016). Prior research (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) asserts that 
common law provides the strongest legal protections for investors. 
2.5.2. Economic development in Indonesia 
On the 11th August 1966, one year following the new administration in Indonesia, a peace 
agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia was signed. This new government opened up 
trade relations with the Western countries and Japan, which had been halted by the previous 
administration’s focus on Indonesian national identity and its anti-Western stance even 
though this led to worse economic conditions (Liow, 2005; Wulandari & Rahman, 2004). 
Indonesia has been independent longer than Malaysia and with the Malaysian foreign policy 
strongly inclined to Western countries until 1981, Indonesia is also more culturally 
independent. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 summarise the history of both countries from the 
colonisation period until now. 
Indonesia’s second president governed for over three decades. Although many cited this 
era as marred by a dictatorial and corrupt government, various domestic and international 
investors saw this administration provide the security and stability necessary for investor 
confidence. Contrasting with the first administration this government opened up to Western 
investment, Western trading and foreign aid which led to economic growth up to 1996 
(Cheah & Cheah, 2003; Liow, 2005; Wulandari & Rahman, 2004). Exports of natural 
resources and primary commodities contributed to such economic growth. This 
administration ended in May 1998 following the resignation of the second president, who 
was under public pressure during the Asian financial crisis. Unfortunately, Indonesia was 
among the last countries to recover and the worst affected in Asia (M. F. Islam, 2001), which 
was caused by the Indonesian government’s inability to keep up with globalisation (Maksum 
& Bustami, 2013). 
Following the second president’s resignation, the country started some institutional 
reform. Many researchers acknowledge the smooth transition from decades of authoritarian 
rule to democracy (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014; Kingsbury, 2015) and this reform was one of 
the key contributors to the Indonesian economy after the Asian financial crisis (Dutu, 2016). 
Even though inefficient bureaucracy and corruption are still considered the two most 
problematic factors for investment in Indonesia, a more democratic administration has 
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managed to provide political stability post-1998 (Verhezen, Soebagjo, & Hardjapamekas, 
2016).  
The current President Jokowi, who assumed office in 2014, has been praised for his 
concern for infrastructure development, deregulation and de-bureaucratisation (Aspinall & 
Mietzner, 2014; Muhtadi, 2015; Park, 2016; Warburton, 2016; Yusuf & Sumner, 2015). 
These policies are designed to cut red tape, attract foreign investment and accelerate 
infrastructure projects (Warburton, 2016).  
Many researchers argue that his agenda arises from his different background compared 
with predecessors (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014; Fukuoka & Djani, 2016; Fukuoka & Thalang, 
2014; Mietzner, 2015; Muhtadi, 2015; Tapsell, 2015; Warburton, 2016). First, Jokowi is the 
first Indonesian president who came to office through local politics. According to Aspinall 
and Mietzner (2014), this would have been impossible during the authoritarian era. Second, 
he is also the first Indonesian president with prior experience in business (Warburton, 2016). 
Thus, this may lead to a more market-oriented and open approach to investment and 
economic development. The current deregulation and de-bureaucratisation policies are 
argued to have a heavy emphasis on attracting foreign investment and have become the 
underlying feature of the current administration’s economic strategy (Park, 2016). Third, he 
is also arguably the first president with no ties to old politics nor originating from a political 
dynasty, whether military or bureaucratic (Fukuoka & Thalang, 2014; Mietzner, 2015). 
Fukuoka and Djani (2016) and Muhtadi (2015) explain that many researchers believe the 
post-1998 government to be controlled by oligarchic forces who were part of the old regime. 
As the current president has no ties to old politics, these oligarchic forces have less control 
than before. 
The current administration aims to reach its 7% economic growth target in 2018 (Crosby, 
2016). Analysts also expect that Indonesia will be the seventh largest economy in the world 
by 2030 (Oberman, Dobbs, Budiman, Thompson, & Rosse, 2012). In purchasing power 
parity terms, Indonesia is expected to be the fifth largest economy in the world in 2030 and 
the fourth largest economy in 2050 (Hawksworth & Chan, 2015). The following graphs 
provide data of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capita and GDP growth of 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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Figure 2.5. Graph of GDP of Indonesia and Malaysia from 1967 to 2015, in current US dollars. 
Source: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/.  
 
 
Figure 2.6. Graph of GDP per capita of Indonesia and Malaysia from 1967 to 2015, in current US 
dollars. 
Source: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/.  
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Figure 2.7. Graph of annual GDP growth of Indonesia and Malaysia from 1961 to 2015, in percent. 
Source: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/.  
 
 
2.5.3. Economic development in Malaysia 
The New Economic Policy introduced in 1970 was replaced by the National Development 
Policy in 1990. This policy focused on the creation of wealth for the Bumiputeras (Menon, 
2009). During the new administration of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 1981, which 
was critical of a pro-West foreign policy, Malaysia adopted a proactive and nationalistic 
foreign policy to reconstruct Malaysian identity and created the nationalist slogan ‘Malaysia 
is able’ (Liow, 2005). This ensured the rapid development of Bumiputera business in 
Malaysia at that time. The different background of this Prime Minister, who did not attend 
tertiary education in Britain and was not from the traditional Malay ruling class, contributed 
to this new foreign policy (Hooker, 2003). Even though this administration adopted a 
nationalistic foreign policy, it did not close itself to foreign investment or foreign trading 
(Menon, 2009).  
The new government in 1981 also called for an acceleration of Bumiputera business. 
During this term, the Malaysian stock exchange increased significantly and was the highest 
market capitalisation to GDP in Southeast Asia and the fifteenth largest in the world (Gomez, 
2004). During this period, a lot of huge Bumiputera and a few large non-Bumiputera publicly 
listed companies emerged which were owned by Malays who had a real connection with the 
government. However, with the 1997 Asian financial crisis, most of these politically well-
connected companies dropped off the list of the largest 100 Malaysian companies.  
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Similar to other Southeast Asian countries, excluding Singapore, corruption is a problem 
in Malaysia. The current allegations against the Prime Minister, who is also the son of the 
second Prime Minister and the nephew of third Prime Minister, may affect the credibility of 
the government which in turn threatens Malaysian economic growth and goals (Crosby, 
2016; Verhezen, Williamson, Soebagjo, & Crosby, 2016). Despite this, in its Vision 2020, 
Malaysia’s target is to be a fully developed country with an 800% increase in its 1990 GDP 
by that year (Mohamad, 1991). 
2.5.4. Trading between Indonesia and Malaysia  
Following Indonesia’s new administration in 1965, an active foreign economic policy was 
emphasised as Indonesia quickly resumed its trade relations with other Western or Western 
oriented countries including with Malaysia (Liow, 2005). The following graph shows bilateral 
trading between Indonesia and Malaysia from 1989 to 2014 (in USD). The trading fluctuated 
as Indonesia was several times a net exporter to Malaysia and also a net importer from 
Malaysia. However, the trading position in the last three years (2012 to 2014) shows that 
Indonesia has recently been a net importer from Malaysia. 
 
Figure 2.8. Graph of bilateral trading between Indonesia and Malaysia from 1989 to 2014, in current 
US dollars. 
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, www.comtrade.un.org/data.  
 
2.5.5. Trading with other countries 
The two biggest trading partners of the Southeast Asian countries are the ‘other’ 
Southeast Asian countries and China (Crosby, 2016; Verhezen, Williamson, et al., 2016). 
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Trading with the US and European countries is less prominent than with China, especially 
after China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001. For both Indonesia and Malaysia, 
China and Singapore are always in the top three trading partners, both for exports and 
imports, Japan being the other. 
The top export destination based on its export value from Indonesia as at 2014 was 
Japan, followed by China and Singapore; while from Malaysia this was Singapore, China, 
and Japan, in that order, with the US in the fourth position for both countries for the same 
time. The following graphs show export activities from Indonesia and Malaysia to these four 
countries from 1989 to 2014. 
 
Figure 2.9. Graph of Indonesian export from 1989 to 2014, in current US dollars. 
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, www.comtrade.un.org/data.  
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Figure 2.10. Graph of Malaysian export from 1989 to 2014, in current US dollars. 
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, www.comtrade.un.org/data.  
 
 
If, in terms of the value of export activities, the ranks of the top three trading partners for 
Indonesia and Malaysia were different; in import activities, these were the same. China, 
Singapore, and Japan respectively were the biggest exporters to Indonesia and Malaysia 
based on import value as at 2014. Korea was the fourth largest exporter to Indonesia and 
was the sixth to Malaysia. The US was the fourth largest exporter to Malaysia and also to 
Indonesia. The following graphs show Indonesian and Malaysian import activities from 1989 
to 2014. 
 
 
Figure 2.11. Graph of Indonesian import from 1989 to 2014, in current US dollars. 
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, www.comtrade.un.org/data.  
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Figure 2.12. Graph of Malaysian import from 1989 to 2014, in current US dollars. 
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, www.comtrade.un.org/data. 
 
2.5.6. Education 
Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia used the Indonesian language as the national 
language. In 1966, the Indonesian government banned Chinese schools, Chinese cultural 
associations, Chinese publications, the usage of Chinese language, and instructed all ethnic 
Chinese to change their names to Indonesian names (Suryadinata, 1984). This situation 
totally contrasted with Malaysia, where the majority of Malaysians actively speak their 
national language and other languages, including English and Chinese (Darmi & Albion, 
2013). Despite the banning of Chinese language in Indonesia, the English language has 
been officially taught in Indonesian schools since 1967.  
Malaysia also gradually converted English and Chinese schools to national schools in 
1970. However, the English language is still taught as a second language in primary and 
secondary schools (Darmi & Albion, 2013). Following this policy, there was a decline in 
English language competence among Malaysians and the government tried to reintroduce 
English as a medium of instruction for science and mathematics in primary and secondary 
schools in 2003 (Stephen, 2013). Furthermore, the Malaysian government acknowledged 
the importance of English language in globalisation and implemented the ‘Strengthening 
English’ program from 2011. 
In terms of government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP, and 
government expenditure per tertiary student as a percentage of GDP per capita, the 
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government expenditure in  Malaysia is higher than in Indonesia. Even so, Indonesia is able 
to constantly increase its percentage of tertiary students to gross enrolments. Figure 2.13, 
2.14, and 2.15 provide these data. 
 
Figure 2.13. Government expenditure on education as percentage of GDP. 
Source: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/topic/education. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Government expenditure per tertiary student as percentage of GDP per capita. 
Source: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/topic/education. 
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Figure 2.15. Percentage of gross enrolment ratio of tertiary students 
Source: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/topic/education. 
 
In regard to the internationalisation of higher education in both countries, Malaysia had 
its first foreign university opening in 1998. In Indonesia, there are no foreign universities to 
date. In order to improve the higher education level of its citizens, Malaysia started to provide 
national scholarships to study in Malaysia or abroad since 1970. In Indonesia, this type of 
national scholarship has been available for academics since 2008 and for all Indonesians 
since 2012. Indonesia also paid less attention to the internationalisation of its research 
output, this has always been below Malaysia’s since 1996. The following figure shows a 
comparison of the international research outputs of Indonesia and Malaysia. 
 
Figure 2.16. International research output of Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Source: http://scimagojr.com/countryrank.php?.  
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2.5.7. Capital market development and investment 
The Malaysian stock exchange was established in 1960 and had 181 listed companies in 
1980. The Indonesian stock exchange originally opened in 1912 under the Dutch colonial 
government as a branch of the Amsterdam stock exchange and was closed several times 
during World Wars I and II. It reopened in 1977 (Daniel, 2003; Jaswadi, 2013; Wulandari & 
Rahman, 2004) and in 1980 there were only six listed companies . As at 2016, there were 
still more listed companies in the Malaysian stock exchange however, the market 
capitalisation of listed domestic companies in Indonesia in 2016 was higher than in Malaysia. 
The following graphs report the market capitalisation of listed domestic companies in both 
countries. 
 
Figure 2.17. Graph of number of listed companies in Indonesian and Malaysian stock exchange 
from 1980 to 2016. 
Source: World of Federation Exchanges database, http://www.world-exchanges.org/home/.  
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Figure 2.18. Graph of the market capitalisation of listed domestic companies in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, in current millions USD. 
Source: World of Federation Exchanges database, http://www.world-exchanges.org/home/.  
 
 
Indonesia experienced an increase in foreign direct investment inward stock in late 2000. 
This explains the significant jump in market capitalisation of listed domestic companies in 
Indonesia. Since then foreign direct investment inward stock of Indonesia has been higher 
than Malaysia. Figure 2.19 provides comparative data from 1990 to 2015. Tambunan (2013) 
explains that the Indonesian government seeks to reform its investment policies and 
regulations as one of the largest contributors to the overall increase of investment in 
Indonesia. He also adds that Indonesia suffered relatively mild effects from the global 
financial crisis in 2008 due to fewer ties to multinational value chains. 
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Figure 2.19. Graph of foreign direct investment inward stock of Indonesia and Malaysia from 1990 
to 2015, in current millions USD. 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016, 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx.  
 
 
2.5.8. Corporate governance development 
Corporate governance is critical, especially in a country that is transitioning from a 
national economy to a global economy (Kidd & Richter, 2003). Johnson et al. (2000) 
documented alleged incidents of corporate crime in Indonesia and Malaysia during the Asian 
financial crisis due to poor corporate governance practices. In Malaysia, the chairman of 
one corporation used company funds to pay off his personal debts. In Indonesia, managers 
diverted corporate funds to finance a political party.  
Furthermore, Dearden (2003) explains that aid donors can contribute to the improvement 
of corporate governance in developing countries. In Indonesia, the commitment to the 
International Monetary Fund, as the country’s major lender following the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, is driving the country’s commitment to corporate governance development. This crisis 
wiped out almost a decade of extraordinary economic growth in East Asia and was caused 
by poor governance, corruption, and cronyism in the region (Gan, 2003). The following 
figures provide a comparison on several indicators for Indonesia and Malaysia. The graphs 
show the improvement of voice and accountability scores, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism scores, rule of law scores, and control of corruption scores in Indonesia 
over years. Furthermore, figure 2.26 to 2.28 show similar cultural values of Indonesia and 
Malaysia. 
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Figure 2.20. Graph of voice and accountability scores of Indonesia and Malaysia from 1996 to 
2015. 
Source: WGI website, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. These scores 
are estimation of governance, ranges approximately from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to 
2.5 (strong governance performance). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.21. Graph of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism scores of Indonesia and 
Malaysia from 1996 to 2015. 
Source: WGI website, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. These scores 
are estimation of governance, ranges approximately from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to 
2.5 (strong governance performance). 
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Figure 2.22. Graph of government effectiveness scores of Indonesia and Malaysia from 1996 to 
2015. 
Source: WGI website, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. These scores 
are estimation of governance, ranges approximately from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to 
2.5 (strong governance performance). 
 
 
Figure 2.23. Graph of regulatory quality scores of Indonesia and Malaysia from 1996 to 2015. 
Source: WGI website, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. These scores 
are estimation of governance, ranges approximately from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to 
2.5 (strong governance performance). 
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Figure 2.24. Graph of rule of law scores of Indonesia and Malaysia from 1996 to 2015. 
Source: WGI website, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. These scores 
are estimation of governance, ranges approximately from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to 
2.5 (strong governance performance). 
 
 
Figure 2.25. Graph of control of corruption scores of Indonesia and Malaysia from 1996 to 2015. 
Source: WGI website, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. These scores 
are estimation of governance, ranges approximately from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to 
2.5 (strong governance performance). 
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Figure 2.26. Graph of Hofstede’s national culture scores of Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Source: Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) 
 
 
Figure 2.27. Graph of GLOBE’s cultural practice scores of Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Source: House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004) 
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Figure 2.28. Graph of GLOBE’s cultural value scores of Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Source: House et al. (2004) 
 
2.5.8.1. Indonesia 
Indonesia established the National Committee for Corporate Governance in 1999 to 
formulate, design and recommend corporate governance policies and prepare a code for 
good corporate governance. In 2004, this committee’s name was changed to the National 
Committee on Governance. The committee published the first code for good corporate 
governance in 2000, and this was subsequently amended in 2001 and 2006. In general, this 
code is consistent with the OECD principles of corporate governance. The 2006 code of 
good corporate governance contains eight parts: ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework, good corporate governance principles, business ethics 
and code of conduct, organs of the company, rights and role of shareholders, rights and role 
of other stakeholders, implementation statement of the code and general guidelines of good 
corporate governance implementation (National Committee on Governance, 2006). A new 
company law was introduced in 2007 prescribing the specific duties of board members. 
There are five good corporate governance general principles in the code: transparency, 
accountability, responsibility, independence, and fairness. The transparency principle calls 
the company to provide easily accessible information for stakeholders. The accountability 
principle calls for a transparent and fair assessment of business performance, and the 
responsibility principle requires the company to comply with all laws and regulations and 
fulfill its responsibility to the communities and environment. An independent management of 
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the company with the appropriate balance of power is the principle of independence, and 
the fairness principle reminds a company to consider all of their stakeholders fairly in 
conducting its activities (National Committee on Governance, 2006). Table 2.1 provides 
code provisions of each principle of Indonesia’s code of good corporate governance. 
As a civil law country, Indonesia applies the dual board structure which consists of the 
management board and the supervisory board. The management board role is similar to 
management under the unitary board system, and the supervisory board role is similar to 
the board of directors under the single board system (Gul & Tsui, 2004; Wulandari & 
Rahman, 2004). It is argued that Indonesia ran the first application of the dual board 
structure in the world when the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie established its 
supervisory board during Dutch colonisation (Jaswadi, 2013). This event happened in 1632, 
which was then followed by the introduction of the dual board structure in France and 
Germany at the beginning of the 19th century. The listing rule of the Indonesian stock 
exchange requires a minimum of 30% of the independent supervisory board to ensure the 
effectiveness of its oversight function. Furthermore, Indonesian Company Law 2007 also 
states that supervisory boards have the right to suspend the board of directors and could 
assume a management role during a specific time frame. 
 
Principles Code Provisions 
Transparency A company must provide timely, appropriate, clear, accurate and comparable information 
accessible to stakeholders that are commensurate with their rights. 
Information disclosed includes but is not limited to the vision, mission, business targets 
and strategy, financial condition, composition and compensation of the management, 
controlling shareholders, shares owned by members of the Board of Directors and the 
Board of Commissioners and its family members in a company and other companies, risk 
management system, oversight and internal control system, GCG structure and 
mechanism and its level of compliance, and important events that may affect the condition 
of a company. 
The transparency principle adopted by a company does not lessen its obligation for 
fulfilling provisions on confidentiality in accordance with laws and regulations, 
occupational confidentiality, and personal rights. 
Company policies must be formally written and proportionally communicated to 
stakeholders. 
Accountability A company must clearly define the job description and responsibilities of each company 
organ and all employees that are in line with the vision, mission, values, and strategy of 
a company. 
A company must ensure that all company organs and all employees shall have the 
qualifications that fit its duty, responsibility, and role in the implementation of GCG. 
A company must ensure the existence of an effective internal control system within a 
company. 
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A company must have performance indicators for all members of the Board of Directors 
and the Board of Commissioners as well as the employees that are consistent with the 
company’s objectives, and have a reward and punishment system. 
In executing its duty and responsibility, each organ of a company and all employees must 
uphold to the business ethics and an agreed upon code of conduct. 
Responsibility The organs of a company must be prudent in decision making and in its actions, and 
ensure compliance with laws and regulations, its articles of association and bylaws. 
A company must fulfill its social responsibility by having, inter alia, an awareness of the 
environmental and societal interests of the communities in which the company operates 
through appropriate planning and implementation to address the issues. 
Independency Each company’s organ must avoid the occurrence of domination by any party, must not 
be influenced by any certain interest, must be free from conflict of interests and any 
influence or pressure, so that the decision making can be carried out objectively. 
Each company’s organ must exercise its function and duty in accordance with the articles 
of association and rules and regulations, not dominating each other and or shifting the 
responsibility from one to the other. 
Fairness A company must provide the opportunity for stakeholders to give input and opinions in 
the interest of a company, and establish access to the company’s information in 
accordance with the transparency principle and within the scope of their respective 
capacities. 
A company must provide a fair and equitable treatment to stakeholders in accordance 
with the benefit and contribution given to the company. 
A company must give equal opportunity in recruitment of employees, in career 
development and for employees to carry out their duty professionally. 
Table 2.1. Principles and code provisions of good corporate governance in Indonesia 
Source: Indonesia’s code of good corporate governance (National Committee on Governance, 
2006) 
 
 
Principles Recommendations 
Enhance the value of 
General Meeting of 
Shareholders (GMS) 
Publicly listed companies have technical procedures in place for voting to ensure 
independence and the interest of shareholders. 
All member of the management board and supervisory board must be present at 
the annual GMS. 
Summary of the minutes of the annual GMS must be available on publicly listed 
companies’ websites for at least one year. 
Increase 
communication quality 
with shareholders or 
investors 
Publicly listed companies have a communication policy in place to communicate 
with shareholders or investors. 
Publicly listed companies disclose their communication policy with shareholders 
or investors on companies’ websites. 
Strengthen structure 
and composition of 
supervisory board 
Determination of number of members of the supervisory board must consider the 
condition of publicly listed companies. 
Determination of composition of members of the supervisory board must take into 
account expertise, knowledge and experience diversity. 
Increase quality of 
execution of duties and 
responsibilities of 
supervisory board 
The supervisory board has a self-assessment policy to assess their performance. 
Self-assessment policy to assess supervisory board performance must be 
disclosed in the annual report. 
The supervisory board has a policy regarding the resignation of its member 
involved in financial crime. 
Supervisory board or committee in charge of nomination and remuneration 
functions arranges a succession policy regarding the nomination process of 
members of the management board. 
Determination of the number of management board members must consider the 
condition of publicly listed companies and its effectiveness in decision making. 
39  
Strengthen structure 
and composition of 
management board 
Determination of composition of members of management board must consider 
expertise, knowledge and experience diversity. 
Members of management board in charge of accounting or finance functions must 
have the expertise and/or knowledge in accounting. 
Increase quality of 
execution of duties and 
responsibilities of 
management board 
Management board has a self-assessment policy to assess their performance. 
Self-assessment policy to assess management board performance must be 
disclosed in the annual report. 
Management board has a policy regarding the resignation of its member involved 
in financial crime. 
Increase corporate 
governance aspects 
through participation of 
stakeholders 
Publicly listed companies have policy to prevent insider trading. 
Publicly listed companies have anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies. 
Publicly listed companies have a policy regarding vendor selection. 
Publicly listed companies have a policy regarding fulfillment of creditor rights. 
Publicly listed companies have a whistleblowing system policy. 
Publicly listed companies have a long-term incentive policy for the management 
board and employees. 
Increase disclosure of 
information 
Publicly listed companies utilise information technology beyond websites as 
media for the disclosure of information. 
Annual reports of publicly listed companies disclose the ultimate shareholders of 
publicly listed companies that own at least 5% of company shares and also 
disclose the ultimate owners of major shareholders and controlling shareholders. 
Table 2.2. Principles and recommendations for corporate governance for publicly listed companies 
in Indonesia 
Source: Indonesian Financial Services Authority (2015a) 
 
Furthermore, following his appointment, President Jokowi showed his concern over this 
area by implementing two new regulations. One was related to disclosures of listed 
companies on the corporate websites (Indonesian Financial Services Authority, 2015b), and 
another concerned regulation of the corporate governance of listed companies (Indonesian 
Financial Services Authority, 2015a). The first rule appeared in June 2015 and the later one 
in November 2015. These complement the regulations of annual reports of listed companies 
and the code of corporate governance. 
The regulations of corporate governance for publicly listed companies were issued on 17 
November 2015. There are eight principles and 25 recommendations for good corporate 
governance application. The difference between these regulations and the 2006 code of 
good corporate governance is that the former only applies to publicly listed companies, and 
the regulation applies the “comply or explain” approach. Table 2.2 provides details of these 
regulations. 
2.5.8.2. Malaysia 
Similar to other countries affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the issue of corporate 
governance practices and recommendations in Malaysia emerged following this crisis. The 
development of corporate governance in Malaysia did not influenced by other parties, such 
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as the International Monetary Fund in the case of Indonesia, as Malaysia did not receive 
financial aid from donors during the crisis (Gomez, 2004; M. F. Islam, 2001). Instead, this 
reform was driven by the government’s belief that weak corporate governance was the most 
significant factor in the crisis and corporate governance improvement was necessary for 
company restructuring (Alnasser, 2012). 
In their effort to establish best corporate governance practices and setting best practices 
for Malaysian companies, a high level finance committee was formed in 1998. This 
committee adopted principles of corporate governance and best practices of corporate 
governance from the OECD, the ADB, the World Bank, the United Kingdom, Australia and 
other common law and non-common law countries (Singam, 2003). However, according to 
Salim (2011) and Mallin (2013), corporate governance regulation in Malaysia draws largely 
from Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems or, more specifically, from UK corporate 
governance.  
The committee introduced the first code of corporate governance in 2000, and since then 
this has been revised in 2007 and 2012. Malaysia has been applying a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach since 2000, as required by its first code of corporate governance. The focus of the 
code revision both in 2007 and 2012 was on board structure, role and committees 
(Securities Commission Malaysia, 2012). While the 2000 code consisted of four principles 
and 13 recommendations, this was enhanced in the 2012 code which included eight 
principles and 26 recommendations. The following tables provide detail on the Malaysian 
code on corporate governance 2000 and 2012. 
 
Principles Recommendations 
Directors Every listed company should be headed by an effective board which should lead 
and control the company. 
The board should include a balance of executive directors and non-executive 
directors (including independent non-executives) such that no individual or small 
group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision making. 
The board should be supplied in a timely fashion with information in a form and of 
a quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties. 
There should be a formal and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
directors to the board. 
All directors should be required to submit themselves for re-election at regular 
intervals and at least every three years. 
Directors’ 
remuneration 
Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract and retain the directors 
needed to run the company successfully. The component parts of remuneration 
should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance, in the case of executive directors. In the case of non-executive 
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directors, the level of remuneration should reflect the experience and level of 
responsibilities undertaken by the particular non-executives concerned. 
Companies should establish a formal and transparent procedure for developing 
policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of 
individual directors. 
The company’s annual report should contain details of the remuneration of each 
director. 
Shareholders Companies and institutional shareholders should each be ready, where 
practicable, to enter into a dialogue based on the mutual understanding of 
objectives. 
Companies should use the annual general meeting (AGM) to communicate with 
private investors and encourage their participation. 
Accountability 
and audit 
The board should present a balanced and understandable assessment of the 
company’s position and prospects. 
The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard 
shareholders’ investment and the company’s assets. 
The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for maintaining 
an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditors. 
Table 2.3. Principles and recommendations of Malaysian code on corporate governance 2000 
Source: Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (2000) 
 
Principles Recommendations 
Establish clear 
roles and 
responsibilities 
The board should establish clear functions reserved for the board and those delegated to 
management. 
The board should establish clear roles and responsibilities in discharging its fiduciary and 
leadership functions. 
The board should formalise ethical standards through a code of conduct and ensure its 
compliance. 
The board should ensure that the company’s strategies promote sustainability. 
The board should have procedures to allow its members access to information and advice. 
The board should ensure it is supported by a suitably qualified and competent company 
secretary. 
The board should formalise, periodically review and make public its board charter. 
Strengthen 
composition 
The board should establish a Nominating Committee which should comprise exclusively 
non-executive directors, a majority of whom must be independent. 
The Nominating Committee should develop, maintain and review the criteria to be used in 
the recruitment process and annual assessment of directors. 
The board should establish formal and transparent remuneration policies and procedures 
to attract and retain directors. 
Reinforce 
independence 
The board should undertake an assessment of its independent directors annually. 
The tenure of an independent director should not exceed a cumulative term of nine years. 
Upon completion of the nine years, an independent director may continue to serve on the 
board subject to the director’s re-designation as a non-independent director. 
The board must justify and seek shareholders’ approval in the event it retains as an 
independent director, a person who has served in that capacity for more than nine years. 
The positions of chairman and CEO should be held by different individuals, and the 
chairman must be a non-executive member of the board. 
The board must comprise a majority of independent directors where the chairman of the 
board is not an independent director. 
Foster 
commitment 
The board should set out expectations on the time commitment for its members and 
protocols for accepting new directorships. 
The board should ensure its members have access to appropriate continuing education 
programmes. 
Uphold 
integrity in 
financial 
reporting 
The Audit Committee should ensure financial statements comply with applicable financial 
reporting standards. 
The Audit Committee should have policies and procedures to assess the suitability and 
independence of external auditors. 
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Recognise and 
manage risks 
The board should establish a sound framework to manage risks. 
The board should establish an internal audit function which reports directly to the Audit 
Committee. 
Ensure timely 
and high 
quality 
disclosure 
The board should ensure the company has appropriate corporate disclosure policies and 
procedures. 
The board should encourage the company to leverage on information technology for 
effective dissemination of information. 
Strengthen 
relationship 
between 
company and 
shareholders 
The board should take reasonable steps to encourage shareholder participation at general 
meetings. 
The board should encourage poll voting. 
The board should promote effective communication and proactive engagements with 
shareholders. 
Table 2.4. Principles and recommendations of Malaysian code on corporate governance 2012 
Source: Securities Commission Malaysia (2012) 
 
2.6. Summary 
Despite the differing history of both countries during key colonisation periods and the 
distinct ways that both countries achieved their independence, both are performing well 
economically, particularly after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The introduction of a 
corporate governance code in both countries following the crisis has helped them to recover 
from the Asian financial crisis’s impact, and both survived the 2008 global financial crisis. 
While the two had a very different path to independence and distinctly different political 
climates since then, both are now firmly on a path of economic and political reform which 
will likely drive economic growth for them both. The updated corporate governance-related 
regulations and code in Indonesia may assist Indonesia’s economy to perform better, 
particularly in attracting foreign investment, as expected by its current president. The 
following chapter discusses corporate governance, corporate disclosures, and corporate 
governance disclosures. Chapter 3 also discusses the different corporate governance 
models existing in Indonesia and Malaysia, and also outlines the UNCTAD corporate 
governance disclosure benchmark. This disclosure benchmark is the measure of corporate 
governance disclosure used in this thesis. Chapter 3 also further compares this benchmark 
to the mandatory and voluntary disclosures made in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the relevant literature on corporate governance, corporate 
disclosures, and corporate governance disclosures and the development of corporate 
governance codes by the OECD and leading countries. Two corporate governance models 
are highlighted: the insider model (also known as the Continental European model) and the 
outsider model (also known as the Anglo-Saxon model). Corporate governance in Indonesia 
is closer to the Continental European model whereas in Malaysia is closer to the Anglo-
Saxon model. This difference is due to the fact that Indonesia’s legal origins are French, and 
Malaysia’s legal origins are Anglo-Saxon (OECD, 2001). Furthermore, two corporate 
governance mechanisms also discussed: internal and external. The difference between 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms is whether these mechanisms are 
internal to the corporation or external to the corporation. 
The literature on corporate disclosure in annual reports and on the WWW is presented. 
The last section of this chapter outlines the UNCTAD corporate governance disclosures 
benchmark. In this thesis, this benchmark is used to construct corporate governance 
disclosure measures. Finally, the benchmark is compared to the mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures made in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
3.2. Corporate governance 
3.2.1. Corporate governance development 
The term ‘corporate governance’ gained prominence in the early 1980s (Tricker, 2009, 
2012). Tricker explains that corporate governance issues arise when the owners of a 
corporation put someone else in charge of its operation. The early debate over the 
separation of ownership and control started in 1827 when Adam Smith, in his book “An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, offered his perspective on this 
issue: 
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
44  
private copartnery watch over their own. … Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs 
of such a company. (Smith, 1827, p. 311).  
Berle and Means (1932) documented the growing trend of more powerful managers of 
corporations’ daily operations, due to the increasing number and geographic spread of 
shareholders. A series of international corporate scandals and the evidence of abuse of 
directors’ powers in the 1980s led to the emergence of ‘corporate governance’ as an 
important issue. Drexal Burnham Lambert (the US), Robert Maxwell Group plc and Coloroll 
(the UK), Rothwells Ltd (Australia), and Nomura Securities (Japan) are a few of the 
companies involved. These improprieties forced regulators to reassess how corporations 
were directed and directors held accountable. 
The Cadbury Report was issued in 1992 in the UK. It provided a definition of corporate 
governance and set out the role of directors and shareholders: 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors 
and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance 
structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the 
company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, 
supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on 
their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the 
shareholders in general meetings. (Cadbury, 1992, p. 15). 
However, it is important to note that there is no universally accepted definition of corporate 
governance due to diverse perspectives (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015; du 
Plessis, Hargovan, & Bagaric, 2011). The Cadbury Report was soon followed by other 
significant reports issued across the world, as summarised in the following table. 
Report  Country Year 
Cadbury Report UK 1992 
Strictly Boardroom Australia 1993 
King Report I South Africa 1994 
Greenbury Report UK 1995 
Viénot Report I France 1995 
TSX Corporate Governance Guidelines Canada 1995 
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Report  Country Year 
Netherlands Report Netherlands 1997 
Statement on Corporate Governance US 1997 
Hampel Report UK 1998 
UK Combined Code UK 1998 
Strictly Boardroom, second edition Australia 1998 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance - 1999 
Turnbull Report UK 1999 
Viénot Report II France 1999 
Myners Report UK 2001 
Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance Culture Canada 2001 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act US 2002 
Updated Statement on Corporate Governance US 2002 
King Report II South Africa 2002 
The Corporate Governance of Listed Corporations France 2003 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations 
Australia 2003 
Corporate Governance Guideline Canada 2003 
Higgs Report UK 2003 
Smith Report UK 2003 
Tyson Report UK 2003 
Revised UK Combined Code UK 2003 
NYSE Corporate Governance Rules US 2003 
The Dutch Corporate Governance Code Netherlands 2003 
Corporate Governance Principles New Zealand 2003 
Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance - 2004 
Myners Report UK 2004 
Revised Turnbull Report UK 2005 
Revised UK Combined Code UK 2006 
Revised UK Combined Code UK 2008 
Myners Report UK 2008 
Revised Smith Report UK 2008 
Revised Dutch Corporate Governance Code Netherlands 2008 
Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations France 2008 
Walker Review UK 2009 
King Report III South Africa 2009 
UK Corporate Governance Code UK 2010 
Stewardship Code UK 2010 
NYSE Commission on Corporate Governance Report US 2010 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations with 2010 
Amendments 
Australia 2010 
Revised Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations France 2010 
Davies Report I UK 2011 
Davies Report II UK 2012 
Revised UK Corporate Governance Code UK 2012 
AFEP-MEDEF Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations France 2013 
Revised Corporate Governance Guideline Canada 2013 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 3rd Edition Australia 2014 
G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance - 2015 
Revised Dutch Corporate Governance Code Netherlands 2016 
Code de Gouvernement d'Entreprise des Sociétés Cotées France 2016 
Table 3.1. Selected worldwide corporate governance report and code development  
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Even though many countries had developed corporate governance guidelines by the mid-
1990s, another series of corporate scandals arose in the early 2000s. The largest and most 
infamous corporate failure being Enron in the US. The oddity in Enron’s case was that the 
corporation collapsed amid claims of fraud and directors’ abuses despite the fact that most 
corporate governance guidelines had been followed by the company (Tricker, 2012). Early 
2000 scandals also include WorldCom (the US), Marconi (the UK), HIH Insurance 
(Australia), Parmalat (Italy), and Vodafone Mannesmann (Germany), among others. There 
have been rapid changes in corporate governance practices internationally following these 
events (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Zalewska, 2014). This revolution in corporate 
governance practices and structures has occurred across all jurisdictions covering a range 
of models, including the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European models.  
The differences in corporate governance practices and regulations between countries can 
be attributed to the diversity of control structures, corporate governance reform periods and 
enforcement levels (Al-Malkawi, Pillai, & Bhatti, 2014; Al Farooque, van Zijl, Dunstan, & 
Karim, 2007; Kim & Lu, 2013; Martynova & Renneboog, 2011). There are conflicting views 
as to whether specific corporate governance models may be best suited for different 
countries (Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2009; Globerman et al., 2011; Khanna, 2000). 
The implementation of sound corporate governance has been found to improve corporate 
performance. Examples are the improvement of financial information timeliness, reduction 
of accounting fraud, higher transparency in reporting (Balachandran & Faff, 2015), higher 
stock liquidity (Chung et al., 2010), higher corporate valuation, higher growth opportunities 
(Durnev & Kim, 2005), reduction of corporate risk taking (Jiraporn et al., 2015; Zagorchev & 
Gao, 2015), reduction of financial distress likelihood (Miglani et al., 2015), and higher return 
on assets (Munisi & Randøy, 2013). In short, “good corporate governance is important to 
companies and it does add value and makes a difference” (du Plessis et al., 2011, p. 42).  
In Asia, significant corporate governance reform was triggered by the 1990s Asian 
financial crisis. Many commentators contend that this crisis was primarily caused by poor 
corporate governance practices, institutional weaknesses, and policy weaknesses (Das, 
2001; Globerman et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002). Furthermore, low-quality 
disclosure practices, lack of transparency, and ineffective board practices were commonly 
found in Asian corporations at that time (ADB, 2014; OECD, 2014). In Indonesia, corporate 
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governance reform was largely driven by pressures from the International Monetary Fund 
as the country’s major donor to develop a corporate governance code. Although Malaysia 
did not receive any financial aid during the crisis, its leaders similarly realised that corporate 
governance improvement was necessary. Corporate governance development in Indonesia 
and Malaysia has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
The following sections discuss corporate governance principles developed by the OECD, 
the US, the UK, and corporate governance systems. This review includes the OECD in the 
discussion as it has designed corporate governance principles to assist countries in 
developing their corporate governance codes. The US and the UK are included as both 
countries have well-developed capital markets and corporate governance.  
3.2.2. OECD corporate governance development 
The OECD is an international organisation that was established in 1961 to mitigate 
economic and social problems in the world. At first the OECD consisted of 18 European 
countries, the United States, and Canada. While this has grown to 35 countries at present, 
most are developed countries. Among its most successful policies are models for tax 
conventions on income and on capital, and principles of corporate governance (OECD, 
2011). 
The OECD first published its principles of corporate governance in 1999, amending these 
in 2004 and 2015. G20 leaders endorsed its latest version of the principles at their 2015 
summit. The 1999 OECD principles of corporate governance were the first initiative by an 
international organisation to develop the main elements of corporate governance (OECD, 
1999). As such, they can be used by governments, both OECD member and non-member 
countries, as a benchmark for related corporate governance regulations of publicly listed 
corporations in their country. There are five principles of corporate governance in these 1999 
principles: the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, and the responsibilities 
of the board.  
The OECD added one principle in their 2004 OECD principles of corporate governance 
(related to ensuring an effective framework) as well as altering some recommendations 
(OECD, 2004). From 2014 to 2015, the OECD conducted a review of the 2004 OECD 
principles of corporate governance which resulted in the G20/OECD principles of corporate 
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governance to maintain and strengthen transparency, accountability, the responsibilities of 
the board, the right of shareholders, and the role of key stakeholders (OECD, 2015). The 
following table summarises the G20/OECD principles of corporate governance. 
 
Principles Recommendations 
Ensuring the basis 
for an effective 
corporate 
governance 
framework 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and fair 
markets, and the efficient allocation of resources. It should be consistent 
with the rule of law and support effective supervision and enforcement. 
The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view to 
its impact on overall economic performance, market integrity and the 
incentives it creates for market participants and the promotion of 
transparent and well-functioning markets. 
The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance 
practices should be consistent with the rule of law, transparent and 
enforceable. 
The division of responsibilities among different authorities should be 
clearly articulated and designed to serve the public interest. 
Stock market regulation should support effective corporate governance. 
Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the 
authority, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and 
objective manner. Moreover, their rulings should be timely, transparent 
and fully explained. 
Cross-border co-operation should be enhanced, including through 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements for exchange of information. 
The rights and 
equitable treatment 
of shareholders and 
key ownership 
functions 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights and ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. 
Basic shareholder rights should include the right to: 
1. Secure methods of ownership registration. 
2. Convey or transfer shares. 
3. Obtain relevant and material information on the corporation on a timely 
and regular basis. 
4. Participate and vote in general shareholder meetings. 
5. Elect and remove members of the board. 
6. Share in the profits of the corporation. 
Shareholders should be sufficiently informed about, and have the right to 
approve or participate in, decisions concerning fundamental corporate 
changes such as:  
1. Amendments to the statutes, or articles of incorporation or similar 
governing documents of the company. 
2. The authorisation of additional shares.  
3. Extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially 
all assets that in effect result in the sale of the company. 
Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and 
vote in general shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, 
including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder meetings: 
1. Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely information 
concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well 
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as full and timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the 
meeting. 
2. Processes and procedures for general shareholder meetings should 
allow for equitable treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures 
should not make it unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes. 
3. Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the 
board, including questions relating to the annual external audit, to 
place items on the agenda of general meetings, and to propose 
resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations. 
4. Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance 
decisions, such as the nomination and election of board members, 
should be facilitated. Shareholders should be able to make their views 
known, including through votes at shareholder meetings, on the 
remuneration of board members and/or key executives, as applicable. 
The equity component of compensation schemes for board members 
and employees should be subject to shareholder approval. 
5. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and 
equal effect should be given to votes whether cast in person or in 
absentia. 
6. Impediments to cross border voting should be eliminated. 
Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to 
consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights 
as defined in the Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse. 
All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally. 
Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to 
obtain a degree of influence or control disproportionate to their equity 
ownership should be disclosed. 
1. Within any series of a class, all shares should carry the same rights. 
All investors should be able to obtain information about the rights 
attached to all series and classes of shares before they purchase. Any 
changes in economic or voting rights should be subject to approval by 
those classes of shares which are negatively affected. 
2. The disclosure of capital structures and control arrangements should 
be required. 
Related-party transactions should be approved and conducted in a 
manner that ensures proper management of conflict of interest and 
protects the interest of the company and its shareholders. 
1. Conflicts of interest inherent in related-party transactions should be 
addressed. 
2. Members of the board and key executives should be required to 
disclose to the board whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of 
third parties, have a material interest in any transaction or matter 
directly affecting the corporation. 
Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in 
the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, 
and should have effective means of redress. Abusive self-dealing should 
be prohibited. 
Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient 
and transparent manner. 
1. The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate 
control in the capital markets, and extraordinary transactions such as 
mergers, and sales of substantial portions of corporate assets, should 
be clearly articulated and disclosed so that investors understand their 
rights and recourse. Transactions should occur at transparent prices 
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and under fair conditions that protect the rights of all shareholders 
according to their class. 
2. Anti-takeover devices should not be used to shield management and 
the board from accountability. 
Institutional 
investors, stock 
markets, and other 
intermediaries 
The corporate governance framework should provide sound incentives 
throughout the investment chain and provide for stock markets to function 
in a way that contributes to good corporate governance. 
Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their 
corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their 
investments, including the procedures that they have in place for deciding 
on the use of their voting rights. 
Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in line with the directions 
of the beneficial owner of the shares. 
Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose how 
they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of 
key ownership rights regarding their investments. 
The corporate governance framework should require that proxy advisors, 
analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others that provide analysis or 
advice relevant to decisions by investors, disclose and minimise conflicts 
of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice. 
Insider trading and market manipulation should be prohibited and the 
applicable rules enforced. 
For companies who are listed in a jurisdiction other than their jurisdiction 
of incorporation, the applicable corporate governance laws and 
regulations should be clearly disclosed. In the case of cross listings, the 
criteria and procedure for recognising the listing requirements of the 
primary listing should be transparent and documented. 
Stock markets should provide fair and efficient price discovery as a means 
to help promote effective corporate governance. 
The role of 
stakeholders in 
corporate 
governance 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in 
creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual 
agreements are to be respected. 
Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
Mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop. 
Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they 
should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a 
timely and regular basis. 
Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative 
bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal 
or unethical practices to the board and to the competent public authorities 
and their rights should not be compromised for doing this. 
The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an 
effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of 
creditor rights. 
Disclosure and 
transparency 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and 
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and 
governance of the company. 
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Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 
1. The financial and operating results of the company. 
2. Company objectives and non-financial information. 
3. Major share ownership, including beneficial owners, and voting rights. 
4. Remuneration of members of the board and key executives. 
5. Information about board members, including their qualifications, the 
selection process, other company directorships and whether they are 
regarded as independent by the board. 
6. Related party transactions. 
7. Foreseeable risk factors. 
8. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
9. Governance structures and policies, including the content of any 
corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is 
implemented. 
Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high 
quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial reporting. 
An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and 
qualified, auditor in accordance with high-quality auditing standards in 
order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and 
shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial 
position and performance of the company in all material respects. 
External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a 
duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of 
the audit. 
Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely 
and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users. 
The responsibilities 
of the board 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic 
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the 
board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders. 
Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with 
due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the 
shareholders. 
Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, 
the board should treat all shareholders fairly. 
The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account 
the interests of stakeholders. 
The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
1. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk 
management policies and procedures, annual budgets and business 
plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation and 
corporate performance; and overseeing major capital expenditures, 
acquisitions and divestitures. 
2. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices 
and making changes as needed. 
3. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing 
key executives and overseeing succession planning. 
4. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term 
interests of the company and its shareholders. 
5. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election 
process. 
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6. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of 
management, board members and shareholders, including misuse of 
corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions. 
7. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial 
reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that 
appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for 
risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance 
with the law and relevant standards. 
8. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on 
corporate affairs. 
1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of nonexecutive 
board members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks 
where there is a potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key 
responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial 
reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board 
members and key executives, and board remuneration. 
2. Boards should consider setting up specialised committees to support 
the full board in performing its functions, particularly in respect to audit, 
and, depending upon the company’s size and risk profile, also in 
respect to risk management and remuneration. When committees of 
the board are established, their mandate, composition and working 
procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board. 
3. Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to 
their responsibilities. 
4. Boards should regularly carry out evaluations to appraise their 
performance and assess whether they possess the right mix of 
background and competences. 
In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access 
to accurate, relevant and timely information. 
When employee representation on the board is mandated, mechanisms 
should be developed to facilitate access to information and training for 
employee representatives, so that this representation is exercised 
effectively and best contributes to the enhancement of board skills, 
information and independence. 
Table 3.2. The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
Source: OECD (2015) 
 
3.2.3. The United States corporate governance development 
In the United States, corporations are regulated by the company law of the state in which 
they are incorporated and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC hereafter) 
regulations and rules mandated by stock exchanges (Mallin, 2013; Tricker, 2012). Another 
regulation that is related to corporate governance in the United States is the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002. 
One of the first regulations related to corporate governance in the United States is the 
requirement for US publicly listed companies to create an audit committee. The SEC 
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mandated this requirement in 1972. The main objective of this audit committee is to ensure 
that the board of directors is fully informed of the issues arising between an external auditor 
and the corporation’s accounting and finance department. 
The first statement on corporate governance in the United States was produced by the 
US Business Roundtable in 1997 and updated in 2002 (Tricker, 2012). This statement listed 
guiding principles of good corporate governance, which includes responsibility of the board 
of directors, the responsibility of management, the responsibility of external auditor, and 
responsibility to its employees. This statement on corporate governance emphasised the 
importance of fair financial statements and how corporations ensure the fairness of their 
financial statements by hiring an independent external auditor. This focus on the fairness of 
financial statements was the result of the Enron and WorldCom financial scandals in early 
2000. 
The US Congress also responded to those scandals by issuing the Accounting Industry 
Reform Act 2002, or also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (Mallin, 2013). Similar to 
the statement on corporate governance issued by the Business Roundtable, the main focus 
of this act was also on the fairness of financial statements. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires 
chief executive officers and chief financial officers to certify that quarterly and annual reports 
of corporations are fully compliant with all regulations and present fair financial statements. 
Furthermore, the act was also aimed  at strengthening the independence of the external 
auditor and audit committee. In response to this act, the SEC also issued regulations related 
to the rotation of audit partners and prohibited non-audit services to be provided by the 
external auditor to their audit clients.  
Following this 2002 law, the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market 
proposed new rules on corporate governance which the SEC approved in November 2003. 
Their focus includes the responsibility of the board of directors, the importance of 
independent directors, the importance of board committees, and disclosures of corporate 
governance guidelines and charters of corporate board committees. 
3.2.4. The United Kingdom corporate governance development 
The United Kingdom produced the first corporate governance report issued by a nation 
in 1992, the Cadbury Report, and has since produced more reports than another country 
(Tricker, 2012). The Cadbury Report emphasised the importance of independent non-
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executive directors, CEO-chairman separation, and the importance of board committees. 
This was followed by the Greenbury Report (1995), which highlighted directors’ 
remuneration and the remuneration committee. In 1998, the Hampel Report underlined the 
importance of principles as rules, rather than prescriptive rules, to ensure the effectiveness 
of good corporate governance. These three reports were combined in 1998 and this became 
known as the UK Combined Code. This code is mandatory for all publicly listed corporations 
on the London Stock Exchange. 
Various reports were produced following the UK Combined Code. The Turnbull Report 
(1999, 2005) focused on internal control issues. The Higgs Report (2003), the Tyson Report 
(2003), and the Davies Report (2011, 2012) concentrated on the board of directors. Other 
reports dealt with institutional investment and board committees. Together, these reports 
have influenced the development of corporate governance in the UK. Furthermore, Mallin 
(2013)  argues that the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 might have influenced corporate 
governance development in the UK.  
3.2.5. Corporate governance models 
Corporate governance practices, regulations, and models differ between countries. 
Generally, these corporate governance models are divided into two types based on different 
systems of corporate ownership (Aguilera, Desender, & de Castro, 2012; Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003, 2010; La Porta et al., 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The first is the outsider 
model, and the second, the insider model. According to the researchers listed above, 
notable examples of the outsider model of corporate governance are the US and the UK 
ones. Therefore, the outsider model is also known as Anglo-Saxon model. The insider model 
of corporate governance is found in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. This model is also 
known as the Continental European model.  
In the Anglo-Saxon model, corporate ownership is widely held and there are large 
numbers of shareholders. The managers in the Anglo-Saxon model are more powerful in 
the decision making process as opposed to the Continental European model, due to 
dispersed ownership. Furthermore, Bhasa (2004) finds better investor protection and more 
professional directors and managers in the Anglo-Saxon model. One of the main 
contributors to better investor protection in this model is the powerful authority to provide 
strong shareholder protection.  
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Corporate disclosures are generally well regulated to ensure that all investors receive 
reliable information for their investment decision making. Another distinction of this Anglo-
Saxon model, as opposed to the Continental European model, is frequent takeovers. 
According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003), external control from the capital market is more 
effective than control from the board of directors in this model. This is because corporations 
may be subject to takeover if the managers are unable to maximise the corporation’s value.  
In contrast, in the Continental European model corporate ownership is concentrated with 
a single owner or a small group of shareholders having control of the corporation. Unlike the 
Anglo-Saxon model, where the board of directors and managers mainly focus on corporate 
value maximisation for their shareholders, in this model the board of directors and managers 
have to address broad stakeholders’ needs (Snyder, 2007).  
Bhasa (2004) contends that long-term shareholdings and substantial cross shareholdings 
between corporations are also common in this model. The substantial long-term 
shareholdings protect corporations from potential takeover threats. Another distinct 
difference between the Anglo-Saxon model and the Continental European model lies in 
disclosure issues. In the latter model, disclosures are rather restricted to selected insiders 
and controlling shareholders. This is very much in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon model 
where disclosures are well-regulated to ensure all investors receive similar reliable 
information. 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be characterised as internal or external. Several 
researchers have investigated how internal and external corporate governance mechanisms 
impact corporate disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; S. S. M. Ho & Wong, 2001; Jaggi & Low, 
2000). The following sections discuss these two types of corporate governance mechanisms 
in more detail. 
3.2.6. Internal corporate governance mechanisms 
The board of directors constitutes an important internal corporate governance 
mechanism, as they represent shareholders and are responsible for monitoring the daily 
management of the corporation. Prior research has investigated the impact of aspects of 
the board of directors: for example, independent directors, the existence of board 
committees, and CEO duality (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010; Gul & Leung, 2004; S. S. M. 
Ho & Wong, 2001). These researchers conclude that independent directors and the 
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existence of audit committees are positively associated with corporate disclosures, and CEO 
duality is negatively associated. However, these findings vary across different ownership 
characteristics. 
Ownership characteristics also form part of internal corporate governance. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) contend that shareholders who hold a substantial portion of shares in 
corporations play an important role in ensuring that corporate governance mechanisms 
function well. However, the empirical results of tests for the impact of ownership 
characteristics on corporate disclosures have been mixed. Although some find that 
ownership concentration and corporate disclosures are positively associated (Chau & Gray, 
2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), this may not be the case in family corporations (Ali et al., 
2007; Chau & Gray, 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). In family corporations, when family 
members sit on the board of directors, as they already have access to internal information 
and thus do not demand that information be published (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  
3.2.7. External corporate governance mechanisms 
According to P. Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011) and Gillan (2006), the most 
common external corporate governance mechanisms analysed in prior corporate 
governance and corporate governance disclosures research are the law, the existence of 
external auditors, and takeovers. However, as takeovers are a distinct characteristic of a 
corporate governance system where share ownership is generally dispersed, and 
Indonesian and Malaysian companies are characterised by concentrated ownership, 
takeovers will not be discussed further. 
The law serves as an external corporate governance mechanism by providing protection 
for shareholders. La Porta et al. (1998) find that different legal origins lead to different levels 
of shareholder protection, with common law countries providing the highest level of 
shareholder protection. In relation to corporate disclosures, Jaggi and Low (2000) also find 
that common law countries provide more extensive disclosure. 
While the law serves as an external corporate governance mechanism at the macro level, 
the external auditor serves as an external mechanism at the meso level. According to Watts 
and Zimmerman (1983), the external auditor is important to provide assurance to investors 
over the management of corporate resources. In regards to corporate disclosure, DeAngelo 
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(1981) find that larger audit firms require fuller disclosure from their client in order to maintain 
their audit quality and reputation.  
3.3. Corporate disclosure 
Corporate disclosure provides a form of communication of corporate information between 
corporations and their stakeholders to allow them to monitor and assess corporate 
performance (Farvaque et al., 2011; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Monks, 2001). The Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants defines corporate disclosure as: 
The process used to communicate with stakeholders, regardless of the vehicle 
used for such communications. It reflects the messages that management 
needs to convey to investors and other stakeholders, taking into consideration 
generally accepted accounting principles for financial reporting and relevant 
regulatory requirements. (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2008, 
p. 1). 
Corporate disclosures can be divided into two types, mandatory and voluntary. Voluntary 
disclosures can be further classified into three different categories: strategic and forward-
looking information, financial information and non-financial information (Cotter, Lokman, & 
Najah, 2011; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). 
While laws and regulations require mandatory disclosures, voluntary disclosures are, by 
definition, not required to be disclosed (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Ghazali, 2008; Meek et al., 
1995). Clarkson, Van Bueren, and Walker (2006) contend that the quantity of voluntary 
disclosure is also less than for mandatory disclosures. Voluntary disclosures are defined as: 
Disclosures in excess of requirements - representing free choices on the part 
of company management to provide accounting and other information deemed 
relevant to the decision needs of users of their annual report (Meek et al., 1995, 
p. 555). 
According to Dye (2001), corporations will only voluntarily disclose favourable 
information. However, corporations will not disclose too much information as too many 
disclosures will be as costly as too few (Core, 2001). This is due to the fact that information 
may be used by competitors to their advantage (Verrecchia, 1983). However, in some cases, 
corporate disclosures may also help non-competitors as they serve as a benchmark for other 
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corporations and investors (Dye, 1990; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). Consequently, this 
information spillover can be substantial for the market. 
In providing disclosures, there are several media for corporations to use. The most 
traditional way is through traditional paper-based disclosure, generally via annual reports. 
Although disclosures on the WWW have their advantages, corporations still use annual 
reports for corporate disclosures. The advantage of annual reports over the WWW is that it 
usually contains an audited financial report, and thus provides assurance for the 
corporation’s stakeholders (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004). The following section 
discusses corporate disclosure on the WWW.  
3.3.1. Corporate disclosure on the WWW  
Traditional paper-based disclosures are less timely compared to WWW disclosures, and 
therefore less useful to decision makers (Ashbaugh, Johnstone, & Warfield, 1999). There 
are several other advantages of WWW disclosures: interactive disclosure, more detailed 
information, lower cost, ability to reach a wider audience, ability to target the intended 
audience, overcomes the geographical limitations of hard copy reports, creates an open and 
transparent corporation and addresses the increasing information demands of stakeholders 
(Cormier, Ledoux, & Magnan, 2009; Lodhia, 2014; Lodhia, Allam, & Lymer, 2004; Xiao, 
Jones, & Lymer, 2002). Due to these advantages, the WWW is a primary source of corporate 
information and news (Bubela et al., 2009; Debreceny & Gray, 1999; Wagenhofer, 2003) 
and has the potential to revolutionise corporate disclosure practices (Xiao, Yang, & Chow, 
2004). Regarding traditional paper-based disclosure, Guthrie (2007) describes it as  
“certainly an endangered species” (p. 518). Hassan, Jaffar, Johl, and Zain (1999) find in 
their research that generally the benefits of WWW disclosures are greater than its costs both 
to the corporations and their stakeholders. 
Dunne, Helliar, Lymer, and Mousa (2013) found that disclosures on the WWW are 
common for medium and large corporations in developed countries. Several other earlier 
researchers have also revealed the same finding (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Craven & Marston, 
1999; Ettredge, Richardson, & Scholz, 2001; Pirchegger & Wagenhofer, 1999). Pirchegger 
and Wagenhofer (1999) further added that corporate profitability is associated with WWW 
disclosures in developed countries. However, there could be an issue as to whether WWW 
disclosure in developing countries is effective as people may not have sufficient access to 
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the internet (Lodhia, 2014). Research from developing countries shows that corporations in 
developing countries use the WWW to provide corporate disclosures, and corporate size is 
a significant determinant of WWW disclosures (Bonsón & Escobar, 2006; Hassan et al., 
1999). 
3.3.2. Benefits and costs of corporate disclosures 
According to Farvaque et al. (2011), corporate shareholders and stakeholders will benefit 
from corporate disclosure. The benefits of corporate disclosure are: increased share value 
and liquidity, decreased share volatility, increased credibility, decreased cost of capital, 
better governance, decreased information asymmetry, decreased agency costs, financial 
scandal avoidance and financial stability improvement (Beyer et al., 2010; Eccles & 
Mavrinac, 1995; Farvaque et al., 2011; Healy et al., 1999; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Kothari, 
2000; Verrecchia, 2001). 
Despite the benefits of corporate disclosure, there are also costs associated with them, 
such as the costs associated with production, dissemination, implementation, competitive 
position, ownership and litigation (Farvaque et al., 2011; Kothari, 2000; Lev, 1992). Despite 
the numerous benefits, there are some disadvantages of WWW disclosures as opposed to 
the traditional paper-based ones. There is the potential for information overload (Debreceny, 
Gray, & Rahman, 2002), security and trust issues due to the non-regulated nature of WWW 
disclosure (Xiao et al., 2002) and the set-up and maintenance costs must be considered 
(Ashbaugh et al., 1999). However, the non-regulated nature of WWW disclosure can also 
be seen as one of its advantages because corporations can voluntarily disclose information 
without any regulatory restrictions that limit them in the traditional paper-based disclosures.  
3.4. Corporate governance disclosures 
Increased information on corporate governance improves the monitoring abilities of 
shareholders and corporate boards (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012). Gandía (2008) argues 
that corporate governance should be disclosed more frequently and that there are several 
channels for corporations to reveal such information, mainly through annual reports, and on 
the internet. 
Darmadi (2013) investigated the corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports 
of seven Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia in 2010. This resulted in a corporate 
60  
governance disclosure index consisting of seven disclosure dimensions: the shariah 
supervisory board, board of commissioners (supervisory board), board of directors, board 
committees, internal control and external audit, risk management, and corporate 
governance implementation reporting. The corporate governance disclosure index in 
Darmadi’s research emphasises the board and management structure and process, and this 
research concluded that the corporate governance disclosure level in Indonesia is relatively 
low. 
Sharma (2014) conducted a corporate governance disclosure study focusing on the 
annual reports of 59 randomly selected Nepalese banking and financial corporations in 
2010. He created a corporate governance disclosure index consisting of four mandatory 
disclosure criteria and four voluntary disclosure criteria. Sharma’s research documented a 
positive association between corporate size and corporate governance disclosures (in all 
types of disclosures: mandatory, voluntary and overall). No association was found between 
foreign ownership and leverage with corporate governance disclosures.  
3.4.1. Corporate governance WWW disclosures 
Balachandran and Faff (2015) argue that corporate governance matters should be 
disclosed promptly. Thus, they agree with Gandía (2008) who argued for disclosures to be 
made more often than in the once a year annual reports. The WWW is increasingly used by 
corporations to disclose their corporate governance information throughout the year.  
Jurisdictions from around the world are increasingly requiring corporate governance 
information to be provided on the WWW. In the US, corporations listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange are required to disclose corporate governance related information (NYSE, 
2009, 2010). In the UK, corporations have an obligation to make corporate governance 
disclosures either in their annual reports or on the WWW (Financial Reporting Council, 
2014). In Australia, the ASX Corporate Governance Council prefers corporations to make 
their corporate governance disclosures on the WWW rather than in the annual report (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2014).  
Gandía (2008), Yabing Jiang et al. (2009), Samaha et al. (2012) and Stewart et al. (2012) 
have conducted single country studies of corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. 
Yabing Jiang et al. (2009) provide a description of the content and design of corporate 
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governance WWW disclosures for 30 US corporations, without a comprehensive analysis of 
the variation within corporations or the determinants of the observed evidence. 
Gandía (2008) examines the corporate governance disclosures of 92 Spanish non-
financial corporations. He constructed three different indexes. The first index relates to 
disclosures in annual reports, which consists of three categories (board of directors, 
ownership structure and other information related to good governance). The second index 
is the stock market regulator index, also with the same three categories, with some 
differences in its sub-categories. The third index is an internet-based index, with the three 
categories above and the annual general meeting added as a fourth. Gandía (2008) 
concludes that the industry sector is a significant determinant of corporate governance 
disclosures in all three indexes. Company’s listing age has a negative association to 
corporate governance disclosures in the annual report, and a positive association to 
corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. He argued that the “older” corporations 
had begun to concentrate their disclosures on the internet. He cites for the significant 
determinants of corporate governance disclosure as being analyst following (important in 
the first and second index) and media visibility (notable in corporate governance WWW 
disclosures).  
Samaha et al. (2012) analysed the corporate governance disclosures made in annual 
reports and on corporate websites, for 100 of the largest Egyptian corporations. Unlike 
Gandía (2008), they did not distinguish between the two formats for disclosure thus their 
results cannot be generalised. The corporate governance disclosure index of UNCTAD 
(2011) was applied in their research, using each sub-category index as well as the overall 
index. This resulted in six different corporate governance disclosure indexes. However, the 
underlying reason for using each of the sub-category indices was not made clear. They find 
that for the overall index and each of the sub-category indexes, board composition, CEO 
duality, blockholder ownership and corporate size is significantly associated with the overall 
corporate governance disclosure index. 
The importance of distinguishing between corporate governance disclosures in annual 
reports and on the WWW in governance disclosure studies was highlighted by Stewart et 
al. (2012). In their research of WWW governance disclosures of 36 Australian state 
government departments, they acknowledged that the annual reports are generally available 
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as a downloadable document. Their research found that disclosures in the annual reports 
dominates those made on the WWW. 
3.4.2. UNCTAD corporate governance disclosure benchmark 
As indicated in the outline of Samaha et al.’s research and earlier in this thesis, the 
UNCTAD Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting has developed a corporate governance disclosure benchmark 
(also known as UNCTAD ISAR benchmark) to assess the transparency of corporate 
governance disclosures. The benchmark was initially developed and introduced in 2006, 
with the latest revision in 2011 resulting in 52 disclosure items being included. These 52 
items are located within five categories: ownership structure and exercise of control rights, 
financial transparency, auditing, corporate responsibility and compliance, and board and 
management structure and process. The details of this benchmark are discussed in the 
governance disclosures Section 5.5 of Chapter 5. 
3.4.3. Corporate governance disclosure regulation in Indonesia and Malaysia 
There are three sources of regulations for corporate governance disclosures in Indonesia. 
These regulations are regarding corporate governance, corporate disclosures in annual 
reports, and corporate disclosures on the WWW (Indonesian Financial Services Authority, 
2015a, 2015b; The Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency, 2012). In 
Malaysia, these are regulated by Bursa Malaysia’s listing requirements (Bursa Malaysia, 
2016a, 2016b). The major differences between regulations in these two countries are related 
to the disclosure requirements on the WWW. In Indonesia, there are slight differences in the 
information needing to be disclosed in annual reports compared with those on the internet. 
While the process for holding annual general meetings, the availability and accessibility of 
the meeting agenda, and the nature, type and elements of related-party transactions are 
mandatory to be placed on the WWW, these items are voluntary in the annual reports. 
Furthermore, information related to the board’s responsibilities regarding financial 
communications, professional development and training activities, and its performance 
evaluation process are mandatory in the annual reports but not required to be disclosed on 
the WWW. 
While in Malaysia corporate governance disclosure on the WWW is largely voluntary, with 
only two mandatory disclosures required, in Indonesia, there are 21 different kinds of 
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corporate governance disclosure information which need to be disclosed on the WWW. In 
Malaysia, the only two areas of corporate governance disclosure proscribed for release on 
the internet relate to the process for holding annual general meetings, and the availability 
and accessibility of the meeting agenda. These are also included in the 21 requirements for 
Indonesian corporations about corporate governance disclosure on the WWW. There are 
17 mandatory disclosure requirements for Malaysian corporations in their annual reports. 
Some differences exist between these and the parallel requirements for annual reports in 
Indonesia. These differences are spread across different categories. In terms of the 
ownership structure and the exercise of control rights, control and corresponding equity 
stake information is required in annual reports in Indonesia but this is voluntary in Malaysia. 
For auditing, there is only one mandatory disclosure requirement in Indonesia: information 
regarding the process for appointment of internal auditors and their scope of work and 
responsibilities. This information is also mandatory for Malaysian corporations, but 
Malaysian regulations require two more mandatory disclosures about auditing. These are 
related to firstly the internal control systems, and secondly auditors` involvement in non-
audit work and the fees paid to them. 
Disclosures about corporate responsibility and compliance are largely voluntary in 
Malaysia. Malaysian regulations only require mandatory disclosures for policy and 
performance in connection with environmental and social responsibilities. While this 
information is also mandatory in Indonesia, Indonesian regulations require three more 
mandatory disclosures regarding the code of ethics, and the policy on whistle blower 
protection.  
The final differences concern the board and management structure and process. Five 
pieces of information are mandatory in Indonesia but are not required to be disclosed in 
Malaysia. These relate to the composition and functions of the board and committee and its 
performance evaluation process. There are also three mandatory disclosure requirements 
in this category in Malaysia which can be disclosed voluntarily in Indonesia. These relate to 
governance structures, independence of the board, and disclosures regarding the number 
of outside board and management position directorships held by the directors.  
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Mandatory corporate governance disclosures in 
the annual reports in Indonesia, but not in 
Malaysia 
Mandatory corporate governance disclosures in 
the annual reports in Malaysia, but not in 
Indonesia 
Control and corresponding equity stake Internal control systems 
A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the 
ethics code 
Auditors` involvement in non-audit work and the fees 
paid to the auditors 
A code of ethics for all company employees Governance structures, such as committees and 
other mechanisms to prevent conflict of interest 
Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all 
employees 
Independence of the board of directors 
Composition of board of directors (executives and 
non-executives) 
Number of outside board and management position 
directorships held by the directors 
Composition and function of governance committee 
structures 
 
Role and functions of the board of directors  
Types and duties of outside board and management 
positions 
 
Performance evaluation process  
Table 3.3. Differences of mandatory corporate governance disclosure requirements in annual 
reports in Indonesia and Malaysia 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2016a, 2016b), Indonesian Financial Services Authority (2015b), The 
Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (2012), UNCTAD (2011) 
  
Mandatory corporate governance disclosures on the WWW in Indonesia, but not in Malaysia 
Ownership structure 
Control structure 
Control and corresponding equity stake 
Financial and operating results 
Nature, type and elements of related-party transactions 
Process for appointment of internal auditors/scope of work and responsibilities 
Policy and performance in connection with environmental and social responsibility 
A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the ethics code 
A code of ethics for all company employees 
Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all employees 
Composition of board of directors (executives and non-executives) 
Composition and function of governance committee structures 
Role and functions of the board of directors 
Risk management objectives, system and activities 
Qualifications and biographical information on board members 
Types and duties of outside board and management positions 
Material interests of members of the board and management 
Duration of director’s contracts 
Determination and composition of directors` remuneration 
Table 3.4. Mandatory corporate governance disclosure requirements on the WWW in Indonesia, but 
not required in Malaysia 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2016a, 2016b), Indonesian Financial Services Authority (2015b), The 
Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (2012), UNCTAD (2011) 
 
Table 3.3 and 3.4 provide a comparison of the different mandatory corporate governance 
disclosures for annual reports and the WWW in the two countries. For the WWW disclosures, 
there are two mandatory disclosures in Malaysia and both are also required in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, there are 19 mandatory disclosures required in Indonesia which are not 
required in Malaysia. These are listed in table 3.4. 
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3.5. Summary 
The concern over corporate governance started to develop following a series of corporate 
scandals. The 1992 Cadbury Report was the first corporate governance report to address 
these corporate governance issues and was soon followed by other reports in other 
countries. This trend to worldwide corporate governance development has led to the 
adoption of different corporate governance models in different countries. However, these 
models can be divided into two broad categories: the outsider model and the insider model. 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be divided into internal and external mechanisms. 
Internal corporate governance mechanisms include the board of directors and ownership 
characteristics. External corporate governance mechanisms include the law and the 
external auditor.  
Corporate disclosures can be divided into mandatory disclosures and voluntary 
disclosures, depending on whether the specific information is required to be disclosed by 
corporations according to the law and regulations. Corporations can disclose information 
through several media, including their annual reports and the WWW. Although there is 
increasing usage of the WWW for corporate disclosures, corporations still produce and 
publish their annual reports as this provides assurance for their stakeholders. Many 
researchers argue that corporate governance disclosures should be made in a timely 
manner (for example Balachandran and Faff, 2015). Therefore, corporations should utilise 
WWW more for corporate governance disclosures. This practice has been applied in 
developed countries, for example, Australia, the UK, and the US. However, the regulation 
of corporate governance disclosures on the internet in both Indonesia and Malaysia is 
relatively new. 
Regulation in Indonesia requires corporations to disclose around 40% of the 52 items of 
UNCTAD’s corporate governance disclosure benchmark in annual reports. In Malaysia, the 
proportion is slightly lower, around 30%. Regarding corporate governance disclosures on 
the WWW, the latest Indonesian regulation released in 2015 mandated corporations to 
disclose around 40% of those 52 items, with slightly different disclosure items than the 
mandatory items on the annual reports. However, in Malaysia, the corporate governance 
WWW disclosures are largely voluntary as there are only two items mandatorily required. 
The next chapter discusses this research’s theoretical framework and hypotheses 
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development. The purpose of these is to provide an analysis of published corporate 
governance behaviour, both in annual reports and on the WWW, in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The next chapter discusses institutional theory as the theoretical framework employed in 
this thesis. Chapter 4 further discusses how the three different levels (micro, meso, and 
macro level) of institutional theory may may be used to explain corporate governance 
practice and disclosure in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
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Chapter 4 Theoretical Framework 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This thesis employs institutional theory as the theoretical framework for hypothesis 
development. Institutional theory explains different institutional levels: the micro, meso, and 
macro levels. It also sets out disparate kinds of institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, 
and normative isomorphism. 
This thesis develops hypotheses around these three institutional levels and explores 
whether institutional isomorphism of these various types can explain the corporate 
governance practices and disclosures of Indonesian and Malaysian corporations. At the 
micro level, this research analyses the impact of a foreign-educated board of directors on 
corporate governance practice and disclosure. At the meso level, it analyses the impact of 
family and government ownership, and corporate size on corporate governance practice. 
Furthermore, this thesis also analyses the impact of corporate governance practice, family 
and government ownership, and corporate size on corporate governance disclosure at the 
meso level. Last, this study analyses whether different board structures and legal origins in 
Indonesia and Malaysia lead to different corporate governance practice and disclosure by 
corporations in these two countries and whether the new Indonesian administration has an 
impact, on corporate governance practice and disclosure in that nation. 
4.2. Institutional theory 
Institutional theory has been used to explain the institutionalised corporate form and why 
corporations adopt similar structures and practices (AbuGhazaleh, Qasim, & Haddad, 2012; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Ingram & Simons, 1995). According to institutional theory, 
corporations operate within norms and values that are appropriate or acceptable in a 
particular institution and corporate policies are influenced by the institutions in which 
corporations operate (Brammer et al., 2012; Oliver, 1997). Davis (2005) contends that 
institutional theory provides a better understanding of how culture and formal factors 
influence corporate governance practices. 
Oliver (1997) explains that there are three institutional determinant levels of the 
institutionalised corporate form and practices: the individual, the corporation, and the inter-
corporation. Beattie (2014) also confirms this and highlights three levels of accounting 
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disclosure determinants: the micro level (individual), meso level (corporation) and macro 
level (country). The new institutional trend suggests that cultural factors and historical and 
political institutions influence corporate strategies and thus will be different across regions 
or countries (Powell & DiMaggio, 2012). In relation to culture and corporate governance, 
dela Rama, Volonte, and Zaby (2014) and Tricker (2009) state that different corporate 
governance principles and models across countries are affected by the contributions of 
cultural differences, legal differences, stock market differences, and historical differences. 
Keim (2003) distinguishes between formal and informal institutions. While formal 
institutions explain the institutional process at the meso and macro levels, informal 
institutions do so at the micro level. Both formal and informal institutions are equally 
important in influencing corporate practices (Briano-Turrent & Rodríguez-Ariza, 2016). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose the concept of institutional isomorphism, a process 
of institutional homogenisation within the same environmental conditions. Their focus is on 
how powerful different external forces change corporate practices (Beddewela & Herzig, 
2013; Nielsen, Roslender, & Schaper, 2016). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that “today, 
however, structural change in organisations seems less and less driven by competition or 
by the need for efficiency” (p. 147). According to them, three mechanisms of institutional 
isomorphism exist: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative 
isomorphism. Prior research shows that these isomorphism processes improve the 
corporate position in the market (Schultz & Wehmeier, 2010). 
Coercive isomorphism derives from coercive authority and the cultural expectations of 
the society, and occurring when political influences arise (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This 
institutional change usually reflects the strength of political actors who hold a central position 
of power and social status (Alon & Dwyer, 2016; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004; Djelic 
& Quack, 2003; Martínez, Fernández, & Fernández, 2016). As these political actors hold 
such a powerful position, the institutional change in this mechanism involves law and 
regulation. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) discern four types of law and regulation changes: 
displacement, layering, drift, and conversion. While new laws and regulations are introduced 
through the first two types of changes, this is not the case with drift and conversion. In 
displacement, the old laws and regulations are completely substituted by the new ones. In 
layering, new laws and regulations are introduced to complement the old ones. The situation 
where there is no enforcement of laws and regulations is called drift, and the opportunistic 
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reinterpretation of law and regulation occurs in conversion. These concepts are further 
explored when the cases of Indonesian and Malaysian corporate governance and 
disclosures are investigated in more detail later in this thesis in Chapter 6.  
Mimetic isomorphism derives from a process where a corporation imitates other 
successful corporate practices in response to uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Nielsen 
et al., 2016). Martínez et al. (2016) add that in mimetic isomorphism, these extend to 
emulating the processes, and strategies as well as the practices of the most successful 
corporations. 
Normative isomorphism derives from normative pressures from professionals, 
emphasising that collective values influence corporate practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Nielsen et al., 2016). These normative pressures may come from professional bodies 
outside the corporation and professionals inside it. According to Fernández-Alles and Valle-
Cabrera (2006), normative isomorphism includes the utilisation of directors’ and managers’ 
experience and expertise. 
4.3. Hypotheses development 
As institutional changes influence corporate practices, this thesis uses institutional theory 
to explore the determinants of corporate governance practice and disclosure by corporations 
in Indonesia and Malaysia. To reiterate, institutional theory can explain how these 
institutional factors through institutional isomorphism on three levels (micro, meso, and 
macro) influence corporate governance practice and disclosure by corporations in both 
countries. Following sections discuss the application of different kinds of institutional 
isomorphism operating at various institutional levels to develop the hypotheses in this thesis. 
Concurrently in this discussion the hypotheses are set out, together with their rationales. 
Then the control variables of this thesis are presented, followed by a summary of the 
chapter. 
4.3.1. Micro level 
Yi Jiang and Peng (2011) indicate the need to analyse culture as an institutional factor in 
corporate governance research. According to Aguilera and Jackson (2010), cultural 
explanations focus on the role of culture in corporate practices and strategic decisions. 
Culture does not only play a role at a macro level, but also at a micro level where the national 
70  
culture influences shareholders and corporate boards (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Minichilli 
et al., 2012; Van Veen & Elbertsen, 2008). This section discusses the impact of culture at a 
micro level on corporate governance disclosures. 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980) and Gray’s secrecy hypotheses (Gray, 
1988) have been applied in many prior studies where the culture relevant to disclosures is 
analysed at the macro level. It could be concluded that only uncertainty avoidance and 
individualism have been found to have a significant impact on disclosure in the majority of 
previous research (Gray & Vint, 1995; Jaggi & Low, 2000; Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996) and 
that these cultural dimensions vary within different legal regimes (Hope, 2003; Jaggi & Low, 
2000). However, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are cultural measurements for the whole 
nation (at the macro level) and are not a cultural measurement for individuals (at the micro 
level). Several researchers are also critical of the usage of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
in accounting research (Baskerville, 2003; Heidhues & Patel, 2011). 
In regard to culture in a corporation, the culture of influential individuals is more important 
than the dominant culture of the nation’s entire population (Merchant et al., 1995). Hambrick 
and Mason (1984) also support the importance of influential individuals by suggesting that 
organisational outcomes are viewed as reflections of the value of these influential individuals 
in a corporation. Based on their national origin, influential individuals not only contribute to 
the collective formulation of cultural norms and views, they experience social reinforcement 
pressures which bring their individual-level assumptions and preferences into close 
alignment with those of their native culture (Geletkanycz, 1997). Furthermore, as corporate 
governance guidance and codes in Indonesia and Malaysia are mostly adopted and adapted 
from foreign countries, it is expected that foreign influence on the board is significantly 
associated with corporate governance practice and disclosure. 
As Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are intended to measure the culture of the whole nation 
(at the macro level) rather than individuals (at the micro level), this research uses different 
proxies to measure culture at the micro level. Two different proxies are used in this research 
based on the corporate board.  
The corporate board itself is used as a proxy for micro level culture as its members are 
influential individuals in a corporation. They represent the interests of corporate owners and 
monitor the corporation’s management (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010). While corporate 
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disclosures are the product of management decisions (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Meek et al., 
1995), it is believed that the corporate board is responsible for the corporate disclosure 
decisions due to board members’ function, influence, and responsibility. Prior research also 
documents that influential individuals may affect corporate governance and corporate 
disclosure (Amran & Devi, 2008; Amran & Haniffa, 2011; Bebbington, Higgins, & Frame, 
2009; M. A. Islam & Deegan, 2008; Rahaman, Lawrence, & Roper, 2004). Following 
previous research in corporate governance, the supervisory board is used instead of the 
management board in dual-board countries (Balsmeier, Bermig, & Dilger, 2013; Fauver & 
Fuerst, 2006; Jackowicz & Kowalewski, 2012; Lausten, 2002; Lin & Liu, 2009; Siregar & 
Utama, 2008).  
To measure culture at the micro level, this study uses the percentage of the board which 
is foreign-educated. Education could be used as an indicator of individual values (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984) and is a crude measure of professional status (Grace, Ireland, & Dunstan, 
1995). In relation to corporate disclosures, Reeb and Zhao (2013) argue that highly-
educated boards are concerned with maintaining their reputations by reducing information 
asymmetry with corporate disclosures. Furthermore, Merchant et al. (1995) also highlight 
the Western influence in education which has contributed to the change of influential 
individuals’ culture in a corporation.  
These foreign-educated directors are expected to exercise normative isomorphism in the 
corporation to improve corporate governance practice and disclosure. This leads to 
Hypothesis 1 which is stated in the null form. All of the hypotheses in this thesis are stated 
in the null as the null hypothesis significance testing is commonly used method of analysis 
of data collected in social science and allow researcher’s judgment in the interpretation of 
the results (Nickerson, 2000). 
Hypothesis 1a: There is no association between the percentage of the board of directors 
who are foreign-educated and corporate governance practice. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is no association between the percentage of the board of directors 
who are foreign-educated and the extent of corporate governance 
disclosure. 
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4.3.2. Meso level 
This section discusses several institutional determinants at the meso level that might have 
an impact on corporate governance practice and disclosure by corporations in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. 
4.3.2.1. Corporate governance practice  
Better corporate governance practices are known to be positively associated with 
improved disclosure and transparency (Hutton, 2007). Prior studies provide empirical 
evidence of these associations, with some measuring the quality of corporate governance 
mechanisms using different individual proxies. Some of these proxies are: independent 
directors (Barros, Boubaker, & Hamrouni, 2013; Chang & Sun, 2009; Gisbert & Navallas, 
2013; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007), the existence of an audit committee (S. S. M. Ho & Wong, 
2001) and the frequency of audit committee meetings (Barros et al., 2013); all of which have 
been found to be positively associated with corporate disclosures. Due to these findings, the 
quality of corporate governance mechanisms might be expected to drive corporate 
governance disclosures.  
This research uses the score of corporate governance mechanisms devised by Sawicki 
(2009) to measure corporate governance practice. She conducted her research on 
corporate governance in Southeast Asia and developed nine criteria with which to rate 
internal corporate governance mechanisms. Each criterion is a dichotomous variable, with 
a score of one if the corporation met the criterion, and zero otherwise. Thus, the maximum 
score of the internal corporate governance index is nine. Consequently, a high score in 
Sawicki’s measure of corporate governance practice is expected to create normative 
pressure for the corporation. This normative pressure exists due to high expectations 
concerning corporate governance performance and transparency over the corporate 
governance information. This leads to Hypothesis 2 which is stated in the null form. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no association between corporate governance practice and the 
extent of corporate governance disclosures.  
4.3.2.2. Family and government ownership 
Corporate governance in Southeast Asia has been characterised by significant family and 
government ownership (Claessens & Fan, 2002). The major concern caused by such 
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concentrated ownership is that controlling shareholders might pursue their self-interest at 
the expense of corporate performance and the interests of minority shareholders (Claessens 
& Fan, 2002; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).  
In relation to the meso level of institutional analysis, Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, and 
Ganapathi (2007) contend that shareholder interests are instrumental drivers of corporate 
practices. Corporate governance practice and disclosure in family- and government-owned 
corporations are both likely to be influenced by the mimetic isomorphism of other family and 
government-owned corporations. Thus, if the majority of family- and government-owned 
corporations produce a low level of corporate governance practice and a low quantity of 
corporate governance disclosures, there is no mimetic pressure for these corporations to 
improve their corporate governance practice and disclosure. 
Compared to other corporations, both family and government-owned corporations have 
fewer problems associated with the separation of ownership and management (Ali et al., 
2007). These corporations face more problems between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders, because of their significant ownership concentration and control over the 
corporations’ board of directors. These characteristics raise interesting issues about the 
impact of competing interests on corporate governance practice and disclosure of these 
corporations. To capture the effects of this capital structure on corporate governance 
practice and disclosure, this research uses an indirect approach by using ownership 
concentration as measures of family and government ownership, following prior research 
(for example Chen et al. (2011)).  
S. S. M. Ho and Wong (2001) argue that voluntary disclosures are not necessary for 
family corporations as family members are usually involved in the daily operations of 
corporations, part of or the entire board of directors and thus are able to monitor managers 
directly. Family corporations may benefit from a lack of transparency in their corporate 
governance practices, facilitating the appointment of family members as board members 
without much interference from non-family shareholders (Ali et al., 2007). Empirical evidence 
shows that family corporations provide less voluntary disclosures in general and less 
voluntary disclosures related to their corporate governance (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Ali 
et al., 2007; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). Thus, it is expected that family ownership is 
negatively associated with corporate governance practice and disclosure. This leads to the 
following hypothesis, stated in the null. 
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Hypothesis 3a: There is no association between the extent of family ownership and 
corporate governance practice.  
Hypothesis 3b: There is no association between the extent of family ownership and the 
extent of corporate governance disclosures.  
A predominant characteristic of government-controlled corporations, particularly in 
command-type economies, is the lack of autonomy where corporations deliver all revenues 
to the government (Ferguson, Lam, & Lee, 2002). Government-owned corporations are 
found to enjoy various benefits, such as preferential treatment as the government is the 
regulator, creditor, consumer and producer (Tian & Estrin, 2008). 
Recent reform has seen increased management autonomy under which the government 
is only entitled to a dividend on its share in the corporations. Despite increased management 
autonomy, the government may exploit the corporations it owns (Shleifer & Vishny, 2002) 
and treat them as cash cows (Ding, Jia, Wu, & Zhang, 2014). Much of the research on 
government-owned corporations has found negative effects of government ownership on 
corporate performance which indicate that they are poorly managed (for example 
Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2004) and Wei, Varela, D'Souza, and Hassan 
(2003)). Tian and Estrin (2008) documented that the positive association of government 
share ownership on political interference by the diversion of corporate wealth for political 
uses, while Ding et al. (2014) argue that the political responsibilities of government-owned 
corporations hinder their responsibility to maximise shareholder value. Ang and Ding (2006) 
also investigated this general area, exploring the controversy of the appointments of a 
government-owned corporation board of directors, which highlights the less democratic 
practices of this type of corporation. 
With high levels of government interest and influence on government-owned 
corporations, it is predicted that governments do not invest in quality corporate governance 
practice and disclosure. Therefore, it is expected that government ownership is negatively 
associated with corporate governance practice and disclosure. This leads to the following 
hypothesis, stated in the null. 
Hypothesis 4a: There is no association between the extent of government ownership and 
corporate governance practice. 
75  
Hypothesis 4b: There is no association between the extent of government ownership and 
the extent of corporate governance disclosures. 
4.3.2.3. Corporate size 
Larger corporations face higher information demands (Lang & Lundholm, 1993), lower 
information production costs (Dye, 1990; Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981) and disclose 
more information to reduce information asymmetry (Sharma, 2014). Previous research 
documents a positive relationship between corporate size and corporate governance 
practice and disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Inchausti, 1997; Meek et al., 1995; Samaha et 
al., 2012). According to Samaha et al. (2012), larger corporations tend to have a better 
corporate governance practice as they have more independent directors and expert 
governance committees. Furthermore, Klapper and Love (2004) contend that larger 
corporations have greater agency problems and this needs to be compensated for with 
better corporate governance practice. 
According to Jennings and Zandbergen (1995), practices in large corporations are more 
likely to be influenced by mimetic isomorphism, especially if particular practices provide a 
competitive advantage. Palenberg, Reinicke, and Witte (2006) also support this, contending 
that competitors’ practices and mimetic pressures are important factors in corporate 
disclosure practices. This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the null. 
Hypothesis 5a: There is no association between the size of the corporation and corporate 
governance practice. 
Hypothesis 5b: There is no association between the size of the corporation and the extent 
of corporate governance disclosures. 
4.3.3. Macro level  
This section discusses several institutional determinants at the macro level that might 
have an impact on differences in corporate governance practice and disclosure by 
corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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4.3.3.1. New administration 
As discussed previously, there has not been much change in Malaysia as the current 
prime minister has governed Malaysia since 2009. In Indonesia, a new president emerged 
in 2014 with a background dissimilar to all prior presidents. His commitment to transparency 
and good governance has led to a series of deregulation and de-bureaucratisation policies, 
including those related to corporate governance and corporate disclosures, to exercise 
coercive isomorphism. Furthermore, he has also shown concern over the low level of foreign 
investment in Indonesia, which can lead to improvements in the corporate governance and 
disclosure of Indonesian corporations in order to attract more foreign investment. A recent 
ADB report shows that Indonesian corporations rated the second worst regarding 
transparency and disclosure and in their overall corporate governance in 2013, only better 
than Vietnam (ADB, 2014). 
In 2015, the Indonesian Financial Services Authority released two new regulations about 
corporate disclosures on the web and corporate governance of publicly listed companies. 
These regulations complement regulation about corporate disclosures in the annual reports, 
and the code of corporate governance. Both Indonesia and Malaysia introduced codes of 
corporate governance for the first time in 2000. While Malaysia has adopted a comply or 
explain approach from the code’s inception, Indonesia only took up this approach following 
a reform of the regulation in 2015. 
Therefore, it can be argued that coercive isomorphism may be in place in Indonesia since 
the new administration assumed office in 2014, with the effect of improving corporate 
governance practice and disclosure by corporations in that country. 
4.3.3.2. Different board structures 
As explained in Chapter 2, while Indonesia has adopted a dual board structure, Malaysia 
has a structure of single boards. Company Law 2007 requires all Indonesian companies to 
have a management board and a supervisory board. This supervisory board has the same 
function as the board of directors in the single board structure. However, all members of the 
supervisory board in Indonesia are non-executives. This study follows prior research to use 
the supervisory board as the ‘board of directors’, instead of the management board, in dual 
board countries (Balsmeier et al., 2013; Fauver & Fuerst, 2006; Jackowicz & Kowalewski, 
2012; Lausten, 2002; Lin & Liu, 2009; Siregar & Utama, 2008). 
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Breuer and Salzmann (2012) associate single board countries with an outsider corporate 
governance system, and dual board countries with an insider corporate governance system. 
Thus corporate boards play an important role within the insider corporate governance 
system. In contrast, they only have a limited role in the outsider corporate governance 
system. As Indonesia has adopted the dual board structure and Malaysia has the single 
board structure, it can be argued that the board of directors in Indonesia plays a more 
important role as compared to in Malaysia. Boards of directors are expected to exercise 
normative isomorphism in the corporation for the improvement of corporate governance 
practice and disclosure. 
4.3.3.3. Legal origin 
According to La Porta et al. (1998), common law countries have the strongest legal 
protections for investors and French civil law countries the weakest. While Malaysia is a 
common law country, Indonesia is historically influenced to a large extent by French civil 
law. This may provide an indication that legal protections for investors in Malaysia are better 
than in Indonesia. Such a view is endorsed by another related study which shows that 
countries with an outsider corporate governance system provide stronger minority 
shareholders protection as opposed to those with an insider corporate governance system 
(La Porta et al., 1998; Noordin & Supramaniam, 2016). Although some researchers (Gilson, 
2006; Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi, & Hilton, 2005) have categorised both countries within same 
corporate governance system, this is invalid as the corporate governance system in 
Malaysia clearly resembles the Anglo-Saxon/outsider corporate governance system 
(Alnasser, 2012; Gomez, 2004; Singam, 2003). Thus, this also supports the indication that 
legal protections in Malaysia are better than Indonesia. In regard to corporate disclosures, 
Jaggi and Low (2000) have found that corporations from common law countries provide 
more disclosures as opposed to those from civil law countries. 
The origin of the legal system is influential on corporate governance practice and 
corporate disclosure and how they provide legal protections for shareholders. Thus, it can 
be argued that the legal origin places coercive pressure to ensure a corporation’s practices 
do not violate shareholders’ rights. 
From the discussion of three sections of the macro level above, this thesis hypothesises 
the following, stated in the null. 
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Hypothesis 6a: There is no difference between the corporate governance practices of 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Hypothesis 6b: There is no difference between the corporate governance disclosures of 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
4.3.4. Control variables 
This section discusses the control variables applied in the research for this thesis. 
4.3.4.1. Leverage 
Corporations with higher debt have greater incentive to provide more disclosures to 
facilitate their borrowing activities and satisfy the information needs of their creditors (Chow 
& Wong-Boren, 1987; Kang & Gray, 2011; Meek et al., 1995; Wallace, Naser, & Mora, 1994). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend that these corporations have higher agency costs due 
to the increased potential for wealth transfer from debtholders to shareholders. Therefore, 
corporations are interested in reducing their agency costs by providing more disclosures. 
Previous studies document a significant relationship between leverage and corporate 
governance practice and disclosure (Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Bradbury, 1992; 
Eng & Mak, 2003; Jaggi & Low, 2000; Meek et al., 1995). To control for this factor, this study 
includes leverage in its regression model. 
4.3.4.2. Profitability 
Researchers find that more profitable corporations provide more corporate disclosures to 
inform stakeholders about their performance and to avoid underestimation of their corporate 
value (Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Gallery, Cooper, & Sweeting, 2008; Inchausti, 
1997; Wallace et al., 1994). However, corporations may also use corporate disclosures to 
provide an explanation for their poor performance to their stakeholders. Previous studies 
document a significant relationship between profitability and corporate governance practice 
and disclosure (Gallery et al., 2008; Inchausti, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Singhvi & Desai, 
1971; Wallace et al., 1994). To control for this factor, this thesis includes profitability in the 
regression model. 
79  
4.3.4.3. Growth opportunities 
Growth opportunities for a corporation will be reflected in its market value, and this 
research uses Tobin’s Q to measure growth opportunities following several prior studies 
(Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Gugler, Mueller, & Yurtoglu, 2004; Klapper & Love, 2004). The 
higher the level of growth opportunities of a corporation, the harder it is to value due to the 
higher level of information asymmetry (Stanny & Ely, 2008). Therefore, a corporation is 
expected to provide more disclosure to reduce the information asymmetry (Verrecchia, 
2001). To control for this factor, this thesis includes growth opportunities in the regression 
model. 
The following figure summarises and categorises the variables in this thesis according to 
the institutional level (micro, meso, and macro) at which they operate and the relevant form 
of institutional isomorphism (normative, mimetic, and coercive). 
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Figure 4.1. Institutional isomorphism on corporate governance practice and disclosure by corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia 
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4.4. Summary 
Institutional theory is applied as the theoretical framework to explain the determinants of 
institutionalised corporate governance practices and disclosure. The notion of three 
institutional levels can be used to account for  corporate governance practice and disclosure 
by corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia. At the micro level, it is contended in this study 
that normative pressures through a foreign-educated board influence corporate governance 
practice and disclosure by corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia. At the meso level, it is 
proposed that normative and mimetic isomorphism exercise pressures on corporations. 
Corporate governance practice, measured by a corporate governance score, serves to 
evoke normative isomorphism. Family and government ownership and corporate size serve 
as mimetic isomorphic influences as it is argued corporations will mimic the corporate 
governance practice and disclosure of those corporations similar to them.  At the macro 
level, this research posits that normative isomorphism and coercive isomorphism are 
influential in determining corporate governance practice and disclosure. Different board 
structures, the dual board in Indonesia and the single board in Malaysia, exercise different 
normative pressures and therefore it is expected that both countries have different extents 
of corporate governance practice and disclosure. Furthermore, coercive pressures through 
the new administration in Indonesia, and the dissimilar legal origins and national cultures of 
Indonesia and Malaysia can explain differences in corporate governance practice and 
disclosure by corporations in both countries. The next chapter discusses the research 
methodology used in this thesis. 
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Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter explains the research methodology employed to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 4. Section 5.2 discusses sample selection and Section 5.3 details the 
study period. The next section (5.4), outlines the data sources used for this thesis. Sections 
5.5 to 5.9, discuss the measurement of dependent variables, independent variables, and 
control variables. Section 5.10 provides the models used to test the hypotheses, and Section 
5.11 concludes this chapter with a summary. 
5.2. Sample selection 
The top 200 publicly listed corporations in each of Indonesia and Malaysia make up the 
research sample. Market capitalisation was the tool used to identify the top 200 corporations 
listed in Indonesia and Malaysia. The following table provides market capitalisation data, 
and number of listed corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia in 2015. The top 200 
corporations in each jurisdiction represents around 90% of total market capitalisation of their 
stock exchanges. 
 
Country Market capitalisation 
(in current millions 
USD) 
Number of listed 
corporations 
Total market capitalisation (in 
current millions USD) of top 
200 corporations 
Indonesia 353,270.96 521 312,188.29 
Malaysia 382,976.65 892 360,223.80 
Table 5.1. Market capitalisation, and number of listed corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia in 
2015. 
Source: World of Federation Exchange database, http://www.world-exchanges.org/home/. 
 
 
5.3. Study period 
This thesis analyses the corporate governance disclosures of the sample Indonesian and 
Malaysian corporations made in the 2015 annual reports. Furthermore, for corporate 
governance disclosures of Indonesian corporations on the WWW, the data was collected 
from February to March 2016. Data collection for corporate governance disclosures of 
Malaysian corporations on the WWW was conducted from September to October 2016. 
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5.4. Data sources 
All annual reports were downloaded from each corporate website or from the respective 
country’s stock exchange website. For analysis of WWW disclosures, all content was 
analysed from the actual corporate websites within the study period specified above. The 
primary source for data on the independent variables was the annual reports. In the event 
that annual reports did not provide such information, this study used secondary sources 
such as the corporate website, Bloomberg database, and LinkedIn. 
5.5. Corporate governance disclosures 
As the dependent variable, the UNCTAD corporate governance disclosures benchmark 
(UNCTAD, 2006, 2011) was adopted to create the score used. All disclosures in the annual 
reports and on the WWW were categorised using this list, i.e., whether the disclosure was 
present or absent in each list. If it was disclosed, the score of that particular item was 1. 
Therefore, the maximum score of corporate governance disclosures in an annual report is 
52. For disclosures on the WWW, all sections of the corporate website (including all 
downloadable documents, but excluding the annual report) were analysed against this list. 
Applying a similar method as with the annual report, the maximum score of corporate 
governance disclosures on the WWW was also 52. Table 5.2 summarises the 52 corporate 
governance disclosure items analysed in this thesis. 
To extend the analysis of corporate governance disclosures, this research also provides 
an analysis of both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures. However, 
as the disclosure regulations in Indonesia and Malaysia are different, the data for both 
countries is analysed separately in regard to the mandatory and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures. The following tables summarise mandatory and voluntary 
corporate governance disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia, for the disclosures in the 
annual reports and on the WWW. The maximum scores of mandatory corporate governance 
disclosures of Indonesian and Malaysian corporations in the annual reports are 21 and 17 
respectively. For the WWW disclosures, while the maximum score of mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures in Indonesia is 21, in Malaysia it is only 2. 
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No. Disclosure Item 
Ownership Structure and Exercise of Control Rights 
1 Ownership structure 
2 Process for holding annual general meetings 
3 Changes in shareholdings 
4 Control structure 
5 Control and corresponding equity stake 
6 Availability and accessibility of meeting agenda 
7 Control rights 
8 Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in capital markets 
9 Anti-takeover measures 
Financial Transparency  
10 Financial and operating results 
11 Critical accounting estimates 
12 Nature, type and elements of related-party transactions 
13 Company objectives 
14 Impact of alternative accounting decisions (judgement) 
15 The decision-making process for approving transactions with related parties 
16 Rules and procedures governing extraordinary transactions 
17 Board’s responsibilities regarding financial communications 
Auditing  
18 Process for interaction with internal auditors 
19 Process for interaction with external auditors 
20 Process for appointment of external auditors 
21 Process for appointment of internal auditors/scope of work and responsibilities 
22 Board confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors 
23 Internal control systems 
24 Duration of current auditors 
25 Rotation of audit partners 
26 Auditors` involvement in non-audit work and the fees paid to the auditors 
Corporate Responsibility and Compliance 
27 Policy and performance in connection with environmental and social responsibility 
28 Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on the firm’s sustainability 
29 A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the ethics code 
30 A code of ethics for all company employees 
31 Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all employees 
32 Mechanisms protecting the rights of other stakeholders in business 
33 The role of employees in corporate governance 
Board and Management Structure and Process  
34 Governance structures, such as committees and other mechanisms to prevent conflict of interest 
35 “Checks and balances” mechanisms 
36 Composition of board of directors (executives and non-executives) 
37 Composition and function of governance committee structures 
38 Role and functions of the board of directors 
39 Risk management objectives, system and activities 
40 Qualifications and biographical information on board members 
41 Types and duties of outside board and management positions 
42 Material interests of members of the board and management 
43 Existence of plan of succession 
44 Duration of director’s contracts 
45 Compensation policy for senior executives departing the firm as a result of a merger or acquisition 
46 Determination and composition of directors` remuneration 
47 Independence of the board of directors 
48 Number of outside board and management position directorships held by the directors 
49 Existence of procedure(s) for addressing conflicts of interest among board members 
50 Professional development and training activities 
51 Availability and use of advisorship facility during reporting period 
52 Performance evaluation process 
Table 5.2. Corporate governance disclosure score used in this research 
Source: UNCTAD (2011) 
 
 
85  
Table 5.3. Mandatory corporate governance disclosure score in the annual reports in Indonesia and 
Malaysia used in this research 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2016a, 2016b), Indonesian Financial Services Authority (2015b), The 
Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (2012), UNCTAD (2011) 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory disclosures in the annual report in 
Indonesia 
Mandatory disclosures in the annual report in 
Malaysia 
Ownership structure Ownership structure 
Control structure Control structure 
Control and corresponding equity stake  
Financial and operating results Financial and operating results 
Board’s responsibilities regarding financial 
communications 
Board’s responsibilities regarding financial 
communications 
Process for appointment of internal auditors/scope 
of work and responsibilities 
Process for appointment of internal auditors/scope 
of work and responsibilities 
Policy and performance in connection with 
environmental and social responsibility 
Policy and performance in connection with 
environmental and social responsibility 
A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the 
ethics code 
 
A code of ethics for all company employees  
Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all 
employees 
 
Composition of board of directors (executives and 
non-executives) 
 
Composition and function of governance 
committee structures 
 
Role and functions of the board of directors  
Risk management objectives, system and activities Risk management objectives, system and activities 
Qualifications and biographical information on 
board members 
Qualifications and biographical information on 
board members 
Types and duties of outside board and 
management positions 
 
Material interests of members of the board and 
management 
Material interests of members of the board and 
management 
Duration of director’s contracts Duration of director’s contracts 
Determination and composition of directors` 
remuneration 
Determination and composition of directors` 
remuneration 
Professional development and training activities Professional development and training activities 
Performance evaluation process  
 Internal control systems 
 Auditors` involvement in non-audit work and the 
fees paid to the auditors 
 Governance structures, such as committees and 
other mechanisms to prevent conflict of interest 
 Independence of the board of directors 
 Number of outside board and management 
position directorships held by the directors 
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Voluntary disclosures in the annual report in Indonesia Voluntary disclosures in the annual report in Malaysia 
Process for holding annual general meetings Process for holding annual general meetings 
Changes in shareholdings Changes in shareholdings 
Availability and accessibility of meeting agenda Availability and accessibility of meeting agenda 
Control rights Control rights 
Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate 
control in capital markets 
Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate 
control in capital markets 
Anti-takeover measures Anti-takeover measures 
Critical accounting estimates Critical accounting estimates 
Nature, type and elements of related-party transactions Nature, type and elements of related-party transactions 
Company objectives Company objectives 
Impact of alternative accounting decisions (judgement) Impact of alternative accounting decisions (judgement) 
The decision-making process for approving transactions with 
related parties 
The decision-making process for approving transactions with 
related parties 
Rules and procedures governing extraordinary transactions Rules and procedures governing extraordinary transactions 
Process for interaction with internal auditors Process for interaction with internal auditors 
Process for interaction with external auditors Process for interaction with external auditors 
Process for appointment of external auditors Process for appointment of external auditors 
Board confidence in independence and integrity of external 
auditors 
Board confidence in independence and integrity of external 
auditors 
Internal control systems  
Duration of current auditors Duration of current auditors 
Rotation of audit partners Rotation of audit partners 
Auditors` involvement in non-audit work and the fees paid to the 
auditors 
 
Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on the 
firm’s sustainability 
Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on 
the firm’s sustainability 
Mechanisms protecting the rights of other stakeholders in 
business 
Mechanisms protecting the rights of other stakeholders in 
business 
The role of employees in corporate governance The role of employees in corporate governance 
Governance structures, such as committees and other 
mechanisms to prevent conflict of interest 
 
“Checks and balances” mechanisms “Checks and balances” mechanisms 
Existence of plan of succession Existence of plan of succession 
Compensation policy for senior executives departing the firm as 
a result of a merger or acquisition 
Compensation policy for senior executives departing the firm 
as a result of a merger or acquisition 
Independence of the board of directors  
Number of outside board and management position 
directorships held by the directors 
 
Existence of procedure(s) for addressing conflicts of interest 
among board members 
Existence of procedure(s) for addressing conflicts of interest 
among board members 
Availability and use of advisorship facility during reporting period Availability and use of advisorship facility during reporting 
period 
 Control and corresponding equity stake 
 A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the ethics code 
 A code of ethics for all company employees 
 Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all employees 
 Composition of board of directors (executives and non-
executives) 
 Composition and function of governance committee structures 
 Role and functions of the board of directors 
 Types and duties of outside board and management positions 
 Performance evaluation process 
Table 5.4. Voluntary corporate governance disclosure score in the annual reports in Indonesia and 
Malaysia used in this research 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2016a, 2016b), Indonesian Financial Services Authority (2015b), The 
Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (2012), UNCTAD (2011) 
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Table 5.5. Mandatory corporate governance disclosure score on the WWW in Indonesia and 
Malaysia used in this research 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2016a, 2016b), Indonesian Financial Services Authority (2015b), The 
Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (2012), UNCTAD (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory disclosures on the WWW in 
Indonesia 
Mandatory disclosures on the WWW in 
Malaysia 
Ownership structure  
Process for holding annual general meetings Process for holding annual general meetings 
Control structure  
Control and corresponding equity stake  
Availability and accessibility of meeting agenda Availability and accessibility of meeting agenda 
Financial and operating results  
Nature, type and elements of related-party 
transactions 
 
Process for appointment of internal auditors/scope 
of work and responsibilities 
 
Policy and performance in connection with 
environmental and social responsibility 
 
A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the 
ethics code 
 
A code of ethics for all company employees  
Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all 
employees 
 
Composition of board of directors (executives and 
non-executives) 
 
Composition and function of governance 
committee structures 
 
Role and functions of the board of directors  
Risk management objectives, system and activities  
Qualifications and biographical information on 
board members 
 
Types and duties of outside board and 
management positions 
 
Material interests of members of the board and 
management 
 
Duration of director’s contracts  
Determination and composition of directors` 
remuneration 
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Voluntary disclosures on the WWW in 
Indonesia 
Voluntary disclosures on the WWW in 
Malaysia 
Changes in shareholdings Changes in shareholdings 
Control rights Control rights 
Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of 
corporate control in capital markets 
Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of 
corporate control in capital markets 
Anti-takeover measures Anti-takeover measures 
Critical accounting estimates Critical accounting estimates 
Company objectives Company objectives 
Impact of alternative accounting decisions 
(judgement) 
Impact of alternative accounting decisions 
(judgement) 
The decision-making process for approving 
transactions with related parties 
The decision-making process for approving 
transactions with related parties 
Rules and procedures governing extraordinary 
transactions 
Rules and procedures governing extraordinary 
transactions 
Board’s responsibilities regarding financial 
communications 
Board’s responsibilities regarding financial 
communications 
Process for interaction with internal auditors Process for interaction with internal auditors 
Process for interaction with external auditors Process for interaction with external auditors 
Process for appointment of external auditors Process for appointment of external auditors 
Board confidence in independence and integrity of 
external auditors 
Board confidence in independence and integrity of 
external auditors 
Internal control systems Internal control systems 
Duration of current auditors Duration of current auditors 
Rotation of audit partners Rotation of audit partners 
Auditors` involvement in non-audit work and the 
fees paid to the auditors 
Auditors` involvement in non-audit work and the 
fees paid to the auditors 
Impact of environmental and social responsibility 
policies on the firm’s sustainability 
Impact of environmental and social responsibility 
policies on the firm’s sustainability 
Mechanisms protecting the rights of other 
stakeholders in business 
Mechanisms protecting the rights of other 
stakeholders in business 
The role of employees in corporate governance The role of employees in corporate governance 
Governance structures, such as committees and 
other mechanisms to prevent conflict of interest 
Governance structures, such as committees and 
other mechanisms to prevent conflict of interest 
“Checks and balances” mechanisms “Checks and balances” mechanisms 
Existence of plan of succession Existence of plan of succession 
Compensation policy for senior executives 
departing the firm as a result of a merger or 
acquisition 
Compensation policy for senior executives 
departing the firm as a result of a merger or 
acquisition 
Independence of the board of directors Independence of the board of directors 
Number of outside board and management position 
directorships held by the directors 
Number of outside board and management 
position directorships held by the directors 
Existence of procedure(s) for addressing conflicts 
of interest among board members 
Existence of procedure(s) for addressing conflicts 
of interest among board members 
Professional development and training activities Professional development and training activities 
Availability and use of advisorship facility during 
reporting period 
Availability and use of advisorship facility during 
reporting period 
Performance evaluation process Performance evaluation process 
 Ownership structure 
 Control structure 
 Control and corresponding equity stake 
 Financial and operating results 
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Table 5.6. Voluntary corporate governance disclosure score on the WWW in Indonesia and Malaysia 
used in this research 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2016a, 2016b), Indonesian Financial Services Authority (2015b), The 
Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (2012), UNCTAD (2011) 
This thesis also uses corporate governance practice as another dependent variable. A 
description and rationale for the measurement of corporate governance practice is available 
in Section 5.7.1 below.  
5.6. Micro level variables 
The proportion of foreign educated directors is the proxy used to measure the institutional 
impact at the micro level. As prior research (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Geletkanycz, 1997; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Merchant et al., 1995; Minichilli et al., 2012; Van Veen & 
Elbertsen, 2008) indicated that foreign influence may have an impact on corporate 
governance practice and disclosure, this study uses foreign education to measure this by 
referring to the proportion of company directors with a history of education in a country other 
than the home country of the corporation. This was done because the amount of time spent 
Voluntary disclosures on the WWW in 
Indonesia 
Voluntary disclosures on the WWW in 
Malaysia 
 Nature, type and elements of related-party 
transactions 
 Process for appointment of internal auditors/scope 
of work and responsibilities 
 Policy and performance in connection with 
environmental and social responsibility 
 A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the 
ethics code 
 A code of ethics for all company employees 
 Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all 
employees 
 Composition of board of directors (executives and 
non-executives) 
 Composition and function of governance 
committee structures 
 Role and functions of the board of directors 
 Risk management objectives, system and activities 
 Qualifications and biographical information on 
board members 
 Types and duties of outside board and 
management positions 
 Material interests of members of the board and 
management 
 Duration of director’s contracts 
 Determination and composition of directors` 
remuneration 
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by the director in their study abroad may bring foreign influence to the board that can 
potentially be related to the company’s corporate governance disclosures. 
5.7. Meso level variables 
5.7.1. Corporate governance practice 
This thesis uses a corporate governance score based on the nine criteria listed in Table 
5.7 to measure corporate governance practice. This corporate governance score has been 
developed by Sawicki (2009) for her research in Southeast Asia. Each criterion in this score 
is a dichotomous variable, with a score of one if the corporation met the criterion, and zero 
otherwise. Thus, the maximum corporate governance score is nine. 
 
Nine criteria of corporate governance score 
Board of 
Directors 
One-third independence of the board, as measured by the number of independent 
directors divided by total number of directors 
 Chairman and CEO separation 
 Largest director’s shareholding (as measured using direct interest and deemed 
interest divided by total issued shares) below 5% of issued capital 
Audit Existence of an audit committee 
 Disclosure of frequency of audit committee meeting 
 Expertise of audit committee 
 Engagement of Big Four auditors1 
Remuneration Existence of a remuneration committee 
Nomination Existence of a nomination committee 
Table 5.7. Corporate governance score used in this research 
Source: Sawicki (2009) 
 
 
5.7.2. Family and government ownership 
This study captures the effects of capital structure on corporate governance disclosures 
by using an indirect approach through family and government ownership concentration. 
Family ownership is measured as the total percentage of shares owned by family interests, 
and government ownership is taken to be the total percentage of shares owned by the 
government or government-owned organisations. This thesis follows Yeh, Lee, and Woidtke 
(2001) definition of shares owned by family members as:  
Shares owned by all family members (of blood and marriage ties), shares 
owned by nominal investment companies and other legal entities that are                                                         
1 The original index by Sawicki (2009) used engagement of big six auditors. 
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effectively controlled by the family and shares cross-owned by affiliated 
companies. (Yeh et al., 2001, p. 28). 
5.7.3. Corporate size 
The last meso level variable investigated in this thesis is corporate size. Corporate size 
is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
5.8. Macro level variables 
This thesis uses three indicators in the macro level as discussed in previous chapter. 
These are the new administration in Indonesia, different board structures, and different legal 
origin in Indonesia and Malaysia. Macro level variables will be tested in two ways: first by 
using a dichotomous variable to indicate each different country, second, by analysing the 
data separately in country-level analysis. 
To determine the dichotomous variable, all three indicators are considered. The first 
indicator, Indonesia’s new administration, may influence corporate governance disclosures 
in Indonesia following that administration’s introduction of new regulations. The second 
indicator is drawn from the fact that some research contends that the board of directors play 
a more important role in a dual board country than in a single board one. Therefore, it is 
expected that the board of directors in Indonesia is more influential than in Malaysia, 
especially in relation to the disclosures. For the third indicator, Malaysia, as a common-law 
country, is expected to provide better investor protection than Indonesia. For this reason, it 
is expected that Malaysian corporations provide more disclosures.  
Therefore, from these three indicators, it may be predicted that there are improvements 
of corporate governance disclosures in Indonesia. Thus, to measure this variable, 
Indonesian corporations is scored 1 and 0 otherwise. 
5.9. Control variables 
Several control variables are included in the analysis. 
5.9.1. Leverage 
Debt to assets ratio is used to measure leverage. 
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5.9.2. Profitability 
Return on assets is used (net profit after tax divided by total assets) to measure 
profitability. 
5.9.3. Growth opportunities 
Tobin’s Q is applied to measure growth opportunities. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total market 
value to total book value of assets. 
5.10. Research model 
This thesis applies multivariate regression analysis of four different research models to 
test the research hypotheses. Multivariate regression analysis is used to determine whether 
the micro level, meso level, and macro level variables determine corporate governance 
practice and disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia2.  
To address the hypotheses related to corporate governance practice (H1a, H3a, H4a, 
H5a, and H6a), this thesis employs Research Models 1 and 3. While in Research Model 1 
all data from Indonesian and Malaysian corporations are analysed at the same time, in 
Research Model 3 separate analyses of Indonesian data and Malaysian data are conducted. 
To investigate hypotheses related to the corporate governance disclosures (H1b, H2, H3b, 
H4b, H5b, and H6b), this thesis employs Research Models 2 and 4. Similar to the approach 
used for Research Models 1 and 3, Research Model 2 conducts analysis for both Indonesian 
and Malaysian data together and Research Model 4 performs two separate analyses. The 
following table summarises the four research model used in this thesis.  
 
Data H1a, H3a, H4a, H5a, H6a H1b, H2, H3b, H4b, H5b, H6b 
All data (Indonesia and 
Malaysia) 
CG = b0 + b1 FEBP + b2 FAMP 
+ b3 GOVP + b4 SIZE + b5 
MACRO + b6 LEV + b7 PRO + 
b8 GO + ε (1) 
DISC = b0 + b1 FEBP + b2 CG 
+ b3 FAMP + b4 GOVP + b5 
SIZE + b6 MACRO + b7 LEV + 
b8 PRO + b9 GO + ε (3) 
Single country data (Indonesia 
or Malaysia) 
CG = b0 + b1 FEBP + b2 FAMP 
+ b3 GOVP + b4 SIZE + b5 LEV 
+ b6 PRO + b7 GO + ε (2) 
DISC = b0 + b1 FEBP + b2 CG 
+ b3 FAMP + b4 GOVP + b5 
SIZE + b6 LEV + b7 PRO + b8 
GO + ε (4) 
Table 5.8. Research models used in this research                                                         
2 Multiple regression is based on the presumption that no multicollinearity exists between the independent 
variables, suggesting there is no exact linear relationship between the independent variables (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009). 
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where: 
CG = corporate governance practice 
DISC = the score of corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports or on 
WWW 
FEBP = proportion of foreign-educated directors 
FAMP = total percentage of shares owned by family members 
GOVP = total percentage of shares owned by government  
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
MACRO = macro level variables (dichotomous variable of 1 if it is Indonesian 
corporation, 0 otherwise) 
LEV =  debt to assets ratio 
PRO = return on assets (net profit after tax divided by total assets) 
GO = Tobin’s Q (ratio of total market value to total book value of assets) 
ε = error term 
5.11. Robustness test and sensitivity analysis 
In addition to the multivariate regression analysis, several robustness tests are 
performed to ensure that multivariate regression results are robust. As this thesis is 
concerned with the individual effect of the independent variables on the corporate 
governance practice and the extent of corporate governance disclosure, the presence of 
multicollinearity is tested. This thesis employs two methods to make sure that there is no 
multicollinearity problem among the independent variables that have biased the results of 
multivariate regression analysis. First, this thesis uses the Pearson’s bivariate correlation 
matrix (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). A serious multicollinearity 
problem exists if the correlation coefficients between two independent variables exceeds 
0.8. Second, this thesis also uses the Variance Inflation Factor test to test the 
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multicollinearity problem. According to Kline (2005), variance inflation factor value more than 
10 indicates a threat of multicollinearity. 
The next robustness test is related to autocorrelation problems. If error terms are 
autocorrelated, several issues arise in the usage of ordinary least square. This thesis uses 
Durbin-Watson statistic to determine whether autocorrelation problems exist and follows 
Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) rule of thumb range for the Durbin-Watson statistic to 
indicates the absence of autocorrelation problems. Next, this thesis also tests potential 
threat of heteroscedasticity. The existence of heteroscedasticity leads to incorrect 
conclusions about the significance of the independent variables in ordinary least square. 
This thesis applies the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test to ensure the existence or absence of 
heteroscedasticity problems. This thesis also further tests endogeneity problem. According 
to Ntim, Opong, and Danbolt (2012), an endogeneity problem exists within a research model 
if the dependent and independent variables are highly correlated with the error term. To 
ensure the absence of endogeneity problems in this thesis, this thesis applies the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test. 
This thesis also conducts sensitivity analysis to ensure that multivariate regression 
results are not sensitive to alternative proxies of independent variables and this thesis uses 
appropriate proxy. In the sensitivity analysis, this thesis runs and test the research models 
differently and also replaces some independent variables with alternative proxies. The next 
section summarises the research methodology of this thesis. 
5.12. Summary 
The hypotheses tested in this thesis focus on two dependent variables, corporate 
governance practice and corporate governance disclosure. The corporate governance 
practice score is based on nine criteria listed in Table 5.7. For the corporate governance 
disclosure score, this research uses the UNCTAD corporate governance disclosures 
benchmark listed in Table 5.2 to 5.6. To test the hypotheses related to the corporate 
governance practices in Indonesia and Malaysia, this study applies multivariate regression 
analysis on Research Models 1 and 2. Hypotheses related to the corporate governance 
disclosures in both countries are tested with OLS regressions of Research models 3 and 4. 
While Research Models 1 and 3 test all 400 companies’ data from Indonesia and Malaysia, 
Research Models 2 and 4 test the Indonesian data and Malaysian data separately. The 
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following chapter provides the results of these tests and analyses the impact of institutional 
changes and isomorphisms at the micro, meso, and macro levels on corporate governance 
practice and disclosure by corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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Chapter 6 Results and Analysis 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the research findings regarding corporate governance practice and 
disclosure by corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia. Section 6.2 provides descriptive 
statistics for the dependent and independent variables in this thesis. This is followed by 
Section 6.3 which presents the results of the multivariate regression analyses. Finally, 
Sections 6.4 and 6.5 describe the robustness of the results and offers sensitivity analysis. 
6.2. Descriptive results 
6.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 provide descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and 
independent variables used in this thesis. The data has been analysed as a pooled dataset 
and for each country separately to enable the analysis of mandatory and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. 
Table 6.1 summarises the descriptive statistics of all data from 400 corporations, 200 
each from Indonesia and Malaysia. Table 6.1 shows that the mean of corporate governance 
practice of all 400 corporations is 7.23, with a maximum score of 9 and a minimum score of 
2. The highest observed score for corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports 
of the 400 corporations is 45, with a maximum possible score of 52. Two corporations, both 
Indonesian, provided disclosures of 45 separate corporate governance-related types of 
information in their annual reports. The minimum score for corporate governance 
disclosures in the annual reports of all corporations is 12, with a mean close to 29.  
Fewer corporate governance disclosures are made on the WWW, with a mean observed 
score of 14.33. The maximum score for corporate governance disclosures on the WWW is 
40. Only one Indonesian corporation provided 40 disclosures of corporate governance 
information on the WWW, one of the two providing the most disclosures in the annual 
reports. In contrast, three corporations did not give any corporate governance information 
on the WWW. 
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Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Corporate governance practice 400 2 9 7.23 8 1.58 
Corporate governance 
disclosures in the annual reports  
400 12 45 28.98 29 5.70 
Corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW 
400 0 40 14.33 14 7.13 
Proportion of foreign-educated 
directors 
400 0 1 0.65 0.67 0.26 
Proportion of family ownership 400 0 0.97 0.33 0.37 0.28 
Proportion of government 
ownership 
400 0 0.90 0.063 0 0.18 
Corporate size 400 10.07 25.83 17.09 17.52 3.85 
Macro level (country) variable 400 0 1 0.50 0.5 0.50 
Leverage 400 0.00 1.67 0.23 0.19 0.21 
Profitability 400 -0.81 0.85 0.08 0.05 0.09 
Growth opportunities 400 0.08 31.98 2.01 1.33 2.51 
Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics of all data 
 
For 54 corporations, all directors were foreign-educated. In contrast, 16 Indonesian 
corporations did not have any foreign-educated directors. The mean of foreign-educated 
directors for all samples is 0.65.  
Furthermore, the mean score of corporate governance practice for Indonesian and 
Malaysian corporations is 7.23, ranging from a minimum score of 2 to a maximum of 9. 
There were 105 corporations scoring the highest possible (9) for corporate governance 
practice, and only one corporation with a minimum score of 2. 
Table 6.1 shows that family and government ownership in Indonesian and Malaysian 
corporations is quite high, with the maximum percentage of family ownership for a company 
reaching 97% and 90% for government ownership. The mean for government ownership is 
considerably lower compared to family ownership, 6.3% for government ownership and 33% 
for family ownership. There were 134 corporations that had 0% of family ownership and 353 
corporations had 0% government ownership. 
Natural logarithm of total assets, a proxy for corporate size, has a mean of 17.09, with a 
minimum score of 10.07 and a maximum of 25.83. The last independent variable in Models 
1 and 3 is a macro level (country) variable, which is a dichotomous variable taking the value 
of 1 if it is an Indonesian corporation and 0 if it is a Malaysian one. 
The last three variables are control variables. The leverage variable ranges from a 
minimum of 0.00 to a maximum of 1.67, with a mean of 0.23. For profitability, as measured 
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by return on assets, it ranges from -0.81 to 0.85 with a mean of 0.08. Tobin’s Q was used to 
measure growth opportunities, ranging from a minimum score of 0.08 to a maximum of 31.98 
and a mean of 2.01. 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 provide a summary of the descriptive statistics of the Indonesian and 
Malaysian data, respectively. Even though corporate governance disclosures of Indonesian 
corporations both in the annual reports and on WWW are generally higher, as indicated by 
the maximum score and its mean, the standard deviation of this measure for the Indonesian 
data is higher. This indicates that the corporate governance disclosure scores in Indonesia 
are spread out over a wider range of items as opposed to the Malaysian scores. While the 
maximum score of corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports and on WWW in 
Indonesia is 45 and 40 respectively, in Malaysia it is slightly lower at 38 and 31.  
The mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures of Indonesia and 
Malaysia are not comparable as the regulation in the two countries are different. In 
Indonesia, there are 21 mandatory corporate governance information that must be disclosed 
in the annual reports and on the corporate websites. Hence, the maximum possible score 
of mandatory corporate governance disclosures in Indonesia is 21, both in the annual 
reports and on WWW. For the voluntary corporate governance disclosures in Indonesia, the 
maximum possible score is 31 both in the annual reports and on WWW. The mandatory 
disclosure requirements in Malaysia are less than Indonesia, with only 17 mandatory 
disclosures required in the annual reports and 2 on WWW. Therefore, these constitute the 
maximum possible scores of mandatory corporate governance disclosures in Malaysia for 
annual reports and the WWW, respectively. The maximum possible score of voluntary 
corporate disclosures in Malaysia is higher than Indonesia as a result of the lower mandatory 
disclosure requirement. The maximum possible scores for voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures in Malaysia in the annual reports and on the WWW are 35 and 50 respectively. 
Table 6.2 shows that the maximum score of mandatory corporate governance disclosures 
in the annual reports is 21. In Indonesia, 29 corporations fully complied with the annual 
report disclosure requirements. However, none fully complied with the WWW disclosure 
requirements, as the maximum score of this variable is 20, with four corporations reaching 
this score, out of a total possible score of 21. Similar to Indonesia, 26 Malaysian corporations 
also fully complied with Malaysian regulations related to annual report disclosures.  
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Tables 6.2 and 6.3 also show that the corporate governance practices score of the 
Malaysian corporations is higher than that for the Indonesian corporations. The average 
score for corporate governance practice in Malaysia is 8. This average score is higher than 
the Indonesian data and has a lower standard deviation. The following section offers a 
descriptive analysis of corporate governance practice in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Corporate governance 
disclosures in the annual reports  
200 12 45 29.09 28 7.17 
Mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures in the 
annual reports 
200 9 21 16.85 17 3.08 
Voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures in the annual reports 
200 1 24 12.24 12 4.60 
Corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW 
200 0 40 14.33 14 7.13 
Mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures on the 
WWW 
200 0 20 10.13 10 5.14 
Voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW 
200 0 21 4.20 3.43 3.43 
Proportion of foreign-educated 
directors 
200 0 1 0.59 0.59 0.27 
Corporate governance practice 200 3 9 6.47 6 1.65 
Proportion of family ownership 200 0 0.97 0.35 0.40 0.30 
Proportion of government 
ownership 
200 0 0.90 0.07 0 0.20 
Corporate size 200 10.07 18.05 13.57 13.53 1.46 
Leverage 200 0.00 1.67 0.29 0.26 0.22 
Profitability 200 -0.81 0.85 0.06 0.05 0.12 
Growth opportunities 200 0.11 31.98 2.21 1.45 3.03 
Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics of Indonesian data               
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Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Corporate governance 
disclosures in the annual reports  
200 16 38 28.87 29 3.71 
Mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures in the 
annual reports 
200 7 17 15.39 16 1.28 
Voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures in the annual reports 
200 6 22 13.48 13 3.03 
Corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW 
200 0 31 14.33 14 6.41 
Mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures on the 
WWW 
200 0 2 0.96 1 0.65 
Voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW 
200 0 30 13.37 13 6.29 
Proportion of foreign-educated 
directors 
200 0 1 0.75 0.8 0.21 
Corporate governance practice 200 2 9 8.00 8 1.06 
Proportion of family ownership 200 0 0.81 0.31 0.35 0.26 
Proportion of government 
ownership 
200 0 0.75 0.06 0 0.17 
Corporate size 200 17.04 25.83 20.61 20.36 1.63 
Leverage 200 0.00 0.59 0.16 0.10 0.17 
Profitability 200 -0.51 0.73 0.08 0.06 0.09 
Growth opportunities 200 0.08 13.81 1.81 1.15 1.83 
Table 6.3. Descriptive statistics of Malaysian data  
6.2.2. Corporate governance practice 
The findings indicate that corporate governance practice in Malaysia scores better than 
that of Indonesia. The average score for corporate governance practice in Malaysia is 8. In 
Indonesia, the average score is 6. These scores show an improvement in corporate 
governance practice in both countries. According to Sawicki (2009), the average scores for 
corporate governance practice in Indonesia for 1994-1996, 1997-1998, and 1999-2003 are 
2.72, 2.93, and 4.36 respectively. The average scores for corporate governance practice in 
Malaysia for 1994-1996, 1997-1998, and 1999-2003 are 3.85, 3.93, and 6.19 respectively. 
These scores show that corporate governance practice in Malaysia is better than that of 
Indonesia. Furthermore, these scores also show that corporate governance practice in both 
countries is improved over years. The higher standard deviation of corporate governance 
practice scores in Indonesia also shows that the variation in corporate governance practice 
is spread over a wider range. The following figure shows how Malaysian corporate 
governance practice is largely concentrated in scores of 8 and 9. In Indonesia, this score is 
spread from scores 5 to 9. 
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From the nine criteria of corporate governance practice score used in this research, three 
of these are mandatory in Indonesia and two of these criteria are recommended (Indonesian 
Financial Services Authority, 2015a). The mandatory criteria are one-third independence of 
the board, chairman and CEO separation, and existence of an audit committee. Indonesian 
corporations are recommended to have a remuneration committee and a nomination 
committee. In Malaysia, there are four required practice. These are one-third independence 
of the board, existence of an audit committee, disclosure of frequency of audit committee 
meeting, and existence of a nomination committee. As an addition to these requirements, 
Malaysian corporations are recommended to have separate chairman and CEO, and have 
a remuneration committee. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Score of corporate governance practice in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
The lowest score for corporate governance practice in Indonesia is 3, with five Indonesian 
corporations (2.5%) having this score. All of these are family corporations. In Malaysia, the 
lowest corporate governance practice score is 2, scored by one corporation (0.5%) which is 
also family owned.  
In Indonesia, all 200 corporations have chairman and CEO separation and an audit 
committee. Furthermore, there are only nine corporations (4.5%) without a board at least 
one-third of which is comprised of independent members. These three criteria are 
mandatory in Indonesia. In Malaysia, all 200 corporations have an audit committee, with 
only one not disclosing the frequency of its audit committee meetings. Both the existence of 
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an audit committee and disclosure of frequency of its meetings are mandatory in Malaysia. 
While all 200 Indonesian corporations also have an audit committee, 22 corporations (11%) 
not disclosing the frequency of its audit committee meetings. In regard to chairman and CEO 
separation, there are 18 Malaysian corporations (9%) that do not have separate chairman 
and CEO. Other two mandatory practices in Malaysia are one-third independence of the 
board and existence of a nomination committee (Bursa Malaysia, 2016b). The findings show 
that there are only three Malaysian corporations that do not have a nomination committee, 
and eight corporations that do not meet the one-third independence threshold. 
There are 129 Indonesian corporations (64.5%) that do not have a nomination committee 
and 115 Indonesian corporations (57.5%) do not have a remuneration committee. This is in 
contrast with Malaysian corporations where there are only 3 (1.5%) without a nomination 
committee and 13 (6.5%) lacking a remuneration committee. In Indonesia, 85 Indonesian 
corporations (42.5%) do not use big four auditors.  
In Malaysia, 110 corporations (55%) have directors with shareholdings in excess of 5%. 
In Indonesia, there are 125 corporations (62.5%) with largest director’s shareholding more 
than 5% of issued capital. 
The findings show that corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia follow the required 
corporate governance practice in their jurisdictions, with only a few exception. The difference 
between the corporate governance practice scores in the two countries is explained by 
several factors. First, the mandatory requirements of corporate governance practice in 
Malaysia are more extensive than that of Indonesia. Second, the majority of Malaysian 
corporations seem to follow recommended practice. Despite being only recommended 
practice, in Malaysia, chairman and CEO separation, and the existence of a remuneration 
committee are almost universally accepted, whereas in Indonesia, more than half of the 
corporations do not have either a remuneration or nomination committee. Third, it might be 
contributed by the different climates for corporate governance reform in the two countries. 
While the government’s agenda drove corporate governance reform in Malaysia, in 
Indonesia reform was driven by the requirements imposed by IMF when Indonesia required 
IMF assistance during the financial crisis. Even though the current administration in 
Indonesia is pushing for improvements in corporate governance practice, the new 
regulations were issued at the end of 2015. Therefore, any subsequent improvement in 
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corporate governance practice in Indonesia may not be captured by the timeframe for this 
research. 
Table 6.4 summarises the number of corporations that scored 0 for each corporate 
governance practice category. A zero score indicates that the corporation does not meet the 
particular corporate governance practice criterion. The next section gives a descriptive 
analysis of corporate governance disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
 
Corporate governance practice criteria Number of 
Indonesian 
corporations 
score 0 for each 
criterion 
Number of 
Malaysian 
corporations 
score 0 for each 
criterion 
One-third independence of the board, as measured by the 
number of independent directors divided by total number of 
directors 
9 8 
Chairman and CEO separation 0 18 
Largest director’s shareholding (as measured using direct 
interest and deemed interest divided by total issued shares) 
below 5% of issued capital 
75 110 
Existence of an audit committee 0 0 
Disclosure of frequency of audit committee meeting 22 1 
Expertise of audit committee 72 12 
Engagement of big four auditors 85 36 
Existence of a remuneration committee 115 13 
Existence of a nomination committee 129 3 
Table 6.4. Corporate governance practice in Indonesia and Malaysia  
6.2.3. Corporate governance disclosures 
Corporate governance disclosures in Indonesian companies’ annual reports have a 
higher standard deviation compared to those in Malaysia: 7.17, compared with 3.71. The 
following figure presents the corporate governance disclosure scores in annual reports in 
both countries. 
Figure 6.2 shows that there are 21 Indonesian corporations (10.5%) that had a higher 
corporate governance disclosure score in annual reports than the corresponding maximum 
score in Malaysia. The maximum corporate governance disclosure score in the annual 
reports in Malaysia is 38, with only one Malaysian corporation (0.5%) with this score. In 
Indonesia, the maximum score is 45 and two Indonesian corporations (1%) had this.  
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These two Indonesian corporations, Bank Central Asia and Bank Danamon Indonesia, 
are also the ones that provided the most corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. 
Bank Central Asia disclosed 40 types of corporate governance information on its WWW, 
and Bank Danamon Indonesia disclosed 39 types of disclosure. There is a similar situation 
in Malaysia, where the corporation giving the most disclosures in its annual report also 
offered the most disclosures on the WWW. Telekom Malaysia Berhad, which received a 
score of 38 for its corporate governance disclosures in the annual report, disclosed 31 types 
of corporate governance information on its WWW. Figure 6.3 provides data on corporate 
governance disclosures on corporate websites in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
 
Figure 6.2. Score of corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports in Indonesia and 
Malaysia.  
 
Figure 6.3. Score of corporate governance disclosures on the WWW in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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Some Indonesian corporations provided more disclosures on the WWW than those in 
Malaysia. The maximum corporate governance disclosures on the WWW in Malaysia is 31, 
and nine Indonesian corporations that provided more than 31 on the WWW.  
In terms of mandatory corporate governance disclosures in annual reports, in Indonesia, 
29 corporations (14.5%) fully complied with this requirement. This means that 171 
Indonesian corporations (85.5%) did not meet the mandatory disclosure requirements for 
annual reports, even though this is obligatory. This research finds that there are only two 
types of information disclosed by all 200 Indonesian corporations. This is related to the 
financial and operating results, and the board of directors’ composition. Meanwhile, the least 
disclosed mandatory corporate governance information concerns the performance 
evaluation process, with only 69 corporations (34.5%) that provide such disclosures in their 
annual reports. Table 6.5 summarises the five most disclosed elements of mandatory 
information and five least disclosed in the annual reports of Indonesian corporations. 
The level of compliance to the mandatory corporate governance disclosures in Malaysia 
is also similar, with only 26 Malaysian corporations (13%) providing all 17 elements of 
mandatory information in their annual reports. However, four types of information were 
disclosed by all 200 corporations in their annual reports. Table 6.6 summarises the most 
and least disclosed sorts of mandatory corporate governance information in annual reports. 
Five most disclosed mandatory 
corporate governance types of 
information in Indonesia 
Number of 
Indonesian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this in their 
annual 
reports 
Five least disclosed 
mandatory corporate 
governance types of 
information in Indonesia 
Number of 
Indonesian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this in their 
annual 
reports 
Financial and operating results 200 Performance evaluation 
process 
69 
Composition of board of directors 
(executives and non-executives) 
200 Professional development 
and training activities 
72 
Qualifications and biographical 
information on board members 
198 Policy on “whistle blower” 
protection for all employees 
102 
Ownership structure 197 A code of ethics for all 
company employees 
107 
Types and duties of outside board 
and management position 
194 A code of ethics for the board 
and waivers to the ethics 
code 
107 
Table 6.5. Five most and least disclosed mandatory corporate governance information in the annual 
reports in Indonesia  
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Five most disclosed types of 
mandatory corporate 
governance information in 
Malaysia 
Number of 
Malaysian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this in their 
annual 
reports 
Five least disclosed types 
of mandatory corporate 
governance information in 
Malaysia 
Number of 
Malaysian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this in their 
annual 
reports 
Ownership structure 200 Auditors’ involvement in non-
audit work and the fees paid 
to the auditors 
75 
Financial and operating results 200 Control structure 102 
Board’s responsibilities regarding 
financial communications 
200 Policy and performance in 
connection with 
environmental and social 
responsibility 
169 
Governance structures, such as 
committees and other 
mechanisms to prevent conflict of 
interest 
200 Material interests of 
members of the board and 
management 
185 
Internal control system 198 Professional development 
and training activities 
187 
Table 6.6. Five most and least disclosed types of mandatory corporate governance information in 
the annual reports in Malaysia  
Corporations in Indonesia and Malaysia also disclose information voluntarily regarding 
their corporate governance practices. In Malaysia, two kinds of voluntary information are 
disclosed by all 200 corporations. Information regarding “checks and balances” mechanisms 
and the composition of the board of directors are found in all 200 Malaysian corporations’ 
annual reports. “Checks and balances” mechanisms are also categorised as voluntary 
information in Indonesia, and this is among the top five voluntary sorts of information 
disclosed by Indonesian corporations. Table 6.7 summarises the top five most disclosed 
voluntary types of corporate governance information in annual reports in both countries. 
Corporate governance disclosures on the corporate website in Malaysia are mostly 
voluntary, as only two required items. However, the level of compliance to disclose this 
mandatory information is low. Information regarding meeting agenda is disclosed by 154 
Malaysian corporations (77%). The process for holding annual general meetings, is only 
disclosed by 38 corporations (19%).  
In terms of voluntary information, the most accessible information on the WWW is 
composition of board of directors, disclosed by 187 corporations (93.5%). The next most 
available information on the WWW of Malaysian corporations is also related to the board. 
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Disclosures regarding the role and functions of the board of directors are found in 162 (81%) 
Malaysian corporations’ websites. 
 
Five most disclosed types of 
voluntary corporate 
governance information in 
Indonesia 
Number of 
Indonesian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this in their 
annual 
reports 
Five most disclosed types 
of voluntary corporate 
governance information in 
Malaysia 
Number of 
Malaysian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this in their 
annual 
reports 
Independence of the board of 
directors 
197 “Checks and balances” 
mechanisms 
200 
Nature, type and elements of 
related-party transactions 
186 Composition of board of 
directors (executives and 
non-executives) 
200 
Governance structures, such as 
committees and other 
mechanisms to prevent conflict 
of interest 
179 Nature, type and elements of 
related-party transactions 
198 
“Checks and balances” 
mechanisms 
178 Composition and function of 
governance committee 
structures 
195 
Number of outside board and 
management position 
directorships held by the directors 
178 Availability and accessibility 
of meeting agenda 
194 
Table 6.7. Five most disclosed types of voluntary corporate governance information in the annual 
reports in Indonesia and Malaysia 
 
There are 21 items of corporate governance information that need to be disclosed on the 
WWW by Indonesian corporations. However, the maximum score of mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures by any Indonesian company on the WWW is only 20. No Indonesian 
corporation fully complies with the mandatory disclosure requirements for the internet. Of 
these, information regarding the composition of the board is the most disclosed information 
on the corporate website in Indonesia. This finding is the same as in Malaysia. The following 
table summarises the five most disclosed mandatory and voluntary kinds of corporate 
governance information on the WWW in Indonesia. 
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Five most disclosed types of 
mandatory corporate 
governance information in 
Indonesia 
Number of 
Indonesian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this on their 
WWW 
Five most disclosed types 
of voluntary corporate 
governance information in 
Indonesia 
Number of 
Indonesian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this on their 
WWW 
Composition of board of directors 
(executives and non-executives) 
183 Independence of the board 
of directors 
169 
Qualifications and biographical 
information on board members 
156 Number of outside board 
and management position 
directorships held by the 
directors 
137 
Availability and accessibility of 
meeting agenda 
152 Company objectives 118 
Process for holding annual 
general meetings 
152 Governance structures, such 
as committees and other 
mechanisms to prevent 
conflict of interest 
77 
Duration of director’s contracts 143 “Checks and balances” 
mechanisms 
76 
Table 6.8. Five most disclosed types of mandatory and voluntary corporate governance information 
on the WWW in Indonesia 
 
This research further analyses whether corporate governance disclosures on the WWW 
are complementary to the disclosures in the annual reports, or whether corporations disclose 
the same information in both media. The findings show that corporations use the WWW to 
complement their annual reports for some corporate governance information. In Indonesia, 
almost half of the sample use the WWW as a complement to the annual reports to provide 
information regarding the process for holding annual general meetings. These 95 
corporations (47.5%) do not provide this information in their annual reports. Table 6.8 shows 
that this information is being disclosed by 152 corporations (76%), which means 57 
corporations (28.5%) disclose this information both in the annual reports and on WWW. In 
Malaysia, 41 corporations (20.5%) use the WWW to complement their annual reports to 
disclose information regarding types and duties of outside board and management positions. 
The following table summarises the top five incremental disclosures on the WWW. 
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Five most disclosed 
incremental types of corporate 
governance information on the 
WWW in Indonesia 
Number of 
Indonesian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this on their 
WWW 
Five most disclosed 
incremental types of 
corporate governance 
information on the WWW 
in Malaysia 
Number of 
Malaysian 
corporations 
disclosing 
this on their 
WWW  
Process for holding annual 
general meetings 
95 Types and duties of outside 
board and management 
positions 
41 
A code of ethics for the board and 
waivers to the ethics code 
27 Company objectives 39 
A code of ethics for all company 
employees 
27 Process for holding annual 
general meetings 
38 
Availability and accessibility of 
meeting agenda 
22 Performance evaluation 
process 
18 
Impact of environmental and 
social responsibility policies on 
the firm’s sustainability 
13 Policy on “whistle blower” 
protection for all employees 
14 
Table 6.9. Five most disclosed incremental types of corporate governance information on the WWW 
in Indonesia and Malaysia 
From the top five most disclosed incremental types of corporate governance information 
on the WWW, the top four are all mandatory disclosures. Disclosures regarding the code of 
ethics for the board and employees are also required in the annual reports. This finding 
shows that 27 Indonesian corporations (13.5%) prefer to disclose their code of ethics on the 
WWW, rather than in their annual reports, despite this being a mandatory annual report 
requirement. With a lot of detailed information regarding its code of ethics, these 
corporations prefer to use the WWW. Hence this finding supports prior research that 
contends that WWW disclosures are able to provide more detailed information as opposed 
to the annual reports (Lodhia, 2014; Lodhia et al., 2004; Xiao et al., 2002). 
6.2.4. Correlations 
Tables 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12 present the Pearson’s bivariate correlation matrix. Table 6.10 
presents the correlation between dependent variables and independent variables for all 400 
corporations. All independent variables are significantly correlated with corporate 
governance practice. While the proportion of government ownership and corporate size are 
positively correlated with the score for corporate governance practices, the proportion of 
family ownership and the country variable are negatively correlated. In regard to corporate 
governance disclosures in annual reports, almost all independent variables are significantly 
and positively correlated, with the exception of the proportion of family ownership and the 
country variable. The proportion of family ownership is significantly and negatively correlated 
with corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports, and the country variable is not 
110  
significantly correlated. For corporate governance disclosures on the WWW, only four 
independent variables are significantly correlated. Three independent variables, corporate 
governance practice, proportion of government ownership, and corporate size are positively 
correlated with disclosures on the WWW. The proportion of family ownership is negatively 
correlated with disclosures on the WWW. 
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 present the correlation matrix for Indonesian data and Malaysian 
data. These tables show similar results to Table 6.10, where almost all independent 
variables are significantly correlated with the dependent variables. The general rule of thumb 
to test for multicolinearity is that serious multicolinearity in the research model exists if the 
correlation between two independent variables exceeds 0.8 (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). All 
bivariate correlation coefficients between independent variables in Tables 6.10, 6.11, and 
6.12 are below 0.8. Hence, this suggests that there is no serious threat of multicolinearity 
that will seriously bias the estimated coefficients. 
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 A W FEBP CG FAMP GOVP SIZE MACR
O 
LEV PRO 
W .481**                   
FEBP .189** 0.067                 
CG .441** .324** .409**               
FAMP -.235** -.241** -.138** -.386**             
GOVP .384** .207** 0.040 .175** -.404**           
SIZE .169** .141** .464** .578** -.146** 0.092         
MACRO 0.019 0.000 -.407** -.484** 0.080 0.029 -.915**       
LEV -.149** 0.007 -0.069 -.231** 0.072 -0.032 -.237** .309**     
PRO 0.008 -0.060 0.011 0.082 -0.025 -0.072 -0.079 -0.058 -.230**   
GO -0.045 -0.060 -0.003 0.000 -.099* -0.048 -.203** 0.079 -.130** .526** 
Table 6.10. Pearson’s bivariate correlation matrix – dependent and independent variables of all data 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed), * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). 
A = corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports; W = corporate governance disclosures on the WWW; FEBP = proportion of foreign-educated directors; CG = corporate 
governance practice; FAMP = proportion of family ownership; GOVP = proportion of government ownership; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; MACRO = country variable, 1 if the 
corporation is listed in Indonesia; LEV = debt to total assets; PRO = return on assets; GO = Tobin’s Q. 
 A AM AV W WM WV FEBP CG FAMP GOVP SIZE LEV PRO 
AM .900**                         
AV .957** .735**                       
W .581** .499** .572**                     
WM .466** .428** .439** .942**                   
WV .624** .493** .643** .863** .643**                 
FEBP .246** .206** .245** 0.086 0.084 0.070               
CG .557** .447** .570** .488** .419** .483** .254**             
FAMP -.252** -.174* -.277** -.190** -0.125 -.245** -0.109 -.384**           
GOVP .421** .369** .409** .227** .162* .274** -0.055 .174* -.415**         
SIZE .634** .523** .640** .483** .390** .515** .198** .520** -.161* .274**       
LEV -.215** -.194** -.206** -0.042 0.027 -0.138 -0.016 -.142* .153* -0.107 -0.067     
PRO -0.007 -0.052 0.023 -0.060 -0.052 -0.060 0.065 0.092 -0.013 -0.036 -.168* -.196**   
GO -0.088 -0.115 -0.060 -0.092 -0.094 -0.068 0.030 0.023 -0.107 -0.056 -.291** -.179* .397** 
Table 6.11. Pearson’s bivariate correlation matrix – dependent and independent variables of Indonesian data 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed), * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). 
A = corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports; AM = mandatory corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports; AV = voluntary corporate governance disclosures 
in the annual reports; W = corporate governance disclosures on the WWW; WM = mandatory corporate governance disclosures on the WWW; WV = voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW; FEBP = proportion of foreign-educated directors; CG = corporate governance practice; FAMP = proportion of family ownership; GOVP = proportion of 
government ownership; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; LEV = debt to total assets; PRO = return on assets; GO = Tobin’s Q. 
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 A AM AV W WM WV FEBP CG FAMP GOVP SIZE LEV PRO 
AM .660**                         
AV .948** .388**                       
W .282** 0.034 .332**                     
WM 0.073 0.049 0.069 .229**                   
WV .280** 0.030 .331** .995** 0.131                 
FEBP .152* 0.040 .170* 0.054 0.045 0.050               
CG .397** .419** .310** .153* .189** 0.136 .289**             
FAMP -.228** -.166* -.209** -.315** -.165* -.304** -0.126 -.436**           
GOVP .339** .202** .330** .179* 0.051 .177* .225** .298** -.399**         
SIZE .251** .155* .243** .213** -0.045 .222** .320** .227** -.205** .319**       
LEV -0.043 -0.044 -0.034 0.085 -0.112 0.099 .202** -0.009 -0.102 0.052 .344**     
PRO 0.047 0.013 0.052 -0.060 0.100 -0.072 -0.129 0.011 -0.031 -0.114 -.493** -.264**   
GO 0.085 0.020 0.096 0.004 0.099 -0.006 0.039 0.097 -0.110 -0.042 -.415** -0.134 .810** 
Table 6.12. Pearson’s bivariate correlation matrix – dependent and independent variables of Malaysian data 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed), * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). 
A = corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports; AM = mandatory corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports; AV = voluntary corporate governance disclosures 
in the annual reports; W = corporate governance disclosures on the WWW; WM = mandatory corporate governance disclosures on the WWW; WV = voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW; FEBP = proportion of foreign-educated directors; CG = corporate governance practice; FAMP = proportion of family ownership; GOVP = proportion of 
government ownership; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; LEV = debt to total assets; PRO = return on assets; GO = Tobin’s Q. 
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6.3. Empirical results 
6.3.1. Determinants of corporate governance practice 
This study analyses the impact of institutional isomorphisms on corporate governance 
practice at three institutional levels. At the micro level, the impact of foreign-educated boards 
on corporate governance practice is evaluated. At the meso level, the impacts of family and 
government ownership, and corporate size are assessed with respect to corporate 
governance practice. At the macro level, this research analyses the effect of institutional 
changes at the country level on corporate governance practice.  
Table 6.13 provides the coefficients and p-values with significance levels for the 
multivariate regression analysis. To analyse the impact of three institutional levels on 
corporate governance, Research Models 1 and 2 are employed. The results for the 
multivariate regression analysis of Research Model 1 is presented in the first column.  
For Research model 2, two separate analyses are conducted. The result of the 
multivariate regression analysis of Research Model 2 on the research sample of Indonesian 
corporations is available in the second column. Finally, the result of the multivariate 
regression analysis of Research Model 2 on the research sample of Malaysian corporations 
is available in the third column. All models are significant at p < 0.0001. The R-squared of 
Model 1 is 0.4711. For Model 2, the R-squared for Indonesian data is 0.4079 and for 
Malaysian data, it is 0.2840. 
This study finds that the internationalisation of the board of directors is significantly and 
positively associated with the corporate governance practice score in both Indonesia and 
Malaysia. FEBP is significant at 1% on Research Model 1 for all data and on Research 
Model 2 for Malaysian data. For Indonesian data (Research Model 2), FEBP is significant at 
10%. Foreign-educated directors exercise normative isomorphism in Indonesian and 
Malaysian corporations to improve their corporate governance practice. This finding 
supports prior research that contends that education indicates individual values and foreign 
influence contributes to the change of individual values (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Merchant 
et al., 1995). Furthermore, this result shows that with both countries adopting and adapting 
foreign countries’ best practices in corporate governance, the existence of a foreign-
educated directors (instead of a foreign directors) influenced by foreign values but 
understanding local values contributes to the improvement of corporate governance 
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practice. Thus, normative isomorphism at the micro level is evident in Indonesia and 
Malaysia and Hypothesis 1a, which stated as “there is no association between the 
percentage of the board of directors which is foreign-educated and corporate governance 
practice” is rejected. 
 
 Research Samples 
All data Indonesia Malaysia 
Intercept 1.3872 -1.1133 5.7552*** 
  (0.1256) (0.2652) (0.0000) 
FEBP 0.8659*** 0.6711* 0.9834*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0597) (0.0055) 
FAMP -1.5387*** -1.6986*** -1.4412*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GOVP -0.1380 -0.6839 0.4487 
 (0.7021) (0.2036) (0.3066) 
SIZE 0.3115*** 0.5702*** 0.0954* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0658) 
MACRO 1.0102*** -0.2082  
 (0.0020) (0.6346)  
LEV -0.7297** -0.2082 -0.8876** 
 (0.0176) (0.6346) (0.0328) 
PRO 0.8221 1.0599 -1.1877 
  (0.1706) (0.1834) (0.2560) 
GO 0.0397 0.0543 0.1022* 
 (0.1456) (0.1080) (0.0714) 
R2 0.4711 0.4079 0.2840 
Model p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
D-W stat 2.0319 2.0782 2.2726 
Table 6.13. Determinants of corporate governance practice in Indonesia and Malaysia 
p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance level (two tailed) at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Dependent variable is corporate governance practice. Independent variables are as follows. FEBP = proportion of foreign-
educated directors; FAMP = proportion of family ownership; GOVP = proportion of government ownership; SIZE = natural 
logarithm of total assets; MACRO = country variable, 1 if the corporation is listed in Indonesia; LEV = debt to total assets; 
PRO = return on assets; GO = Tobin’s Q. 
 
The impact of meso level institutional isomorphism is analysed through FAMP, GOVP, 
and SIZE. Hypothesis 3a states that there is no association between family ownership and 
corporate governance practice. This hypothesis is rejected as family ownership is 
significantly and negatively associated with corporate governance practice in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. All research models show that the proportion of family ownership is significant at 
1%. This finding confirms prior research (Ali et al., 2007; S. S. M. Ho & Wong, 2001). This 
also shows that family corporations mimic other family corporations in term of poor corporate 
governance practice. Thus, mimetic isomorphism at the meso level is evident in both 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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The significance level of GOVP across Research Models 1 and 2 for both the Indonesian 
and Malaysian data is not significant. Therefore, the findings fail to reject Hypothesis 4a, 
there is no association between government ownership and corporate governance practice. 
Despite prior research that documents poor management of government corporations (Ding 
et al., 2014; Megginson et al., 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 2002), this research fails to find 
evidence that government ownership has any association with corporate governance 
practice in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The last proxy for analysis of the impact of institutional isomorphism at the meso level is 
corporate size. Corporate size is positively significant in all research models. In Research 
Model 1, the coefficient for SIZE is 0.3115 and significant at 1. In Research Model 2 for 
Indonesian data, it is also significant at 1% with a coefficient of 0.5702. In Malaysia, SIZE is 
significant at 10% with a coefficient of 0.0954. Therefore, corporate size is positively 
associated with corporate governance practice in the combined data and in Malaysia. This 
finding confirms the contention of Jennings and Zandbergen (1995) that mimetic 
isomorphism influences large corporations’ practices. In this case, large corporations mimic 
other large corporations’ corporate governance practice to ensure that they do not lose 
competitive advantage over others.  
However, this research also finds that corporate size is not positively associated with 
corporate governance practice in the data of Indonesian corporations. Therefore, this may 
indicate that good corporate governance practice in large Indonesian corporations is not as 
institutionalised as it is in Malaysian corporations. In fact, the only variable that is positively 
associated with corporate governance practice in the data of Indonesian corporations is 
internationalization of the board of directors. This may show that Indonesian corporations 
try to improve their corporate governance practice by ‘importing’ foreign values’ influence 
on the board. 
 From the three measurements for institutional isomorphism at the meso level on 
corporate governance practice, this study finds evidence that mimetic isomorphism at the 
meso level influences corporate governance practice in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Corporations with a higher level of family ownership tend to have poorer corporate 
governance practice. Conversely, larger corporations tend to have better corporate 
governance practice. These findings provide evidence on mimetic isomorphism, a process 
in which a corporation imitates the corporate practices of other corporations. In the 
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Indonesian and Malaysian cases, poor corporate governance practice in family corporations 
tends to spread to other family corporations. In contrast, large corporations mimic each 
other’s best corporate governance practices and this is evident in a significant positive 
association of corporate size with corporate governance practices. 
The last analysis of the institutional impact on corporate governance practice is at the 
macro level. Indonesia and Malaysia have different board structures, with Indonesia having 
adopted a dual board structure and Malaysia a single board structure. Prior research 
contends that corporate boards play a more important role in the insider corporate 
governance system, a corporate governance system assumed in Indonesia (Breuer & 
Salzmann, 2012). Malaysia has taken on  an outsider corporate governance system, and 
hence corporate boards may have a less important role there. Therefore, it can be expected 
that the normative isomorphism in Indonesian corporations is stronger than in Malaysia. 
For coercive isomorphism in Indonesia and Malaysia, this study considers Indonesia’s 
new administration, and the origins of the legal system in both countries. The new 
administration in Indonesia may have a positive impact on the improvement of corporate 
governance practice, as it shows concerns over corporate governance development with 
the introduction of a series of new regulations. However, being a civil law country, as 
opposed to Malaysia, which uses common law, Indonesia is placed in a weaker position for 
investors’ legal protection and this indicates poorer corporate governance practice. In fact, 
several country-level governance indicators that have been discussed in the institutional 
background (Chapter 2) show that Malaysian governance is better than Indonesian.  
The results in Table 6.13 show that macro level institutional isomorphism positively and 
significantly affects corporate governance practice, and thus Hypothesis 6a is rejected. 
Hypothesis 6a was stated in null as “There is no difference in corporate governance 
practices between Indonesia and Malaysia”. In spite of the descriptive statistics showing that 
corporate governance practice in Indonesia is poorer than in Malaysia, after controlling for 
external factors, the multivariate regression analysis finds the recent institutional change in 
Indonesia has brought a positive improvement. Despite prior research that indicates 
Indonesian corporate governance practice is one of the worst in ASEAN (ADB, 2014) and 
macro level indicators (i.e. the origin of the legal system and legal protections) are in favour 
of Malaysia, this study finds that Indonesian corporations perform better in terms of 
corporate governance practice.  
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The findings show that normative pressures exercised by the board of directors in 
Indonesia, which takes the form of a dual board, provide better pressures than in Malaysia 
which has the single board. Evidence of the internationalisation of the board of directors in 
Indonesia is the only positive significant explanatory variable showing the strong influence 
of the board of directors on corporate governance practice in Indonesia. Furthermore, this 
result also shows a successful coercive isomorphism at the macro level in Indonesia. Its 
new administration in 2014, followed by a series of new regulations in corporate governance 
and corporate disclosures, all contribute to the improvement of corporate governance 
practice in Indonesia. 
In regard to the control variables, LEV is significantly and negatively associated with 
corporate governance practice in Research Models 1 and 2 for the Malaysian data. For GO, 
it is only positively significant in Research Model 2 for the Malaysian data. Furthermore, 
PRO is not significant across all research models. From these results regarding the 
determinants of corporate governance practice, it can be concluded that all kinds of 
institutional isomorphism across the three different institutional levels are influential on 
corporate governance practice in Indonesia and Malaysia. The following section discusses 
the determinants of corporate governance disclosure in annual reports. 
6.3.2. Determinants of corporate governance disclosure in the annual reports 
Table 6.14 summarises the multivariate regression results of Research Models 3 and 4. 
While Research Model 3 tests the whole research sample, two separate analyses of 
Research Model 4 were run, one on Indonesian data and the other with Malaysian data. 
Furthermore, this study also extends corporate governance disclosure analysis for these 
countries by distinguishing between mandatory and voluntary disclosures on a country by 
country basis. Results are available in Table 6.15. This analysis cannot be conducted in the 
whole sample due to different regulations in these two countries. 
Table 6.14 shows that all models are significant at 1% with p < 0.0001. The R-squared 
for Model 3 is 0.4333, and for Model 4 is 0.5663 for the Indonesian data and 0.2558 for the 
Malaysian data. From all independent variables observed, only one different result emerges 
across the three tests. FEBP is significant in Indonesia, but not in Malaysia or in the two 
countries’ data combined. For all other independent variables, CG, FAMP, GOVP, and SIZE, 
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the significance and sign of the coefficients are the same across all tests for all three 
datasets. 
While the average proportion of foreign-educated directors in Malaysia is higher than in 
Indonesia, foreign-educated directors are not a significant determinant of corporate 
governance disclosures in Malaysian annual reports. With the reform agenda of the new 
Indonesian administration, foreign-educated directors in Indonesian corporations are 
asserting best international practice in regard to corporate governance disclosures in their 
annual reports. FEBP is significant at 5% in Indonesia. 
This finding shows that internationalisation of the board of directors is positively 
associated with corporate governance disclosures only in Indonesia, hence Hypothesis 1b 
(There is no association between the percentage of the board of directors which is foreign-
educated and the extent of corporate governance disclosure) is only partially supported. 
This indicates that boards with foreign influence exercise normative pressure to ensure 
higher transparency in the annual reports in Indonesia. While this may be seen as the better 
influence of a board of directors in a dual board structure, this may also be interpreted to 
indicate that shareholder protection in Malaysia, in terms of transparency, is well-
institutionalised in corporate practice and does not need further normative pressure at the 
micro level. 
The next four analyses concern the impact of institutional isomorphism at the meso level. 
Hypothesis 2 (There is no association between corporate governance practice and the 
extent of corporate governance disclosures) is rejected, as CG is positively significant at 
1%. The coefficients of CG in Research Model 3, and Research Model 4 in Indonesia and 
Malaysia are 1.4145, 1.2046, and 1.0376, respectively. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
corporate governance practice is positively associated with corporate governance 
disclosures in Indonesian and Malaysian annual reports. This finding shows that better 
corporate governance practice leads to more extensive corporate governance disclosures, 
similar to that of Abdullah, Percy, and Stewart (2015). This supports the notion that 
corporations mimic other corporations’ practices. In this case, corporations with a certain 
level of corporate governance practice try to keep up with similar corporations in providing 
corporate governance disclosures.  
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This research fails to reject Hypothesis 3b, as FAMP is not significant across tests of the 
three datasets. Hypothesis 3b was stated in null as there is no association between family 
ownership and the extent of corporate governance disclosures. Thus, the proportion of 
family ownership is not associated with corporate governance disclosures in the annual 
reports of Indonesia and Malaysia. Contrary to prior research that found family ownership is 
negatively associated with corporate disclosure (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Ali et al., 2007; 
Ghazali & Weetman, 2006), this study does not find any association between family 
ownership and corporate governance disclosures in either countries.  
Further analysis of mimetic isomorphism at the meso level shows that the proportion of 
government ownership is positively associated with corporate governance disclosures in 
annual reports in Indonesia and Malaysia. Therefore, Hypothesis 4b (there is no association 
between government ownership and the extent of corporate governance disclosures) is 
rejected. The coefficient of GOVP in Research Model 3 is 7.7113 and is significant at 1%. 
For GOVP in Research Model 3 in Indonesia and Malaysia, the coefficients are 10.5687 and 
4.6422 respectively, both significant at 1%. This finding provides evidence on mimetic 
isomorphism at the meso level in government corporations.  
The analysis also rejects Hypothesis 5b, as SIZE is significant at 1%. Hypothesis 5b is 
“There is no association between the corporate size and the extent of corporate governance 
disclosures”. All the coefficients are positive, and therefore corporate size is positively 
associated with corporate governance disclosures in Indonesian and Malaysian annual 
reports. This finding provides evidence of mimetic pressures among large corporations, 
suggesting that large corporations mimic each other’s disclosure practices, consequently 
providing more disclosures. 
The last hypothesis, Hypothesis 6b (There is no difference in corporate governance 
disclosures between Indonesia and Malaysia), is related to institutional isomorphism at the 
macro level. This research finds that Indonesian corporations provide better corporate 
governance disclosures in their annual reports compared to Malaysian corporations. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 6b is also rejected. Similarly to prior research that put Indonesian 
corporations among the worst performers of corporate governance practice, the ADB (2014) 
also found that Indonesian corporations were among the worst in this sense in Southeast 
Asia. However, the current study finds otherwise. Thus, this researcher provides evidence 
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of normative isomorphism through different board structures. Results also indicate that 
coercive isomorphism on the macro level can influence corporate governance disclosures. 
In summary, this research finds evidence of institutional isomorphism at the micro level 
in Indonesia alone. Institutional isomorphism at the meso level is evident both in Indonesia 
and Malaysia, with corporate governance practice, the proportion of government ownership, 
and corporate size positively and significantly associated with corporate governance 
disclosures in the annual reports. Of all meso level variables, only the proportion of family 
ownership is not associated with corporate governance disclosures in the annual report. 
This study also finds evidence of institutional isomorphism at the macro level, with 
Indonesian corporations providing better corporate governance disclosure, in the sense of 
a larger incidence and variety of types of disclosures, in their annual reports compared to in 
Malaysia. 
For the control variables in Research Models 3 and 4, Table 6.14 shows that leverage is 
negatively and significantly associated with all data combined and for Indonesian data. 
Leverage is significant at 1% in Research Model 3, and significant at 5% in Research Model 
4 for the Indonesian data. Profitability is also significantly and positively associated with 
corporate governance disclosures in annual reports in Research Model 3. The significance 
level of profitability is 5%. 
This research extends corporate governance disclosure analysis by differentiating 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures for data in Indonesia and Malaysia. The dependent 
variable used in Table 6.14 is corporate governance disclosures, regardless of whether it is 
mandatory or voluntary information. The study employs research Model 4 and uses 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia as the dependent variables, 
and the results are summarised in Table 6.15. All research models are significant at 1%, 
with R-squared for Indonesian data being 40% and 56% and for Malaysian data around 
20%. 
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 Research Samples 
All data Indonesia Malaysia 
Intercept -6.3834* -7.3905** 8.8555 
  (0.0602) (0.0492) (0.0302) 
FEBP 1.3812 3.0937** -0.4281 
 (0.1535) (0.0216) (0.7374) 
CG 1.4145*** 1.2046*** 1.0376*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
FAMP 1.4199 1.7008 0.5269 
 (0.1232) (0.2192) (0.6205) 
GOVP 7.7113*** 10.5687*** 4.6422*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0034) 
SIZE 1.0831*** 1.9565*** 0.5481*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0036) 
MACRO 10.7663***   
 (0.0000)   
LEV -3.8865*** -3.6112** -1.7658 
 (0.0008) (0.0283) (0.2378) 
PRO 5.3926** 2.9118 4.6868 
  (0.0167) (0.3297) (0.2110) 
GO -0.0383 0.0158 0.1361 
 (0.7079) (0.9006) (0.5032) 
R2 0.4333 0.5663 0.2558 
Model p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
D-W stat 1.6493 1.5704 1.8710 
Table 6.14. Determinants of corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports 
p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance level (two tailed) at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Dependent variable is corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports. Independent variables are as follows. FEBP 
= proportion of foreign-educated directors; CG = corporate governance practice; FAMP = proportion of family ownership; 
GOVP = proportion of government ownership; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; MACRO = country variable, 1 if the 
corporation is listed in Indonesia; LEV = debt to total assets; PRO = return on assets; GO = Tobin’s Q. 
 
Similar to results presented in Table 6.14, analysis using mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures also only finds evidence of institutional isomorphism at the micro level in 
Indonesia. FEBP, as a proxy for institutional isomorphism at the micro level, is positively and 
significantly associated with corporate governance disclosures in Indonesia. For mandatory 
disclosures, it is significant at 1%, with a coefficient of 1.2901 and for voluntary disclosures 
it is significant at 5%, with a coefficient of 1.8036. In the Malaysian data, this variable is 
significant neither in mandatory disclosures nor in voluntary disclosures. 
Corporate governance practice is also a positive and significant determinant of corporate 
governance disclosures in the annual reports, both for mandatory and voluntary disclosures, 
in the two countries. CG is significant at 5% for voluntary disclosures in Malaysia, and at 1% 
for both mandatory and voluntary disclosures in Indonesia and only for mandatory 
disclosures in Malaysia. This result is also similar to those in Table 6.14, where corporate 
governance practice is significant across the three models. 
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This research also fails to find evidence of an association between the proportion of family 
ownership and corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports, regardless of 
whether its status is mandatory or voluntary. The proportion of government ownership and 
corporate size are not significantly related to mandatory disclosures in Malaysia. These 
findings may offer support to the previous analysis that transparency is well-institutionalised 
in Malaysian corporate practice, and as all such corporations, regardless of their ownership 
structure, adhere to the regulations regarding corporate disclosures. For mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures in Indonesia, both GOVP and SIZE are positive and significant 
determinants. 
 
 Research Samples 
Indonesia –   
Mandatory 
Disclosures 
Indonesia – 
Voluntary 
Disclosures 
Malaysia – 
Mandatory 
Disclosures 
Malaysia – 
Voluntary 
Disclosures 
Intercept 4.5676** -11.9580*** 9.8436*** -0.9882 
  (0.0163) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7719) 
FEBP 1.2901* 1.8036** -0.7313 0.3032 
 (0.0572) (0.0359) (0.1089) (0.7772) 
CG 0.4403*** 0.7643*** 0.5162*** 0.5213** 
 (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0169) 
FAMP 1.1461 0.5548 0.3251 0.2018 
 (0.1014) (0.5300) (0.3913) (0.8213) 
GOVP 4.4411*** 6.1276*** 0.7483 3.8939*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1816) (0.0035) 
SIZE 0.6326*** 1.3239*** 0.0883 0.4598*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.1836) (0.0036) 
LEV -1.7280** -1.8832* -0.2651 -1.5007 
 (0.0375) (0.0730) (0.6184) (0.2321) 
PRO 0.6270 2.2848 0.9148 3.7720 
  (0.6772) (0.2316) (0.4925) (0.2304) 
GO -0.0397 0.0556 -0.0110 0.1471 
 (0.5351) (0.4932) (0.8794) (0.3890) 
R2 0.4002 0.5694 0.2039 0.2099 
Model p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
D-W stat 1.7007 1.5513 1.8472 1.8203 
Table 6.15. Determinants of mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures in the 
annual reports 
p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance level (two tailed) at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Dependent variable is mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports. Independent 
variables are as follows. FEBP = proportion of foreign-educated directors; CG = corporate governance practice; FAMP = 
proportion of family ownership; GOVP = proportion of government ownership; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; LEV 
= debt to total assets; PRO = return on assets; GO = Tobin’s Q. 
 
In summary, mandatory corporate governance disclosures in Malaysia are only 
influenced by normative isomorphism of corporate governance practice at the meso level. 
Institutional isomorphism at the micro level and mimetic isomorphism at the meso level do 
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not impact mandatory corporate governance disclosures in Malaysian annual reports. For 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures in Malaysian annual reports, both normative 
and mimetic isomorphisms at the meso level are significant determinants. Normative 
isomorphism at the micro level is only evident in Indonesia, along with normative and 
mimetic isomorphism at the meso level. All these can be reflected in the mandatory and 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports in Indonesia. The following 
section discusses the determinants of corporate governance disclosures on the corporate 
websites. 
6.3.3. Determinants of corporate governance disclosure on the WWW 
While corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports is the main focus for the 
analysis of corporate governance disclosures in this thesis, disclosures on the corporate 
website were also explored to provide a more complete picture of corporate governance 
disclosure in Indonesia and Malaysia. Even though WWW disclosures in Indonesia are also 
regulated, this study finds that disclosures on the WWW are far less common than 
disclosures in the annual reports. In Malaysia, WWW disclosures are largely voluntary.  
Similar to the analysis of the determinants of corporate governance disclosures in annual 
reports, analysis in this section is also divided into two parts. The first part analyses all 52 
corporate governance disclosures, and the results are summarised in Table 6.16. The 
second part divides corporate governance disclosures into mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures, with the results summarised in Table 6.17. 
Table 6.16 shows that all research models are significant at 1%, with p < 0.0001. The R-
squared for Research Model 3 is 0.2056. Research Model 4 analyses Indonesian data and 
Malaysian data separately, with the R-squared for Indonesian data being 0.3225 and for 
Malaysian data being 0.1267. Research Model 3 analyses the impact of institutional 
isomorphism at the micro, meso, and macro levels. As Research Model 4 analyses research 
samples from Indonesia and Malaysia separately, this model does not analyse impact at the 
macro level. Thus, research Model 4 only analyses the impact of institutional isomorphism 
at the micro and meso levels. 
Unlike the results in the annual reports, analysis of disclosures on the corporate websites 
fails to reject Hypothesis 1b for all research models. Therefore, internationalisation of the 
board of directors is not proven to be associated with corporate governance disclosures on 
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the WWW in Indonesia and Malaysia. This research fails to find evidence of normative 
isomorphism at the micro level of corporate governance disclosures on the corporate 
websites. What may contribute to this finding is that disclosures on the WWW are 
supplementary disclosures, because it is not the primary media for corporate governance 
disclosure in Indonesia and Malaysia. Data shows that the average number of corporate 
governance disclosures on the WWW comprises less than half of corporate governance 
disclosures in the annual reports in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
This research also does not find evidence of the impact of normative isomorphism at the 
meso level on corporate governance disclosures on the WWW in Malaysia. Table 6.16 
shows that CG, as a proxy of normative isomorphism at the meso level, is not significant in 
Malaysian data. However, CG is a positive and significant determinant of corporate 
governance disclosures on the WWW in the combined data and in Indonesia. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. Corporate governance practice is significant at 1% for 
both Research Models 3 and 4 for Indonesian data. The coefficient for Model 3 is 1.2751 
and 1.6198 for Model 4. This finding shows  evidence of normative isomorphism at the meso 
level on corporate governance disclosures on the WWW.  
Hypothesis 3b is also partially supported, as the proportion of family ownership is 
negatively and significantly associated with corporate governance disclosures on the WWW 
in Malaysia. While this variable is not significant in corporate governance disclosures in the 
annual reports across all research models, these results find a negative and significant 
association in one. In this case, the coefficient of -6.5278 and a significance level at 1% 
indicate that the higher proportion of family ownership, the lower the corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW is. This study provides evidence of mimetic isomorphism on family 
corporations in Malaysia. Such corporations provide fewer disclosures on the WWW for all 
kinds of disclosures combined and for voluntary disclosures (there being only two mandatory 
disclosures required on the WWW in Malaysia). This shows that Malaysian family 
corporations are reluctant to provide corporate governance information on the WWW, as it 
is largely voluntary. 
Further analysis at the meso level shows support for Hypothesis 4b with GOVP not being 
significant across all three research models. This indicates that government ownership is 
not associated with corporate governance disclosures on the WWW in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Despite findings that show government ownership is positively associated with 
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corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports in both countries, the results from 
the WWW do not find such evidence.  
The only independent variable that is a significant determinant across all three research 
models is corporate size. Hence, Hypothesis 5b is rejected. Table 6.16 shows that SIZE is 
significant for all models. In Research Model 3, it is significant at 1%. For Research Model 
4, it is significant at 1% for Indonesian data and 5% for Malaysian data. These findings are 
also similar to those about corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports, in which 
corporate size is positively associated with the number of disclosures. This shows that 
mimetic isomorphism in large corporations is an important influence on corporate 
governance disclosures on the WWW. Larger corporations provide more disclosures and 
this creates mimetic pressure on other similar sized corporations to provide corporate 
governance disclosures on the WWW. 
The last analysis is related to institutional isomorphism at the macro level. Similar to the 
findings in corporate governance practice and corporate governance disclosures in the 
annual reports, this research rejects Hypothesis 6b. Results indicate that Indonesian 
corporations provide better corporate governance disclosures on the WWW compared to 
Malaysian corporations. The Indonesian government has been successful in creating 
coercive pressure on all Indonesian publicly listed corporations. The coercive pressure on 
WWW disclosures is evident in layering, the introduction of new regulations to complement 
the old ones. In this case, the regulation regarding corporate disclosures on the WWW 
issued in 2015 complements the 2012 regulation of corporate disclosures in the annual 
reports. 
In summary, this study does not find evidence of the impact of institutional isomorphism 
at the micro level on corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. At the meso level, 
normative isomorphism from corporate governance practice is only evident in the whole data 
of both countries combined and in Indonesian data. For mimetic isomorphism, the proportion 
of family ownership is only significant in the Malaysian data and corporate size is significant 
in these three research models. This finding also confirms the evidence of institutional 
isomorphism at the macro level on corporate governance disclosures on the WWW in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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 Research Samples 
All data Indonesia Malaysia 
Intercept -17.6231 -17.5664 1.7877 
  (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.8138) 
FEBP -1.9747 -1.5146 -1.4068 
 (0.1681) (0.4059) (0.5555) 
CG 1.2751*** 1.6198*** -0.0195 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9678) 
FAMP -2.1827 0.4540 -6.5278*** 
 (0.1095) (0.8092) (0.0012) 
GOVP 2.0749 3.8025 1.0555 
 (0.2990) (0.1664) (0.7189) 
SIZE 1.1382*** 1.5772*** 0.7391** 
 (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0345) 
MACRO 9.5773***   
 (0.0000)   
LEV 0.8961 1.2857 0.5490 
 (0.5997) (0.5640) (0.8441) 
PRO 3.5298 1.0527 2.1735 
  (0.2885) (0.7955) (0.7558) 
GO -0.0421 -0.0100 0.1161 
 (0.7808) (0.9537) (0.7599) 
R2 0.2056 0.3225 0.1267 
Model p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 
D-W stat 2.0592 2.2330 2.0598 
Table 6.16. Determinants of corporate governance disclosures on the WWW 
p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance level (two tailed) at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Dependent variable is corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. Independent variables are as follows. FEBP = 
proportion of foreign-educated directors; CG = corporate governance practice; FAMP = proportion of family ownership; 
GOVP = proportion of government ownership; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; MACRO = country variable, 1 if the 
corporation is listed in Indonesia; LEV = debt to total assets; PRO = return on assets; GO = Tobin’s Q. 
 
Table 6.17 presents the results of Research Model 4, using mandatory disclosures and 
voluntary disclosures on the WWW as dependent variables. The research model for 
Indonesian data is significant at 1% with p < 0.0001. The research model for mandatory 
disclosures in Malaysia is significant at 10% and, for voluntary disclosures, it is significant 
at 1%. The R-squared of the Indonesian models are relatively higher than those for the 
Malaysian models, with the R-squared for the mandatory disclosures and voluntary 
disclosures models being 0.2307 and 0.3542 respectively. For the Malaysian mandatory 
disclosures model, the R-squared is 0.0654 and for voluntary disclosures, it is 0.1241. 
Similar to the analysis of all disclosures, this thesis does not find evidence of the impact 
of institutional isomorphism at the micro level on voluntary and mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures on the WWW in Indonesia and Malaysia. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b 
is not rejected. CG, a proxy for normative isomorphism at the meso level, is significant in 
three research models. For Research Model 4 with Indonesian data, corporate governance 
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practice is significant at 1% both in mandatory disclosures and voluntary disclosures. For 
Research Model 4 with Malaysian data, this thesis finds that corporate governance practice 
is significant at 10% in mandatory disclosures. All coefficients are positive, which indicates 
that better corporate governance practice leads to a higher extent of corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. Similar to the practice 
of mandatory disclosures in annual reports in Malaysia, this variable is the only significant 
determinant of mandatory corporate governance disclosures on the WWW in that country.  
 
 Research Samples 
Indonesia –   
Mandatory 
Disclosures 
Indonesia – 
Voluntary 
Disclosures 
Malaysia – 
Mandatory 
Disclosures 
Malaysia – 
Voluntary 
Disclosures 
Intercept -7.5305 -10.0359 0.7853 1.0024 
  (0.0361) (0.0000) (0.3236) (0.8931) 
FEBP -0.6314 -0.8833 0.1075 -1.5143 
 (0.6214) (0.2594) (0.6671) (0.5187) 
CG 1.0379*** 0.5819*** 0.0860* -0.1055 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0896) (0.8239) 
FAMP 0.8355 -0.3815 -0.3172 -6.2106*** 
 (0.5270) (0.6367) (0.1287) (0.0017) 
GOVP 1.9210 1.8816 -0.0936 1.1491 
 (0.3187) (0.1111) (0.7604) (0.6903) 
SIZE 0.7546** 0.8226*** -0.0218 0.7609** 
 (0.0102) (0.0000) (0.5488) (0.0269) 
LEV 2.1674 -0.8816 -0.3865 0.9355 
 (0.1668) (0.3573) (0.1869) (0.7332) 
PRO 1.3098 -0.2571 0.1184 2.0550 
  (0.6459) (0.8828) (0.8714) (0.7649) 
GO -0.0375 0.0275 0.0068 0.1093 
 (0.7568) (0.7106) (0.8636) (0.7699) 
R2 0.2307 0.3542 0.0654 0.1241 
Model p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.1000 p < 0.0100 
D-W stat 2.1912 2.0688 1.8160 2.0505 
Table 6.17. Determinants of mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures on the 
WWW 
p-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance level (two tailed) at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Dependent variable is mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. Independent variables 
are as follows. FEBP = proportion of foreign-educated directors; CG = corporate governance practice; FAMP = proportion 
of family ownership; GOVP = proportion of government ownership; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; LEV = debt to 
total assets; PRO = return on assets; GO = Tobin’s Q. 
 
 
While GOVP is not significant in any of the four research models, which supports 
Hypothesis 4b, Hypothesis 3b is only partially supported as FAMP is significant for voluntary 
disclosures in Malaysia. The -6.2106 coefficient of FAMP, which is significant at 1%, shows 
that the proportion of family ownership is a negative and significant determinant of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. With corporate governance disclosures on 
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the WWW in Malaysia being largely voluntary, Malaysian family corporations tend to provide 
fewer disclosures through this channel. This result is also in line with prior research that 
concludes that family corporations provide fewer disclosures (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; 
Ali et al., 2007).  
The last independent variable is corporate size, which is not a significant determinant for 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. In Indonesian data, corporate 
size is significant at 5% with coefficient 0.7546. For voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures, it is significant at 1%. Corporate size is also significant at 5% in voluntary 
corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. These results show that only institutional 
isomorphism at the meso level influences mandatory and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW. The following section summarises all research findings in 
Sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2, and 6.3.3. 
6.3.4. Summary of empirical results 
Table 6.18 summarises regression results exploring the determinants of corporate 
governance practice in Indonesia and Malaysia. Institutional isomorphisms at three levels, 
micro, meso, and macro, are significant determinants of corporate governance practice in 
the two countries. From three measurements of institutional isomorphisms at the meso level 
in Research Models 1 and 2, only the proportion of government ownership is not significant. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
All data Indonesia Malaysia 
FEBP Significant + Significant + Significant + 
FAMP Significant - Significant - Significant - 
GOVP No relation No relation No relation 
SIZE Significant + Significant + Significant + 
MACRO Significant +   
Table 6.18. Results summary of corporate governance practice determinants  
Table 6.19 presents the summary of determinants of corporate governance disclosures 
in the annual reports in Indonesia and Malaysia. While institutional isomorphism at the 
macro level determines corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports in Indonesia 
and Malaysia, institutional isomorphism at the micro level does not have any impact in 
Malaysia. Institutional isomorphism at the meso level is a significant determinant for 
disclosures in both countries, with some differences across different type of disclosures 
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(mandatory or voluntary). This study does not find evidence of institutional isomorphism in 
family corporations. 
 
 Model 3 Model 4 – Indonesia  Model 4 – Malaysia  
All data All disc Mandatory Voluntary All disc Mandatory Voluntary 
FEBP No relation Significant + Significant + Significant + No relation No relation No relation 
CG Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + 
FAMP No relation No relation No relation No relation No relation No relation No relation 
GOVP Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + No relation Significant + 
SIZE Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + No relation Significant + 
MACRO Significant +       
Table 6.19. Results summary of corporate governance disclosures determinants in the annual 
reports  
Table 6.20 shows that there is no impact of normative isomorphism through the existence 
of a foreign-educated directors on corporate governance WWW disclosures in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. At the meso level, institutional isomorphism influences WWW disclosures in 
Indonesia and Malaysia (either through corporate governance practice, the proportion of 
family ownership, or corporate size). Similar to the above two results, institutional 
isomorphism at the macro level is a significant determinant for corporate governance 
disclosures on the WWW in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
 
 Model 3 Model 4 – Indonesia  Model 4 – Malaysia  
All data All disc Mandatory Voluntary All disc Mandatory Voluntary 
FEBP No relation No relation No relation No relation No relation No relation No relation 
CG Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + No relation Significant + No relation 
FAMP No relation No relation No relation No relation Significant - No relation Significant - 
GOVP No relation No relation No relation No relation No relation No relation No relation 
SIZE Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + Significant + No relation Significant + 
MACRO Significant +       
Table 6.20. Results summary of corporate governance disclosures determinants on the WWW  
The following section discusses the robustness of the results in this research. 
6.4. Robustness tests 
This study examined assumptions in multiple regression analysis to ensure that the 
results of the multiple regression analysis presented in this thesis are reliable. The first 
robustness test is regarding multicollinearity problems. Two methods were employed to 
ensure that multicollinearity is not a problem in the multiple regression analyses. The first 
method uses the Pearson’s bivariate correlation matrix (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2013). According to these researchers, a serious multicollinearity problem exists if 
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the correlation between two independent variables exceeds 0.8. All bivariate correlation 
coefficients between independent variables in Tables 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12 are below 0.8. 
Therefore, this indicates that a multicollinearity problem does not seriously threaten the 
robustness of the results of the multiple regression analysis. The second method to test for 
a multicollinearity problem is by using the Variance Inflation Factor Test. Kline (2005) 
contends that a threat of multicollinearity is indicated by a variance inflation factor value 
more than 10. In this research, this value, for all independent variables, is less than 10. 
Therefore, this method fails to identify that multicollinearity is a serious problem in this 
research. 
The next robustness test is related to autocorrelation problems. This study used the 
Durbin-Watson statistic, as a measure of the autocorrelation of errors, to determine whether 
an autocorrelation problem exists. Following Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999), this research 
used the rule of thumb range for the Durbin-Watson statistic of between 1.5 and 2.5. If the 
Durbin-Watson statistic of a research model falls within this range, an autocorrelation 
problem is not present. All research models in this thesis have a Durbin-Watson statistic of 
between 1.5 and 2.5. Therefore, this indicates that autocorrelation falls within acceptable 
norms. 
A further potential threat is the issue of a heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
test was implemented to ascertain the presence or absence of this heteroscedasticity 
problem. If the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test statistic has a p-value below 0.05, then 
heteroscedasticity is assumed. In order to eliminate the potential for a heteroscedasticity 
problem, Huber-White standard errors were applied (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The results 
of the application of Huber-White standard errors do not significantly differ with the original 
results. 
The last robustness test relates to the endogeneity problem. Ntim, Opong, and Danbolt 
(2012) contend that an endogeneity problem exists within a research model if the dependent 
and independent variables are highly correlated with the error term. The existence of an 
endogeneity problem can alter empirical findings significantly (Core, Guay, & Rusticus, 
2006). To test whether an endogeneity problem exists for corporate governance disclosures 
and corporate governance practice in this research, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test was 
applied. The failure to reject a null hypothesis of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test indicates 
that significant endogeneity problem does not exist and the ordinary least square method 
131  
should suffice (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006; Khandker, Koolwal, & 
Samad, 2010). Results indicate that for all research models, there was a failure to reject a 
null hypothesis using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test. Therefore, endogeneity does not 
present a serious problem for this research. 
6.5. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was performed to confirm the robustness of the research findings. 
This analysis tests the appropriateness of the proxies used to test all the research models 
in this thesis. To do this, the data were run and tested differently. Initially, only PRO was 
removed and multiple regression analysis conducted. Then only GO was taken out and the 
data similarly tested for multiple regression. Thirdly both PRO and GO were eliminated 
before the multiple regression analysis. However, the from those three sensitivity tests are 
largely similar in terms of significance level and sign, R-squared, and the model significance. 
Furthermore, the same procedure was undertaken separately for FAMP and GOVP, and 
FAMP and GOVP together. As with the findings above, the results from multiple regression 
analysis of these three sensitivity tests are also largely similar in terms of the independent 
variables’ significance level and sign, R-squared, and the model significance.  
The only difference in results from the sensitivity analysis is found when FEBP is replaced 
with foreign boards. FEBP is a measure of the proportion of foreign-educated boards, while 
foreign boards are measured by the proportion of foreign boards in a corporation. This 
research finds that foreign boards are not a significant determinant across all research 
models. This indicates that while internationalisation plays an important role in corporate 
governance practice and disclosures by corporations in both countries, this also requires 
‘international’ directors that have a good knowledge of local practice. Therefore, foreign-
educated boards provide an appropriate proxy for institutional isomorphism at the micro 
level as the majority of the foreign-educated boards are local and have a good knowledge 
of local practices. Furthermore, this also confirms that the corporate governance practices 
and systems in each country are different and that the existence of foreign boards does not 
necessarily improve corporate governance practices and disclosures by corporations in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the results and analysis of all research models to find the 
determinants of corporate governance practice and corporate governance disclosures in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. In general, corporate governance practice in Indonesia is poorer 
than in Malaysia. However, the number of corporate governance disclosures in Indonesia is 
generally higher, mainly contributed to by more mandatory disclosure requirements in 
Indonesia compared with Malaysia. Internationalisation of the board of directors, measured 
by the proportion of foreign-educated directors, is greater in Malaysia.  
The empirical results show that institutional isomorphism at three different levels is a 
significant determinant of corporate governance practice and corporate governance 
disclosures, with the exception of corporate governance disclosures on the WWW. This 
study also finds evidence that institutional changes at the macro level in Indonesia have 
been successful in improving corporate governance practice and corporate governance 
disclosures in the country. The results from ordinary least square multivariate regression 
analysis are robust for multicollinearity, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and endogeneity 
problems. Furthermore, several sensitivity tests support the appropriateness of the proxies 
used to test the models of these results. The next chapter concludes this thesis. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter summarises and concludes this thesis. The research for this thesis has two 
objectives. The first is to document the corporate governance practice and corporate 
governance disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia. The second is to examine whether 
coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism at the micro, 
meso, and macro levels are associated with corporate governance practice and disclosures 
by corporations in these two countries. To address these research objectives, six main 
hypotheses were developed based on institutional isomorphism at the three levels. To test 
these hypotheses, this study employed ordinary least square multivariate regression 
analysis on the data from the 200 largest Indonesian corporations and the 200 largest 
Malaysian corporations. A summary of the main findings and conclusions regarding the 
determinants of corporate governance practice, corporate governance disclosures in annual 
reports, and corporate governance disclosures on the WWW are presented in the next 
section. Section 7.3 then discusses the contributions of this thesis, followed by Section 7.4 
which outlines its limitations. The last section, Section 7.5, suggests some directions for 
future research. 
7.2. Summary and conclusion 
7.2.1. Corporate governance practice in Indonesia and Malaysia 
The first part of this thesis analyses corporate governance practice in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. In general, corporate governance practice in Indonesia is poorer than in Malaysia. 
From the maximum score of 9, the average score of corporate governance practices in 
Indonesia and Malaysia are 6.47 and 8.00 respectively. This study used the corporate 
governance score developed by Sawicki (2009) who has conducted her research in 
Southeast Asia. In her corporate governance scoring, she incorporates nine criteria which 
include the board of directors and committees for audit, remuneration, and nomination. The 
volatility of corporate governance practice score in Indonesia is also higher than in Malaysia, 
with 1.65 in Indonesia and 1.06 in Malaysia. This higher volatility indicates that corporate 
governance practices in Indonesia are spreads over a broader range than in Malaysia. 
134  
Furthermore, this research also finds that of the corporations that have the lowest score of 
corporate governance practices in these two countries, all are family corporations. 
Both Indonesian and Malaysian corporations follow the required corporate governance 
practice well, with three mandatory requirements in Indonesia and four mandatory 
requirements in Malaysia. The findings show only a few corporations that do not follow these 
mandated requirements. The differences between the corporate governance practice scores 
of the two countries are driven by how corporations follow recommended practice. The two 
recommended practices least followed by Indonesian corporations are the existence of a 
remuneration and a nomination committee. This contrasts with the Malaysian corporations, 
where most follow all recommended practices. In Malaysia less than 10% of the corporations 
do not follow the recommendation to have chairman and CEO separation, and existence of 
a remuneration committee. These differences might be explained by the different corporate 
governance reform history in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
As corporate governance reform in Malaysia was driven by the government’s agenda, it 
is possible that Malaysian corporations have more pressure on them to acknowledge the 
importance of good corporate governance practice. In contrast, corporate governance 
reform in Indonesia was driven by externally imposed IMF requirements and therefore 
Indonesian have been less willing to acknowledge the importance of good corporate 
governance practice at the time of observations.  
In regard to the impact of institutional isomorphism at three levels, the research for this 
thesis finds institutional isomorphism at all three levels influences corporate governance 
practice in Indonesia and Malaysia. Normative isomorphism at the micro level, through 
normative pressures from foreign-educated boards, is positively and significantly associated 
with corporate governance practice in Indonesia and Malaysia. Mimetic isomorphism at the 
meso level, through mimetic pressures from family-owned corporations and large 
corporations, is significantly associated with corporate governance practice in these two 
countries. Furthermore, normative isomorphism and coercive isomorphism at the macro 
level is also positively and significantly associated with corporate governance practice in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. The following section summarises and concludes the determinants 
of corporate governance disclosures in annual reports in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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7.2.2. Corporate governance disclosure in annual reports in Indonesia and Malaysia 
The second part of this thesis explores the determinants of corporate governance 
disclosure in annual reports in Indonesia and Malaysia. This research finds that annual 
report is the primary media used by corporations to provide corporate governance 
information. In general, the level of corporate governance disclosure in Indonesian annual 
reports similar to the level of disclosure in Malaysia. The average score of this disclosure in 
Indonesia is 29.09 and in Malaysia 28.87. While corporate governance practice in Malaysia 
is better than that of Indonesia, this thesis finds that Malaysian corporations are less focused 
on corporate governance disclosures. This might be explained by two factors. First, 
Indonesia’s marginally higher result may be contributed to by the higher requirements for 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures in annual reports in Indonesia. In Indonesia, 
there are 21 required types of information to be disclosed in the annual reports. In Malaysia, 
the required disclosures are only 17. This is reflected in the average score of mandatory 
corporate governance disclosures in Indonesia being also slightly higher than in Malaysia, 
with 16.85 in Indonesia and 15.39 in Malaysia. However, the level of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures in Malaysia is higher than in Indonesia. This may also be 
contributed by more extensive voluntary disclosures in Malaysia, due to less extensive 
mandatory disclosure requirements. This research finds an average score of 13.48 for 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures in Malaysian annual reports, as opposed to a 
score of 12.24 in Indonesia. Second, this thesis support Ghazali and Weetman (2006) who 
contend that Malaysian family corporations outweighed government’s agenda to increase 
transparency. As Malaysian corporations in this thesis is dominated by family corporations 
(135 corporations), this may provide an explanation on why the level of corporate 
governance disclosure in Malaysian annual reports similar to that of Indonesia, despite 
having better corporate governance practice. 
Despite the mandatory requirements, not all corporations provide mandatory disclosures 
in the annual reports. In Indonesia, there are only two kinds of information disclosed by all 
Indonesian corporations in the research sample. These are financial and operating results 
and the composition of the board. In Malaysia, four kinds of information disclosed by all 
Malaysian corporations: ownership structure, financial and operating results, board’s 
responsibilities regarding financial communications, and governance structures. The 
mandatory information regarded as the least important in Indonesia and Malaysia is the 
performance evaluation process disclosure in Indonesia, and auditors’ involvement in non-
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audit work and the fees paid to the auditors in Malaysia. The findings show that corporations 
in both countries do not fully comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements, with only 
29 Indonesian corporations and 26 Malaysian corporations fully complied with these 
requirements. While 141 Malaysian corporations fail to provide one or two mandatory 
information in the annual reports, it varies in Indonesia with 124 Indonesian corporation do 
not provide more than two mandatory information. Therefore, the regulators in both countries 
need to exercise regulatory enforcement to ensure that all corporations provide all required 
disclosures in the annual reports. 
In regard to voluntary disclosures, 197 Indonesian corporations provide voluntary 
disclosures of board independence in their annual reports. In Malaysia, two voluntary 
disclosures disclosed by all Malaysian corporation. These are check and balance 
mechanisms, and the composition of the board. 
Furthermore, the analysis of institutional isomorphism at three levels shows different 
results for the two countries. While the impact of foreign-educated boards is positive and 
significant in Indonesia, it is not significant in Malaysia. There is less variation in Malaysia 
where majority of the boards are foreign dominated. There are 168 Malaysian corporations 
that have more than 50% of foreign-educated directors in their companies. In Indonesia, 
there are 109 corporations that have more than 50% foreign-educated directors. 
Furthermore, there are 16 Indonesian corporations that do not have foreign-educated 
directors at all. In Malaysia, there is no corporations that do not have foreign-educated 
director sits in its board. This may show that foreign-educated boards are influential in 
improving corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports in Indonesia. Similarly to 
the results of corporate governance practice, this research also finds that institutional 
change in Indonesia drives the improvement of corporate governance disclosures there. At 
the meso level, normative isomorphism through corporate governance practice is positively 
and significantly associated with all research models. Mimetic pressures from government-
owned corporations and large corporations also influence corporate governance disclosures 
in the annual reports, with the exception of mandatory disclosures in Malaysia. The following 
section provides a summary and conclusion of corporate governance disclosures on the 
WWW in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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7.2.3. Corporate governance disclosure on the WWW in Indonesia and Malaysia 
This research finds that the WWW is the secondary media used to provide corporate 
governance disclosures, and therefore is supplementary to the annual report disclosures. 
The frequency and number of different types of corporate governance disclosure on the 
WWW in Indonesia and Malaysia are far lower than in the annual reports. The average score 
of corporate governance disclosure on the WWW is less than half the average score of the 
disclosure in the annual reports in both countries. The rounded average score of corporate 
governance disclosure on the WWW in both countries is 14.33, with the Indonesian average 
score only a little higher at the level of one thousandth of a decimal number. This score 
shows that while in Malaysia the disclosures on the WWW are largely voluntary, the WWW 
disclosure of two countries in general is almost the same in terms of frequency and number 
of types of disclosures. The findings also show the need for regulators in Indonesia and 
Malaysia to continue encouraging corporations to use the WWW for corporate governance 
disclosure. 
This research further analyses whether corporations use the WWW to supplement the 
annual reports. Results indicate that 95 Indonesian corporations use WWW disclosure to 
provide information regarding the process for holding annual general meetings, which has 
not been disclosed in their annual reports. In Malaysia, 41 corporations use the WWW to 
disclose the types and duties of outside board and management positions, information that 
has not been provided in their annual reports. 
Unlike the results of corporate governance practice and corporate governance 
disclosures in annual reports, this research does not find the influence of micro level 
institutional pressures in either country. However, the macro level institutional pressures still 
show a positive and significant association with corporate governance disclosures on the 
WWW. There are some variations regarding the results of institutional isomorphism at the 
meso level. Normative pressures from corporate governance practice is a positive and 
significant determinant for all data combined and for Indonesian data. For Malaysian data, 
it is only positively and significantly associated with the mandatory disclosures. The mimetic 
pressures from family corporations are only found in all disclosures in Malaysia and also in 
Malaysian voluntary disclosures, with the proportion of family corporations bringing a 
negative impact to corporate governance disclosures on the WWW in Malaysia. 
Furthermore, mimetic isomorphism through corporate size is found almost in all research 
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models, with the exception of mandatory disclosures in Malaysia. The following section 
discusses the contributions of this thesis. 
7.3. Contributions 
This thesis provides a complete picture of corporate governance practice and corporate 
governance disclosures in Indonesia and Malaysia. While previously the majority of 
corporate governance disclosure studies in emerging countries has only considered 
disclosures in annual reports, this thesis’s research also considers disclosures on the 
WWW. This study shows that regulators need to encourage Indonesian and Malaysian 
corporations to use WWW disclosures more, as it is the current best practice for corporate 
governance disclosures in developed countries. 
Furthermore, this research contributes to providing evidence of the impact of institutional 
isomorphisms at three levels on corporate governance practice and disclosures by 
corporations in the two countries. First, at the micro level, the importance of 
internationalisation is shown in improving corporate governance practice and disclosures. 
An international board, being defined as a foreign-educated directors, may bring foreign 
culture and influence to exercise normative pressures for corporate governance practice 
and disclosure improvement. This study also finds evidence of institutional isomorphism at 
the meso level influencing corporate governance practice and disclosures in the two 
countries. Lastly, this research also documents how institutional changes in a country may 
support the improvement of corporate governance practice and disclosures. This research 
shows how Malaysian government’s agenda to reform corporate governance practice 
following financial crisis was successful, as opposed to externally imposed IMF 
requirements in Indonesia. However, current Indonesian government’s concerns over 
corporate governance and disclosures have been successful in improving such practices. 
While a 2014 ADB report (ADB, 2014) shows poor corporate governance disclosures in 
Indonesia, this thesis documents a significant improvement in Indonesia and finds the similar 
level of corporate governance disclosures between Indonesian and Malaysian corporations. 
These research findings suggest that both corporations and regulators have to consider all 
these three levels to improve corporate governance practice and disclosures. 
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7.4. Limitations  
Although this study attempts to makes conclusions regarding the population of 
corporation in Indonesia and Malaysia, its sample is limited to the largest 200 corporations 
each in Indonesia and Malaysia. While the market capitalisation of these 200 corporations 
represents more than half of each country’s national market capitalisation, these samples 
may not cover the practices and disclosures of smaller corporations. It might be expected 
the smaller corporations will have greater variation in the quality of their corporate 
governance practice and disclosures. 
Furthermore, data from the 2015 annual reports and WWW disclosures was collected in 
February to March 2016, and September to October 2016. In Indonesia, the Indonesian 
Financial Services Authority released two new regulations on WWW disclosures and 
corporate governance in 2015. Therefore, there is a possibility that not all Indonesian 
corporations have fully complied with these two new regulations and this research captures 
the early adopters. 
Finally, only one proxy for institutional isomorphism at the micro level has been 
considered. The limited availability of micro level data, especially in Indonesia (i.e. ethnicity 
of the board, religion of the board), hinders the potential for additional proxies to test the 
impact of institutional isomorphism at the micro level. 
7.5. Future research 
Future research may envisage a longitudinal analysis to analyse whether there is a 
continuous improvement of corporate governance practice and disclosures over time in 
similar settings, and also across other samples. Especially with Indonesia, where research 
sample in this thesis may be thought of as the early adopters, a research sample from the 
year or years beyond 2015 may provide further evidence of institutional isomorphism.  
Furthermore, future research may also investigate testing whether these institutional 
isomorphisms are ‘sticky’ over time. There is a possibility that current corporate governance 
practice and disclosures are not only influenced by current measures of institutional 
isomorphism but also by institutional isomorphism from prior years. Lastly, as this thesis 
finds a hint that the lowest scoring corporations for corporate governance practice and 
disclosures are mostly family corporations, future research may also consider focusing on 
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the study of family corporations. As there are a great number of family corporations in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, this may provide evidence about whether there are different 
impacts of institutional isomorphism in these family corporations. 
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Appendix  
Exemplar company disclosure from Indonesia and Malaysia 
1. Disclosure of qualifications and biographical information on board members 
 
Tonny Kusnadi (aged 67) has been a Commissioner of BCA since June 25, 
2003. Prior to joining BCA, he was a Director at PT Cipta Karya Bumi Indah, 
a property development and construction company, from 2001 to 2002, after 
previously serving as a Commissioner. His earlier management positions 
included President Director of PT Sarana Kencana Mulya, an electronic 
distributor, from 1999 to 2001 and Chief Manager of Corporate Banking for 
PT Bank Central Asia from 1992 to 1998. He was also a General Manager 
at PT Tamara Indah, an engineering and general supplier company, from 
1988 until 1992 and General Manager at PT Indomobil, a leading 
Indonesian automotive company, in 1987. He graduated in Mechanical 
Engineering from the University of Brawijaya, Malang. 
 Bank Central Asia (Indonesia), page 508 
 
Dato’ Frits van Dijk has been a director of the Company since 26 April 2006 
as a Non-Independent, Non-Executive Director. He was later re-designated 
as an Independent, Non-Executive Director on 19 November 2013. He is a 
member of the Nomination Committee and the Compensation Committee. 
He has served the Nestlé group of companies for 41 years, beginning from 
1970 as a Sales Representative with Nestlé UK. He has held various senior 
positions within the Nestlé group of companies in various countries, such 
as India, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, China and Japan. Dato’ was the Chief 
Operating Officer and subsequently the Market Head of the Company from 
1987 until 1995. He has also served as the Market Head of Nestlé Japan, 
the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Nestlé Waters, and the 
Executive Vice President and Head of Zone Asia, Oceania, Africa and 
Middle East of Nestlé S.A., Switzerland, before retiring at the end of 
September 2011. 
Dato’ graduated with a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics from the School of 
Economics, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, and has attended the Executive 
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Development Programme at the International Institute for Management 
Development, Lausanne, Switzerland. 
In the financial year ended 31 December 2015, Dato’ Frits van Dijk has 
attended four (4) out of the five (5) meetings of the Board of Directors. 
 Nestlé (Malaysia) Berhad, page 38 
 
2. Disclosure of professional development and training activities 
 
 
 Bank Danamon Indonesia, https://www.danamon.co.id/-
/media/FILE-PDF-TENTANG-DNMN/PEDOMAN-KERJA-BOD-
BOC/ENG/Program-Pelatihan-Dewan-Komisaris_English.pdf 
 
For this Financial Year, the Board also attended conference/training 
programmes in areas such as economics, regulatory developments, risk 
management, finance, tax and investment as well as industry-related 
programmes, facilitated by local and international training providers.  
The list of conferences/training programmes attended by the Directors 
during the Financial Year under review is as follows: … 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad (Malaysia), page 112 
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3. Disclosure of policy on “whistle blower” protection for all employees 
 
Whistleblowing System (SPP) 
As a manifested implementation of integrated GCG practices, the 
whistleblowing system represents the information system which has been 
developed by the Company for the purpose of facilitating stakeholders in 
submitting their reports or indications of alleged violations against the 
Company’s regulations. The reporting process is confidential, anonymous 
and independent. 
Based on Decision Letter of BOD No. 173/SK-BOD/Leg-AOP/XII/2013 
regarding the Whistleblowing System of PT Astra Otoparts Tbk, the 
Company prepares a guideline for whistleblowing system as a main policy. 
Further, through Decision Letter of BOD No. 174/SK-BOD/Leg-
AOP/XII/2013 of Establishment and Appointment of Special Team for 
Whistleblowing System, the Company establishes and appoints the 
Whistleblowing Special Team which is directly reporting to BOD. 
… 
 PT Astra Otoparts Tbk (Indonesia), page 159 
 
 
Whistleblowing Program 
In order to improve the overall organisational effectiveness and to uphold 
the integrity of the Company in the eyes of the public, the Company has 
updated the whistleblowing program during the year which acts as a formal 
communication channel where all stakeholders can communicate their 
concerns in cases where the Company’s business conduct is deemed to be 
contrary to the Company’s common values. 
All concerns should be addressed to the Group Head - Internal Audit who 
will then assess all concerns reported and recommend the appropriate 
action, and subsequently: 
• Compile all reports received and submit to the Chairman of the AC; and 
• Report to Management on behalf of the AC the results of the 
investigation for further action. 
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All details pertaining to the name and position of the whistleblower will be 
kept strictly confidential throughout the investigation proceedings. 
 AirAsia Berhad (Malaysia), page 148 
 
4. Disclosure of outside board and management position directorships held by the directors 
 
Jennifer Maki was appointed as Commissioner at the General Meeting of 
Shareholders on November 3, 2007 and appointed Chairman at the 
Extraordinary General Meeting on September 25, 2014. 
Ms. Maki has been the Executive Director of Base Metals for Vale S.A. since 
November 2014. Prior to taking her current position, Ms. Maki served as 
Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer of Base Metals, during 
which time she was responsible for the overall financial affairs of Vale 
Canada Limited. 
… 
 PT Vale Indonesia Tbk, page 74 
 
Izzaddin is currently the Group Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer 
of UEM Group Berhad, a position he held since July 2009. Izzaddin has 
over 20 years of experience in the fields of investment banking, financial 
and general management having served in various senior positions at 
Malaysian International Merchant Bankers Berhad, Malaysian Resources 
Corporation Berhad and Southern Bank Berhad. Before his current position, 
he was the Chief Financial Officer/Senior Vice President (Group Finance) 
of Tenaga Nasional Berhad, a position he held from September 2004 to 
June 2009. 
Axiata (Malaysia), https://www.axiata.com/corporate/board-of-
directors/44 
 
5. Disclosure of a code of ethics for all company employees 
 
As the holding company of a group of companies under lndomobil Group, 
the Company’s employees should always behave and act in line with the 
norms of the company which is the basis of act and conduct between 
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colleagues, directors and generally with stakeholders. For this purpose the 
Company has a Code of Ethics functioning as a guide of conduct to 
materialize the Company’s norms according to the principles of good 
corporate governance in the employees’ behavior. 
Attitudes and actions of lndomobil Group’s employees basically should 
reflect the following manners: 
1. To serve 
2. To respect 
3. Caring attitude 
In addition, employees of the Company must obey the prevailing rules and 
regulations. 
In integrating the good value into the employees behaviours, the Company 
has created another guidance besides its code of conduct, which comes in 
the form of a daily morning briefing namely INDOMOBIL DAILY VALUE 
COMPASS. This guidance serves as a counselor for the mind, motivation, 
attitude and behavior of the employees. 
 PT Indomobil Sukses Internasional Tbk (Indonesia), page 70 
 
The Board has adopted and implemented a Code of Conduct (“Code”) 
which reflects Digi’s vision and core values of integrity, respect, trust and 
openness. It provides a clear direction on conducting business, interacting 
with the community, government and business partners, and general 
workplace behaviour. It also includes guidance on disclosure of conflict of 
interests, maintaining confidentiality and disclosure of information, good 
practices, internal controls and the duty to report where there is a breach of 
the Code. 
All employees including Board members are required to read and 
acknowledge the Code. Digi’s Ethics and Compliance Officer reports 
regularly to the ARC on the compliance of the Code by Digi and its 
employees. … 
A copy of the Code is accessible on Digi’s website at: 
www.digi.com.my/aboutus/corporate_overview/governance.do 
 Digi.Com Berhad (Malaysia), page 60 
 
